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Abstract
This dissertation investigates the use of a Kalman filter (KF) to predict, within the
shutdown system (SDS) of a nuclear power plant (NPP), whether a safety parameter
measurement will reach a corresponding trip set-point (TSP). The proposed predictive
SDS (PSDS) designs aim to initiate shutdown actions at a time which is earlier than con-
ventional shutdown initiation. These early detections are, in turn, expected to improve
safety and productivity margins within the NPP.
The KF-based point-PSDS design utilizes a linear time-varying (LTV) system model
to predict mean safety parameter measurements for comparison against the TSP. The KF
considers noise covariances that either have assumed predetermined values, or are esti-
mated online using an adaptive limited memory filter (ALMF). The PSDS is enhanced to
consider, by recursive least squares (RLS) estimation, conditions that are uncertain with
respect to the assumed system model and noise properties. The result is a KF/RLS-based
PSDS that compensates for prediction error by RLS-based estimation of deterministic
disturbances to the system state and measurement. The PSDS is further enhanced to
calculate confidence intervals for the predictions as a function of the propagated error co-
variance. This enhancement results in interval-PSDS designs that consider confidence in
an impending condition by comparing predetermined confidence interval bounds against
the TSP. Finally, an optimal-PSDS design is formulated to adapt the effective prediction,
e.g. horizon or bias, by limiting and minimizing the probability of missed and false trip
ii
occurrences respectively using hypothesis testing methods and optimal alarm theory. In
this manner, the optimal-PSDS is made aware of the quality of past predictions.
The PSDS designs are compared, through simulation and experiment, against a con-
ventional SDS in terms of response time or time-to-trip for the steam generator level low
(SGLL) safety parameter under various conditions of uncertainty, e.g. parameter error or
unmeasurable signals. MATLAB-based simulations demonstrate that the PSDS designs
are able to reduce time-to-trip. The PSDS designs are then implemented within a Tricon
v9 safety-PLC with a scan time that adheres to current nuclear industry regulations. The
experimental results reveal that a reduced time-to-trip can be achieved for a real-world
system with unknown system-model mismatch.
Keywords: prediction, Kalman filtering, uncertainty, optimal alarm, safety instru-
mented systems
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In general, an unsafe system has the potential for an uncontrolled release of large amounts
of energy. In contrast, a safely operating nuclear power plant (NPP) releases energy in a
controlled manner. Within an NPP, nuclear energy is first converted into thermal energy
within the reactor core by means of fissile material undergoing fission reactions. All NPP
designs utilize nuclear energy to produce electrical power. Within pressurizedwater reactor
andpressurizedheavywater reactorNPPdesigns, the thermal energy is transferred between
the coolants of one or more subsequent heat transport loops to a subsystem known as the
steam generator or boiler. As thermal energy accumulates in the secondary-side coolant
of the steam generator, the coolant boils and the resulting steam is piped out of the top
of the steam generator. For electrical power generation, and within all NPPs, the net
positive kinetic energy of some flowing material is then made to rotate a set of turbines
that are affixed to the rotor of an electrical generator. This rotation results in the kinetic
energy being converted into electrical energy. Finally, electrical power is output from the
generator to a switch-yard where a small portion of the total power is returned to the
station as auxiliary power and the remainder is made available to the grid for transmission,
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distribution, and consumption.
The thermodynamic efficiency of the a nuclear power generating system increases in pro-
portion to the nominal operating thermal power of the reactor core. This nominal amount
of thermal power, in turn, determines the amount of electrical power that is output by the
electrical generator. Thus, in order to improve thermodynamic efficiency, the electrical
power output of a single NPP unit is usually rather large, ranging from hundreds to thou-
sands of megawatts electric (MWe). Large amounts of energy therefore flow between, and
are stored throughout, the subsystems of an NPP. These large amounts of energy increase
the potential for accidents involving uncontrolled releases of energy to occur. In addition,
NPPs utilize a radioactive primary fuel source that, if affected, may significantly increase
the severity of such accidents. NPP designs therefore undergo continual enhancement to
include measures that aid in preventing and mitigating the consequences of severe acci-
dents, i.e. accidents that involve significant core degradation. These enhanced measures
aim to protect workers, the public, and the environment from the harmful effects of the
ionizing radiation that is produced as a result of fission reactions and is to be contained
during a severe accident [1]. The development of these enhanced measures is essential in
reducing the likelihood of future severe accidents like those that have occurred at Three
Mile Island NPP Unit 2 in 1979, Chernobyl NPP Unit 4 in 1986, and Fukushima Daiichi
NPP Units 1, 2, 3, and 4 in 2011.
In line with the concepts of prevention, mitigation, and protection, this dissertation
aims to enhance the decision-making mechanism or logic solver within a shutdown type
of NPP automatic protection system by including the capability of predicting an impend-
ing abnormal condition. This enhancement presents a paradigm shift from the like-for-like
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functional replacements that have historically been performed when replacing existing pro-
tection systemswithmodern computer-based technologies. The predictive shutdownmeth-
ods of this dissertation take advantage of increases in computational power and advanced
functional capabilities that are common to modern industrial computerized technologies.
These methods are, at the same time, constrained by the capabilities of these technologies
when compared against cutting edge computer processors and supercomputers.
In achieving the above aim, it is expected that abnormal conditions will be predicted
at a time which is earlier than conventional shutdown detection. This early detection
is essentially a reduction in the amount of time between a trip inducing fault, failure,
or initiating event and the activation of sufficient protective actions within the reactor
core. It is expected that this reduction in time will, in turn, result in increased margins
of safety between peak surges in energy, inventory, pressure, temperature, and flow, and
the physical limits of the subsystems and components within the NPP. Moreover, these
increased margins of safety are also expected to reduce the likelihood of the NPP dynamics
reachingunsafe, or accident conditions. Thepredictive decision-makingmethods developed
herein are also not limited to shutdown applications or the NPP systems. These methods
may therefore be applied within the logic solvers of a safety instrumented system (SIS)
for a variety of generic applications in order to make early decisions regarding impending
safety-related conditions.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.1 introduces industry
specific terminology, establishes context regarding the enhancement of NPP automatic
protection systems, and provides a brief introduction to the prediction methods. Section
1.1 also presents the rationale for enhancing automatic protection systems in order to
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reduce protection system response time and to achieve earlier activations of the related
safety function. Section 1.2 elaborates on the two high-level problems that are investigated
within this dissertation, conceptualizes a predictive shutdown sequence, and segments the
two problems into a list of objectives. Section 1.2 also states the scope of this research,
including high level limitations and assumptions. Section 1.3 describes themain theoretical
and practical contributions, and deliverables that are the result of this study. Finally, the
organization of this dissertation is outlined in Section 1.4.
1.1 Background and Motivation
According to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US-NRC), shutdown is
a decrease in the rate of fission and heat or thermal energy production within a reactor [2].
Shutdown may also be referred to as: trip, i.e. the activation of a mechanism, or safety
control rod axe man (SCRAM)1, as used during the first controlled release of energy by
nuclear fission at Chicago Pile number 1 (CP-1) [5,6]. The components within an NPP that
are responsible for shutdown are commonly referred to as a shutdown system (SDS) while
reactor protection system (RPS), reactor trip system (RTS), and emergency protection
system (EPS) may also be used [7, 8].
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) categorizes SDSs within a sub-
category of safety systems known as protection systems. According to the IAEA, a protec-
tion system “encompasses all electrical and mechanical devices and circuitry, from and
including the sensors up to the input terminals of the safety actuation systems and the
1the exact terms used within the scram acronym are often contested [3, 4]
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safety system support features, involved in generating the signals associated with the pro-
tective tasks” [9]. Further, the IAEA states that the purpose of a protection system within
an NPP is to “monitor the operation of a reactor and which, on sensing an abnormal
condition, automatically initiate actions to prevent unsafe conditions” [10]. An SDS is
therefore a collection of electrical and mechanical devices and circuitry that monitor the
operation of a reactor as well as supporting subsystems and, upon sensing an abnormal
condition, automatically initiates actions to decrease the rate of fission and heat or thermal
energy production within the reactor core. Each subsystem is referred to individually as a
system being protected when it is necessary to discern the system that is being protected
from an otherwise unprotected system.
The subsystems of an NPP operate within one of many different operating modes or
conditions; normal, abnormal, unsafe, and emergency or accident. These conditions are
illustrated in Figure 1.1 along with the thresholds that are the boundaries or limits between
the conditions. This conceptual illustration includes conditions that are two-dimensional,
y1 and y2, although the conditions may also be single dimensional or have greater than two
dimensions.
The operation of the various systemsmay follow any of the numbered paths or transients
as provided in Figure 1.1. For example, the system may deviate from (1) an anticipated
operational occurrence (AOO) as the result of a postulated initiating event (PIE) and
approach abnormal (2) and then unsafe (5) conditions. PIEs are those events are are antic-
ipated to cause a safety parameter to operate outside of the normal operating conditions.
Alternatively, a trip occurrence activates a safety function in order to prevent the system
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Figure 1.1: Operating conditions/modes, set-points/thresholds/limits, and conceptual
events and system transients, trajectories, or paths of operation.
ating condition, and possibly the original operating point by means of start-up procedures
(4). It is therefore assumed, that a system operating beyond normal conditions will not
recover from the abnormal conditions without some form of safety action being performed.
The systemmay also exhibit unanticipated behaviours while operating under any on the
conditions as is indicated by the uncertain region of Figure 1.1.In Figure 1.1, the numbered
paths do not correspondwith the uncertain condition. It is convenient to consider, however,
that a PIE causes the system behaviour to become uncertain as illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Moreover, paths (5) and (6) may correspond with either a design basis accident (DBA) or
a beyond design basis accident (BDBA) within the nuclear industry. These are postulated
accidents which have respectively been considered and are beyond consideration during
the design of the NPP according to established design criteria [10].
The first shutdown type of nuclear-related automatic protection system was that of
CP-1. This first protection system was responsible for releasing neutron absorbing rods
when signals from ion chambers, a type of sensor to measure nuclear fission reactions,
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exceeded a predetermined trip set-point (TSP) which may also be referred to as a limiting
safety system setting (LSSS) [11]. Upon release, the shut-off rods were pulled into the
reactor pile by a 100lbs weight. The instrumentation for this and other early SDSs was
composed of simple amplifier circuits made up of triodes, diodes, and resistors, as well
as magnetic amplifiers and electro-mechanical relays. In addition, the TSPs for these
SDSs were calibrated to release safety actuators at predetermined values corresponding to
physical properties of the actuating devices, e.g. current to an electromagnet or position of
a solenoid catchmechanism [12]. More generally, the TSPs are the thresholds against which
safety parameters are compared within a protection system in order to detect abnormal
conditions. The TSP is therefore the boundary between normal and abnormal conditions
of Figure 1.1.
Since the days of CP-1, SDS instrumentation has undergone various functional and
technological enhancements. Although the main functionality of SDSs remains as it was in
CP-1, SDSs now include coincidence voting, hysteresis, and seal-in logic, as well as TSPs
thatmay vary as a function ofmajor systemparameters. These enhancements have resulted
in the rewriting of standards, regulations, and best practices, e.g. the extensive review of
software by formalmethods [13]. Further, many safety concepts, including defence in depth,
diversity, redundancy, and other best-practices are now formally defined in a vast number of
safety reports and guides [14,15]. Technologically, SDSs have evolved from a basic electri-
cal, electro-mechanical, direct wired, analog signal form through an electronic, solid-state
form, to in some cases, an electronically programmable, fully computerized, digital form
within a safety-rated distributed control system (DCS) or programmable logic controller
(PLC). Moreover, within the last decade there has been growing interest in replacing the
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software and central processing unit (CPU) of these fully computerized SDSs with an elec-
tronically programmable hardware implementation known as a field programmable gate
array (FPGA) [16, 17, 18].
Given proper safety and hazard analysis and selection of protective actions, enhance-
ments to protection systems are primarily concerned with: true and spurious trip; safety
variables, sensors, and TSPs; response time; environmental and power conditions; and sys-
tem reliability [19]. In fact, these design bases are the safety principles for automatic protec-
tion system development and, in some cases, are ameans of measuring system performance,
i.e. response time, reliability, independence, availability, simplicity, and conformance to
environmental, power, and various other conditions [14, 20].
In general, protection system enhancements aim to improve either safety or productivity
and to maintain a balance between the two. For example, TSPs can be improved by
considering beyond design basis events [21]. In fact, it is common for nuclear utilities to
develop enhancements that reduce margins of uncertainty while maintaining or improving
margins of safety in order to utilize excess electrical generating capacity that was previously
unavailable [22]. For example, an increase in safety sensor accuracy may allow for an
increase in a TSP and subsequent increases in the nominal operating power of the reactor
as well as the electrical power generated by the NPP. The end result is a balanced increase
in safety and productivity, or alternatively, an increase in production while maintaining
safety margins. These two competing results are compared in Figure 1.2 for conventional
and conceptual predictive trip occurrences. The predictive trip of Figure 1.2 results in
an effective TSP that is a time-varying value or threshold equal to the safety parameter






























Figure 1.2: Improvement of a) conventional trip in terms of b) safety and c) productivity
margins as a conceptual result of predictive trip.
quality of the predictions as well as the length of the forecast window or prediction horizon.
The nuclear power generating industry is very conservative with respect to the concep-
tual modified operations of Figure 1.2 where rigorous analyses of any and all modifications
to protection systems are required to ensure identification and mitigation of any possible
negative impacts on safety [22]. For example, delaying the response time of the SDS may
result in a reduction in the number of spurious protective actions, otherwise known as
spurious or false trips. Reductions in spurious trips, in turn, increase the availability of the
NPP unit to generate electrical power. In this inadvisable example, the NPP has improved
production, or capacity factor, at the cost of reducing margins of safety since the delayed
SDS activation results the peak response of the safety parameter transients being closer to
the established safety limits; see (3) in Figure 1.1.
As previously stated, this dissertation aims to improve safety by detecting abnormal
conditions at a time that is earlier than is possible when using conventional SDSs. More

























Figure 1.3: Sample trip sequence and time-to-trip measure for SDS1 of the CANDU NPP.
Unless stated otherwise, time-to-trip is the total amount of time of these time components.
a trip inducing fault or failure and the insertion of sufficient negative reactivity into the
reactor core without causing a reduction in the margins of safety. This amount of time is
also referred to as time-to-trip, and includes the response time of the trip computer or logic
solver within the SDS. A sample trip sequence and time-to-trip measure are provided in
Figure 1.3 for the Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) shutdown system number one
(SDS1) design. The proposed SDSmodifications, andmore specifically the early detections,
are expected to provide the advantage of reducing the maximum values of the peak surges
in the parameters of the safety related subsystems as illustrated in Figure 1.2.
In terms of time-to-trip, conventional SDSs have the fundamental limit of, at best, initi-
ating the insertion of negative reactivity into the reactor core at the instant a safety parame-
ter reaches a TSP.Moreover, conventional SDSs are increasingly being implemented within
trip computers that are modern industrial computers, programmable electronic systems,
safety DCSs, PLCs, and even FPGAs. These modern platforms, however, are generally
underutilized in terms of computational power due to the relatively simple functionality re-
quired by protection systems when compared against advanced control system algorithms.
This research therefore overcomes the fundamental limit of conventional shutdown by pre-
dicting the future behaviour of the monitored subsystems and associated safety parameter
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values and making anticipatory, or predictive trip decisions, i.e. a predictive shutdown
system (PSDS).
Prediction and forecasting dates back to over two millennia ago with the rudimentary
prediction of celestial body movements and a growing interest in the field of astronomy
[23]. The mathematical methods that form the foundation of optimal prediction were not
established, however, until 1632 when Galileo investigated the minimization of various
functions of error to help explain his experimental celestial observations [24]. Another
century and a half would pass before the first complete theory of linear estimation, known
as the method of least squares (LS), was formulated by Gauss in 1795. This achievement
in forecasting also centred around the study of celestial body movements, as reported and
independently formulated byLegendre in 1805 [24,25,26]. More recently, modern predictive
algorithms incorporate system models and also account for uncertainty in the model and
signals. For example, the stochastic state-space model assumed within the Kalman filter
(KF) published by Kalman in 1960 [27]. Nowadays, prediction algorithms have even been
used within NPP controls systems [28].
In utilizing a prediction algorithm for shutdown, it is expected that a PSDS will be able
to initiate shutdown actions at the instant a fault, failure, or initiating event is predicted
to result in an abnormal condition. At this limit, anticipatory or predictive shutdown is
conceptually similar to fault detection [29], a field which has numerous applications within
NPP systems [30,31]. Moreover, given the well-established literature regarding prediction
of dynamical systems as well as the availability of capable industrial computer technologies,
it seems natural to investigate the development of a predictive automatic protection system.
It is expected that the predictive protection system will be able to make confident, high
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quality decisions at a time which is earlier than the conventional case without reducing
margins of safety or productivity. It is further expected that these algorithms can be
implemented within modern safety-critical industrial computer platforms given limited
processing and memory resources.
In addition to reducing time-to-trip, the proposed SDS modifications deviate from the
historical practice of like-for-like functional transfer of SDS logic from existing to newly
commissioned technologies by developing, in an evolutionary manner, an advanced safety-
critical decision-making algorithm. Within the nuclear industry, plant life extensions and
related refurbishments have resulted in the replacement of antiquated and obsolescent in-
dustrial computers, programmable digital comparators, analog circuitry, and relay logic
withmodern industrial computer technologies [8,32,33]. These platforms are capable of ex-
ecuting advanced functional, mathematical, and logical capabilities that enable a broader
set of decision-making algorithms to be implemented. Moreover, these algorithms include
well-established filtering and modelling methods that allow for control and protection sys-
tems to consider a larger set of prior knowledge regarding the system being controlled
or protected. For example, the automotive industry has recently developed and imple-
mented collision avoidance systems and automatic predictive braking within a variety of
automobiles [34].
Finally, thiswork considers the consequences of implementing advanceddecision-making
algorithms within safety-critical industrial computers. For example, a given algorithmmay
require additional execution time that may result in delayed decisions. The advanced al-
gorithms investigated herein are therefore designed to anticipate, or predict, impending
conditions. Forecasting and prediction does, however, introduce a new form of uncertainty
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within the safety-critical shutdown task. Thus, in predicting the future behaviour of a
system being protected, the effects of uncertainty and the complexity of the prediction
algorithm on SDS performance, e.g. spurious trip rate, must also be well understood and
taken into consideration within the predictive trip detection mechanism.
1.2 Problem Statements, Objectives, and Scope
Two major problems are investigated within this dissertation. The main problem is the
enhancement of NPP SDSs to utilize the increased computational power as well as func-
tional capabilities of modern industrial computers in an effort to reduce the amount of time
required to activate a safety function. This primary problem is expected to be resolved by
incorporating a prediction algorithm within the SDS. In investigating this main problem, a
secondary problem is encountered. The secondary problem is the development of a predic-
tion algorithm that considers a larger set of prior information or knowledge to accurately
predict impending abnormal conditions even when the dynamic process is operating under
uncertain conditions. In addition, the functionality of the prediction algorithm is modified
to consider the quality of previously calculated multi-step-ahead predictions. These two
problems are expected to be resolved by incorporating prediction error compensation and
statistical quality assessment routines within the SDS.
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1.2.1 Shutdown system enhancement and reduction of
time-to-trip
The primary problem that is addressed within this dissertation is the enhancement of SDS
functionality in an effort to reduce time-to-trip. Within the nuclear power industry, SDS
enhancements aremost often performed to address hardware obsolescence. These enhance-
ments may also, however, be performed to address insufficient electrical energy production
and safety margins. Of these enhancements, those that are due to obsolescence result
in the replacement of existing SDS components with new or more advanced technologies
while trip logic functionality remains largely unchanged. In contrast, those enhancements
that aim to improve energy production or safety generally focus on improving SDS reliabil-
ity, independence, availability, simplicity, or conformance to government regulations and
international standards rather than SDS response time.
The problem is not that these existing and upgraded SDS designs fail tomeet regulatory
requirements for response times which are typically less than a few hundred of milliseconds
in length. The problem is instead that conventional SDSs at best initiate shutdown ac-
tions at the instant a safety parameter is determined to have reached a TSP. Thus, SDSs
currently utilize comparator-based trip functionality even though modern technologies are
capable of executing increasingly advanced model- and data-based prediction, detection,
and decision-making algorithms, many of which are straightforward, well-established and
have been proven through use. There is therefore an opportunity to detect in advance,
with predetermined confidence and without reducing safety or productivity margins, that
a system is approaching an abnormal condition. There are also significant safety, energy
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production, and economic benefits that may be realized by reducing time-to-trip. These
benefits are due to the nominal operating thermal power as well as the electrical power
output of a given NPP unit being functions of SDS response time. More precisely, it may
be possible to increase the operating power and electrical power output of the NPP as a
result of reducing time-to-trip.
A reduction in time-to-trip reduces the magnitude of fault-induced high power surge,
and in turn, the temperature within the reactor core and the potential for critical com-
ponents to be damaged [35]. Achieving near-immediate time-to-trip is essential during
operating conditions when fission reactions within the reactor core may be beyond the
control of the reactor regulating system (RRS) and the heat energy accumulating within
the reactor core may increase exponentially leading to unsafe operation, or even accident
conditions. For these reasons, a reduction in time-to-trip results in increased margins of
safety [36]. In addition, for existing NPPs where increased margins of safety can be guaran-
teed, it may be possible to take advantage of additional electrical power generating capacity
by undertaking power up-rating initiatives [22]. That said, the current state-of-the-art in
terms of SDS functionality is to use an FPGA to compare trip parameter measurements
against a TSP that is most often a constant value, and is at most a function of some major
safety-related system parameter.
By continuing along the path of like-for-like functional replacement of SDS decision-
making algorithms, it is expected that the ability of automatic protection systems to meet
the safety demands of increasingly complex and challenging engineering problems will be
hindered both within and beyond the nuclear power generating industry. In addition, it is
becoming necessary to consider the consequences that proactive, prognostic, and predictive
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decisions have on safety and operability given that these strategies are now being imple-
mented within themonitoring and supporting controllers of potentially hazardous systems.
By considering the effects of predictive functions from the perspective of a safety-critical
system, it is expected that there will be a reduced likelihood of safety being compromised
in order to attain an increase in production value whether within the nuclear power indus-
try or otherwise. In addition, a paradigm shift to a continuing evolutionary enhancement
of automatic protection system algorithms will bring about improvements to safety and
production margins, the efficiency of existing NPP units, and the economic performance
of nuclear power generation in general. More specifically, a reduction in time-to-trip leads
to increased productivity as a direct result of increased margins of safety as illustrated in
Figure 1.2. In one report, it is stated that each additional percentage of increased operat-
ing trip margin increases revenue by a present value of 20 to 40 million dollars per reactor
unit [37].
In response to the SDS enhancement and reduction of time-to-trip problem, Chapter 3
investigates various theoretical methods for advanced and intelligent but well-established
prediction algorithms. These prediction algorithms are utilized to calculate predictions of
the safety parameter measurements that are available within conventional SDSs. Chapter
5 constructs various modular PSDS designs that each aim to reduce time-to-trip. The
predictions are then compared against a corresponding TSP to determine whether a trip
condition is imminent. This TSP is also referred to as an alarm threshold, and the trip
occurrence as a threshold-crossing event. Chapter 5 also aims to re-frameSDS enhancement
and safety-critical decision-making in general, by making accurate predictive decisions
while at the same time considering the computational power of modern industrial safety
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controllers. These considerations are essential for implementation of the PSDS designs
within the Tricon v9 safety-PLC of the experimental platform presented in Chapter 6. By
performing these enhancements in an evolutionarymanner, it is expected that the proposed
PSDS designs will maintain the reliability of the existing conventional SDSs.
1.2.2 Predictive shutdown concept
A conceptual predictive shutdown occurrence is illustrated in Figure 1.4. This figure il-
lustrates for a single safety parameter the measurement, corresponding TSP, as well as
past, present, and future safety parameter predictions. In Figure 1.4, discrete time index
k denotes the current, or present, time-step with units equal to seconds over the sampling
interval Ts, or s/Ts. Time-steps that have values less than k have occurred in the past and
time-steps that have values greater than k are yet to occur in the future. At each time-
step, the prediction algorithm propagates the safety parameter predictions to a prediction
horizon Np time-steps into the future. The predictions are then compared against a corre-
sponding TSP. A predictive trip is initiated if any of the predictions within the prediction
window have reached the TSP. Thus, in the example sequence of Figure 1.4, a predictive
trip occurs at time-step k due to the predicted safety parameter measurements, propagated
to prediction horizon (k +Np), having reached the TSP. Predictive trip therefore results
in a reduction in time-to-trip when compared against a conventional shutdown that occurs
at some future time-step. For example, a reduction in time-to-trip of Np time-steps would
result for a hypothetical conventional shutdown occurring at time-step (k +Np).









Figure 1.4: The concept of predictive shutdown, or predictive trip, for a single safety
parameter with a predictive trip occurring at time-step k.
compared against conventional shutdown. These margins are illustrated in Figure 1.4 with
respect to a hypothetical conventional trip occurring at the prediction horizon. The first
margin coincides with the main objective of reducing time-to-trip, where time-to-trip has
been reduced by (kp − kc) time-steps. This is the difference in time between the predictive,
kp, and conventional, kc, times-to-trip. The second margin is the indirect advantage of an
(Ξp − Ξc) increase in the effective TSP that is an approximation of the change to the safety
margin as a result of the reduction in time-to-trip. The effective TSPs are the values of the
safety parameter measurement at the time of trip. These changes to safety and production
margins are similar to those presented in Figure 1.2b).
Within the nuclear industry, margin of safety is defined as the minimum difference in
measurement between a predetermined physical safety limit and the safety parameter mea-
surements during the process fluctuations that follow a trip occurrence [36]. An example
of this is the conceptual safety margin of Figure 1.1. When compared to the case of con-
ventional trip, the predictive trip occurs: i) at a time which is earlier, and ii) where safety
parameter measurements are a greater distance from the physical safety limits. Where
increased safety margin can be guaranteed, one of two benefits may result. Either i) the
18
operating power of the NPP remains at the pre-enhancement level with improved safety,
or alternatively, ii) the productivity of the NPP is increased through an increase in electri-
cal power output and the safety margins are returned to the pre-enhancement margins as
illustrated in Figure 1.2.
1.2.3 Prediction of abnormal conditions under uncertainty
A supporting problem that was identified in the course of this dissertation work is the accu-
rate prediction abnormal conditions under uncertainty. The topics of linear and adaptive
prediction are thoroughly covered in the existing literature which includesmodel- and data-
based prediction algorithms. These algorithms provide solutions to the prediction problem
for models that i) possess some inherent randomness and are considered stochastic, ii)
are fully determined by parameter values as well as initial conditions and are therefore
deterministic, or iii) are a mix of stochastic and deterministic components.
Those algorithms that consider stochastic models are preferred since NPP subsystems
are designed to match within some degree of uncertainty the real-world dynamic response
to a dynamic model. In this form, the calculated predictions are defined over a probability
space that, at specific points within the measurement domain, can be interpreted as levels
of confidence with respect to the predicted measurement. More specifically, in the case of
KF-based prediction, the system model is assumed to be linear and the uncertainty in this
model is assumed to be additive white Gaussian noise. The predictions that are plotted
in the conceptual predictive trip of Figure 1.4 may therefore be calculated through the use
of a KF predictor given an assumed model and statistical noise properties or uncertainty
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descriptions.
KFs are often implemented as estimators and predictors with little attention given to
the effect that various uncertainties have on prediction accuracy and the quality of the
calculated prediction probability distributions. Although the standard KF can be incor-
porated as the prediction algorithm within an SDS, a more advanced KF-based prediction
algorithm is investigated herein in order to make increasingly accurate predictions under
a variety of operational and uncertain conditions.
The problem of predicting an impending abnormal condition becomes more difficult
when the dynamic process changes and the statistical properties that are assumed within
the prediction algorithmno longer represent the true uncertainty. In addition, whenmaking
safety-critical predictive decisions, the prediction algorithm should consider the possibility
that the system is operating under uncertain conditions. The prediction algorithm should
also be aware of the quality or accuracy of past predictions. The standard KF does not,
however, include either of these features.
Uncertainties or discrepancies between the prior knowledge regarding the systemmodel
and signals may arise as a result of a fault, failure or initiating event during the transient
towards the TSP. Under uncertain conditions, the predictions as well as the probability
distributions that describe uncertainty in the predictions may be erroneous. For example,
the assumption of additive white Gaussian noise may no longer hold, or the system may be
being affected by a more deterministic fault, failure, or disturbance. Thus, it is necessary
to compensate for prediction error within the prediction algorithm. The presence of uncer-
tainty and error is addressed by robust prediction algorithms including model predictive
control (MPC) and fault prognostic applications.
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Robust prediction algorithms, however, often require complex application-specific so-
lutions. These algorithms also generally ignore the quality of multi-step-ahead predictions.
It is therefore necessary to develop a relatively simple yet robust prediction algorithm that
includes amechanism formonitoring the accuracy and quality of the calculated predictions.
With respect to making the KF more robust, the oﬄine estimation of noise covariance is
often left to best practices that are not very well defined. Moreover, it may be benefi-
cial to modify a KF-based prediction algorithm to adapt the prediction metrics over the
given prediction window since KF predictors do not inherently take into consideration
multi-step-ahead prediction error.
Without compensating for prediction error, the predictive decision-making algorithm
will not be able to accurately predict the behaviour of the system under uncertain condi-
tions. Moreover, without assessing prediction quality, the decision-making algorithm will
not be aware of whether or not previously predicted safety parameter values are, in fact,
valid. These two factors may result in an impending abnormal condition being missed,
i.e. a missed trip, and the usefulness of the prediction algorithm being degraded. Missed
trips occur when a trip sequence is not initiated but the system has reached an abnormal
condition. In contrast, reductions in time-to-trip by erroneous predictions may result in
an increased number of spurious or false trip occurrences. Spurious trips occur when a
trip sequence is initiated but the system has not truly reached an abnormal condition.
For example, a measurement sample that initiates shutdown may be erroneous due to im-
proper calibration, sensor degradation, electromagnetic interference, etc. These spurious
trip occurrences reduce NPP revenue by at least 50 thousand dollars per hour per non-
operational unit for the CANDU SDS1 design [38]. In one case time-delay functions have
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been included within the logic solver of an SDS to reduce the number of spurious trip oc-
currences [39]. These spurious and missed trip occurrences must be well understood and
taken into consideration within the modified SDS designs.
This research work combines methods from a set of existing publications regarding pre-
diction under uncertainty within Chapter 3, prediction of abnormal conditions in Chapter
4, and the assessment of prediction quality within Chapter 5. The improvement of per-
formance margins by predictive trip requires accurate and high quality predictions. In
practice, however, there may be mismatch between the model used within the KF and the
true model of the physical system. There may also be disturbances within the signals of
the system. KF-based predictors consider these uncertainties in the form of covariances
that allow the estimates to be weighted more heavily either towards measurement, i.e. the
output of the system, or the system model.
In safety system applications with redundant sensors there is usually a high degree of
sensor measurement accuracy. KF-based predictions are propagated, however, using the
model as there are no future measurements on which to correct the predictions. Thus,
in certain cases of system-model mismatch, the predictions diverge from the true future
measurement with each time-step into the future. For this reason, LS estimation is used to
correct the multi-step ahead predictions by estimating a model-based disturbance in the
measurement as presented in Chapter 4. In addition, a recursive form of the LS solutions
known as the recursive least squares (RLS) filter is also formulated in Chapter 4. This
estimation of disturbance inputs provides the added benefit of indicating that the system
response is deviating from that of the model. The result of this LS estimation is a KF/
RLS-based prediction algorithm.
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The statistical assumptions within the KF also allow for the incorporation of statis-
tical and hypothesis testing methods to assess the quality of the calculated predictions.
These testing methods also close the loop with respect to the multi-step-ahead KF-based
predictions and provide a mechanism by which to adapt the effective prediction horizon or
mean prediction error. Hypothesis testing methods can then be used to assess the poten-
tial for impending spurious trip and also missed trip occurrences as these two occurrences
correspond to false positive and negative hypotheses. Finally, optimal alarm theory may
be used to optimize the predictive activation of trip. By enhancing the SDS to calculate
accurate and high quality predictions of impending abnormal conditions, it is expected that
predictive shutdown will achieve reduced time-to-trip while maintaining existing margins
of safety and productivity even when the system is operating under uncertain conditions.
In general, the above-mentioned reductions in time-to-trip are achieved by methods
that do not involve the modification of safety system functionality. In fact, the task of
modifying the software within an SDS requires a significant amount of resources in order
to ensure that the software does not infringe upon the safe operation of the NPP. Thus, it
is important to consider that the addition of predictive trip detection may affect safety. It
is also the case that the predictive shutdown will provide various model- and data-based
metrics and time-series that may be useful in alarm management and operator indication
although these aspects of prediction are considered beyond the scope of this dissertation
work.
Although the KF is a popular tool for model-based prediction and prognostics, the
research presented herein encompasses the first known effort to combine a prediction al-
gorithm with an NPP automatic protection system. In addition, there are only a limited
23
number of existing publications that combine prediction with protective functions for dy-
namical systems. A study by Juricek et al. relates closely to the proposed concept of
predictive shutdown wherein a KF is used for predictive monitoring of abnormal situation
management for a mixing or stirring application [40]. In addition, Juricek et al. also con-
sider uncertainty and accuracy in the predictions through the use of confidence intervals
and statistical testing as well as LS estimation to compensate for prediction error caused
by a disturbance to the system state. This solution presented herein, however, formulates
the recursive solution to the RLS problem, and investigates disturbance within both the
system state and measurement.
During preliminary development of an initial KF-based PSDS design, the ability of the
KF to calculate accurate predictions for time-varying systems under uncertainty became of
concern. An extended literature review brought forward an algorithm for noise covariance
estimation, as well as one particular study by Martin combines KF-based prediction with
optimal alarm theory [41]. Martin formulates a probabilistic solution for the prediction
of a two-sided symmetric threshold crossing event over the entire prediction window while
assuming a steady state solution for the Kalman gain. In contrast, the solution presented
herein considers each time-step within the prediction window individually. Moreover,
the abnormal conditions are one-sided and are not symmetric. The optimization of an
alarm threshold within this dissertation does not therefore produce an explicit solution
to the alarm region problem as presented by Martin [41]. The solution presented in this
work instead selected a prediction from within a set of predictions that has the maximal




This work investigates the reduction of SDS response time through the use of model-
based prediction algorithms. These prediction algorithms are required, however, to be
accurate under operating conditions that may be uncertain with respect to an assumed
model and signal parameters or properties, and of reasonable computational complexity
for implementation within a commercial off the shelf industry-standard safety-PLC. The
proposed PSDS designs are therefore made to compensate for prediction error, to asses the
accuracy of previous predictions, and to adapt the current predictions accordingly. Given
these criteria, the objectives of this research are as follows:
1. Review the state-of-the-art literature regarding NPP shutdown and reactor trip,
prediction of abnormal conditions under uncertainty, and methods of assessing pre-
diction quality
2. Develop an initial PSDS design
(a) predict future safety parameter measurements
(b) adapt the uncertainty descriptions that are provided to the prediction algorithm
(c) compensate for prediction error
(d) combine prediction algorithm with conventional SDS logic
3. Enhance the PSDS design to consider prediction uncertainty
(a) calculate confidence intervals for the predicted safety parameters
(b) select bound of confidence interval for comparison against TSP
4. Enhance the PSDS design to consider prediction quality
(a) evaluate prediction consistency to assess prediction quality
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(b) reduce Type I and (II) errors, i.e. inactivation (activation) of a safety func-
tion when the potentially hazardous system is actually operating abnormally
(normally), i.e. missed and false trip occurrences
(c) select or adapt optimal effective prediction metrics, e.g. prediction horizon, as
a function of the above statistical measures, for comparison against TSP
5. Implement the SDS and PSDS designs for a single safety parameter within the Tricon
v9 safety-PLC
(a) adhere to functional scan time requirement of 100ms; report PLC scan time
In support of the methods used to achieve the above objectives, this thesis provides com-
parisons of performance, benefits, and drawbacks between the developed PSDS designs and
a conventional SDS through both simulation and experiment. These objectives ultimately
aim to improve upon the state-of-the-art regarding the design of NPP protection systems,
the prediction of abnormal conditions, and prediction under uncertainty in general.
1.2.5 Scope
The scope of this research is segmented into two main categories: those of the methods,
and those of the experimental application. The methods include the fundamental theories
behind the prediction, error compensation, prediction quality assessment, optimal alarm
algorithms, as well as the strategies for enhancing the SDS designs. Review of the history
and state-of-the-art for these methods are included primarily within Section 2.1. In con-
trast, SDS enhancement and the quality assessment strategies are discussed in Section 2.2.
The assessment of prediction quality and optimal alarm theory are included within this
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second section since these methods related to decision rather than prediction theory. The
experimental application includes the development of a predictive shutdown logic solver
based on the CANDU SDS1 design with state-of-the-art for SDS development reported in
Section 2.2. In addition, discussion regarding international standards and national regula-
tions including themore general design of an SIS as well as the industrial design of CANDU
SDS1 are included within Section 2.2. For a more detailed description of assumptions that
relate to the experimental setup refer to Chapter 6.
1.2.5.1 Methodology
The methodologies of this work are divided into four main topics: prediction under uncer-
tainty, prediction of abnormal conditions, safety system enhancement, and the assessment
of prediction quality.
Prediction under uncertainty: This dissertation investigates time-series prediction
methods that support short-term prediction horizons, are computationally simple, and are
relatively well-established within the literature and industrial application. The prediction
methods are to be executed online in real-time for discrete-time linear time-varying dy-
namic processes with partially documented models that include some uncertainty and are
therefore stochastic and potentially nonstationary. In contrast, this thesis does not investi-
gatewhether the system,model, or data are natural or synthetic, univariate ormultivariate,
and clean or noisy.
There are many algorithms that allow for the calculation of predictions, however, this
dissertation only considers those that are based on the KF. The system and uncertainty
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descriptions are therefore limited to those that are considered within the definition of the
standard KF equations, i.e. stochastic state-space model with assumed additive white
Gaussian noise uncertainties in the state and measurement equations. The KF-based pre-
dictor utilizes the error covariances that are calculated within the KF to, in turn, calculate
confidence intervals for the predictions. The distribution of the resulting predictions is also
assumed to be Gaussian. The KF-based predictor therefore considers uncertainties that
can be represented using a Gaussian distribution in order to calculate probability distribu-
tions for the predictions that are also Gaussian. The KF investigated in this work is not
the steady state KF that is common to linear time-invariant (LTI) systems. The KF is the
standard recursive form discrete-time KF including update and predict stages. This work
does not consider nonlinear or non-Gaussian implementations of the KF. The KF-based
predictor is, however, modified to consider a linear-time-varying (LTV) system with po-
tentially linear time-varying statistical noise descriptions. In order to achieve the second
of these objectives, an adaptive limited memory filter (ALMF) is incorporated into the KF
state estimation procedure. Moreover, since the model is assumed to be time-varying, the
future values of the parameters are assumed to be known within the current time-step to
allow for the calculation of predictions. This is also true with respect to the values of the
system input and output signals and other related signals.
Prediction of abnormal conditions: Prediction of abnormal conditions refers, within
this work, to the early detection of a threshold crossing event by an estimate of a future
safety parameter measurement where the alarm threshold is a constant TSP. It is naive to
assume that the systemmodel will match exactly the true conditions of the subsystemwhen
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the dynamic response of the subsystem is approaching a TSP. Thus, this work investigates
the prediction of abnormal conditions, i.e. reaching a TSP, under the uncertain condition
of either system-model mismatch or disturbances within the system signals. In either
case, the uncertainty is modelled as a sustained additive disturbance to either the state
or measurement equation of the state-space model for the subsystem. Within this work,
the disturbance model is limited to represent a ramp or an offset to either the state and/
or measurement equations. Moreover, the estimation of these disturbances are limited
to LS-based algorithms. The LS filter is selected as it allows for a deterministic model
of the disturbance to be considered. The deterministic representation of disturbances
complements that of the stochastic assumptions regarding the state and measurement
equations within the KF. In contrast to the work of Juricek et al. [40], the disturbance
estimation procedure assumes that the time-step of disturbance initiation is unknown. The
initiating time of the disturbance is instead reset or updated at regular intervals during the
course of operation. This work does not investigate the robustness of the LS filter or the
recursive implementation of the LS filter to the selection of the disturbance model. The
disturbances are assumed to be significant and consistent, e.g. a step or ramp change in
input.
Enhancement of shutdown: The enhancement of the SDS is performed in an effort
to reduce time-to-trip. It is expected that this reduction can be achieved by implementing
the aforementioned KF-based prediction algorithm. The resulting PSDS algorithms are
limited to the advanced functionalities that are available in modern programmable elec-
tronic systems. In terms of performance, this dissertation aims to achieve high accuracy
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with low computational complexity. High accuracy is necessary due to the safety-critical
nature of the application whereas reduced computational complexity is required due to the
processing power of the available programmable electronic systems that are qualified for
safety-critical applications within NPPs, e.g. the Tricon v9 safety-PLC.
TheproposedPSDSdesigns are restricted in terms of complexity to bewithin reasonable
execution intervals or scan times, although these scan times are insignificant in comparison
to the prediction horizons, e.g. a 100ms scan time against a 2000ms prediction horizon.
It is expected that the effective prediction horizon can be adapted so that high accuracy
short-term predictions of 300 or 400ms may even be utilized within the predictive trip
decision-making process. It is also possible to use KF-based measurement estimations to
make trip decisions. The use of estimates would not, however, result in a reduction in time-
to-trip. In fact, due to the time required to execute the KF algorithm, the use of filtered
measurement estimates may actually delay the trip decision and increase the time-to-trip.
The purpose of developing the PSDS methods is to prototype the predictive shutdown
concept and to better understand the ability of relatively simple prediction algorithms to
predict impending abnormal conditions. These methods are not, however, developed in
an attempt to qualify for regulatory approval. That said, the complexity of the PSDS
is limited so as to satisfy the scan time functional requirement of CANDU SDS1. The
inclusion of a prediction algorithm within the SDS is expected to benefit existing SDS
implementations. For this reason, the signals that are required by the developed prediction
algorithm are assumed to already be monitored within the target NPP SDS. In this way, no
new cabling or sensors need to be installed. In addition, this research does not investigate
the recalculation of either the safety limit or TSP for the chosen safety parameter. These
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two calculations are complex tasks that involve specific safety analysis codes and thorough
uncertainty analysis with respect to a given set of PIEs.
The PSDS is designed as an evolution of the conventional SDS. Moreover, the conven-
tional SDS logic remains active within all of the proposed PSDS designs. This backup
conventional logic is strongly recommended for real-world PSDS implementations so that
the PSDS does not perform worse, with respect to response time, than the conventional
SDS. These conventional mechanisms are, however, disabled within the simulations and
experiments of Chapter 7. Although the main aim of this research is to reduce time-to-trip,
significant effort is made to prevent these reductions from resulting in increased spurious,
unnecessary or false trip, as well as increased occurrences of missed trip. Thus, beyond
the simple addition of an “open loop” prediction algorithm, this research also investigates
various statistical techniques that are able to assess the quality of the predicted future
safety parameter values. This research does not, however, attempt to cover all possible
impacts on safety that result from either the inclusion of the prediction algorithm or the
reduction in time-to-trip.
Assessing prediction quality: This research is primarily concerned with the calcula-
tion of accurate predictions. In order to achieve this objective, it is expected that KF-based
prediction needs to be “closed-loop” with respect to multi-step-ahead predictions. This
research does not, however, attempt to close this loop within the standard KF algorithm
and equations. This research instead considers the statistical assumptions regarding the
stochastic variables of the KF equations. More specifically, this research investigates the
use of statistical and hypothesis testing methods that are able to quantify the quality of
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previously calculated multi-step-ahead KF-based predictions.
Although various statistical tests may be applied to the quality assessment problem,
this research makes use of three statistical testing methods that are specifically related to
Gaussian probability distributions. The three tests are selected based on the assumption
within the KF that the additive noise terms of the state and measurement equations and
therefore the resulting state and measurement signals being Gaussian. The first test is
referred to as the innovation bound (IB) or Z test. The IB metric assesses whether the
prediction error is bounded within a predetermined interval of the Gaussian probability
distribution. This research also makes use of the one-tailed Z test that is more conducive to
the one-sided threshold-crossing problem of optimal alarm theory. The second test is the
square of the normalized prediction error, normalized innovations squared (NIS), or chi-
square (χ2) test. The NIS metric transforms the Gaussian distribution of the measurement
space into the chi-square distribution with a specified number of degrees of freedom. For an
uncorrelated sequence of samples, the number of degrees of freedom is equal to the length of
the sequence. The third test is referred to as innovation whiteness (IW) and is a measure of
correlation between the prediction errors of different time-steps. This measure is calculated
by taking the convolution of the prediction errors and comparing these convolutions against
an acceptance gate. These three tests assess whether there is any bias within the calculated
predictions, and also whether the calculated uncertainty in the predictions is either wide or
narrowwith respect to the standard deviation of the error covariance. These statistical tests
are not, however, intended to test whether the distribution of prediction errors actually
belongs to the Gaussian distribution rather than an alternate probability distribution.
The above tests are utilized in hypothesis testing to investigate the occurrence of true
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and false positive and negative decisions. These concepts are shared with those of optimal
alarm theory where the probability of an impending abnormal condition is optimized for
the expected probability of an alarm given the calculated predictions. The research of
this dissertation, instead, considers the performance of past predictions of the current
measurementwith respect to the value of the currentmeasurement. The effective prediction
horizon is then selected by optimizing the probability of an impending trip condition given
that a predictive trip occurs, e.g. the true positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR).
Hypothesis testing therefore provides measures that are related to the spurious and missed
trip occurrences that are to be minimized within the design of NPP SDSs since these two
event occurrences correspond directly with false positive and false negative detections, FPR
and false negative rate (FNR) respectively. This research does not investigate whether the
addition of hypothesis testing or optimal alarmmethods actually reduces spurious ormissed
trip rates under all conditions. The results of this research do, however, demonstrate that
a prediction algorithm can be made aware of the quality of past predictions, and can adapt
current decisions as a function of prediction quality.
1.2.5.2 Experimental verification
This dissertation studies a portion of CANDU SDS1 as an example to demonstrate that
KF-based prediction can improve time-to-trip within CANDUNPPs. This investigation is
limited, however, to a single safety parameter being considered within the SDS and PSDS
designs. In contrast, the full SDS1 implementation considers between ten and twelve
signals, as discussed in Section 2.2. Moreover, the input signals for the model of the
selected system are also assumed to be available to, and measured by, the SDS. These
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signals are not measured within the current implementation of CANDU SDS1; however, it
is anticipated that the necessary system inputs could be estimated given models of related
NPP subsystems as well as the other existing safety parameter signals.
The safety parameter of interest is the steam generator level and the steam generator
level low (SGLL) TSP. The model provided to the KF is therefore the open-loop discrete-
time state-space representation of the steam generator water level dynamic. Although the
steam generator level has a relatively slow dynamic, the complex inverse response charac-
teristic of the steam generator water level provides an interesting case for the predictive
trip problem. In other words, the dynamic of the steam generator level is rather complex
in that it has an initial response that opposes the manoeuvre made by the manipulating
variable. This dynamic is discussed in more detail within Chapter 6. In contrast, SDS
enhancements are usually studied with respect to the faster dynamics of the neutronic trip
parameters and corresponding PIE known as the loss of coolant accident (LOCA). It is
expected that the nonlinear model of the neutronics within the reactor core may be more
suited to an advanced form of the KF as discussed in Section 2.1, but these aspects are
beyond the scope of the current work.
The experiments of this dissertation examine only a single initiating event otherwise
referred to as a PIE. This PIE is, however, investigated for varying degrees of uncertainty
both between the true system and the model and also within the signals that are made
available to the SDS. The specific PIE studied within this work is the loss of secondary side
coolant. The PIE is studied within two normal operating manoeuvres that are referred to
as power transients. This research also considers an unanticipated change or disturbance
in the water level set-point for the steam generator. In terms of uncertain conditions, the
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simulations and experiments of Chapter 7 investigate parameter error or model mismatch
between the true system and the assumed model provided to the KF. Moreover, an unde-
tectable fault in the manipulated variable of the steam generator is also investigated within
the experimental results.
1.3 Contributions
The main contributions of the research performed within this dissertation are summarized
as follows:
1. Application, analysis, and evaluation of the KF towards reducing the time-to-trip
within the SDS of a NPP by predicting the future behaviour of safety parameter
measurements related to a system being protected.
2. Analysis and evaluation of the effect of uncertainty, in the form of noise and error in
the signals and parameters of a stochastic state-space model, on the performance of
the KF-based prediction algorithms.
3. Application of confidence intervals to the safety parameter prediction problem to
achieve an increased level of confidence in the predicted impending conditions.
4. Derivation, application, analysis, and evaluation of KF/RLS-based prediction algo-
rithms towards improving prediction performance by compensating for prediction
error within the KF-based predictions when the system is operating under uncertain
conditions.
5. Integration of the KF and RLS algorithms as well as the confidence-based decision-
making into the conventional SDS structure, i.e. a point-PSDSdesign and an interval-
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PSDS design, while adhering to technological and timing constraints as well as in-
dustry standards.
6. Derivation, application, analysis, and evaluation of three separate statistical tests to-
wards assessing the quality of the KF-based predictions given the assumed stochastic
state-space model of the system as well as additive noise characteristics.
7. Application, analysis, and evaluation of hypothesis testing towards quantifying the
quality of the calculated predictions against the eventual measurements.
8. Derivation of an adaptive decision-making algorithm towards limiting and minimiz-
ing respectively the probability of spurious andmissed trip occurrences by combining
statistical and hypothesis testing with optimal alarm theory.
9. Integration of the optimal decision-making algorithm into the PSDS structure, i.e.
optimal-PSDS, again while adhering to technological constraints and industry stan-
dards.
10. Comparison, analysis, and evaluation, through simulation and experimentation, of
the developed PSDS algorithms as well as a conventional SDS implementation in
terms of time-to-trip and computational complexity.
In addition to the above contributions, the various other deliverables that have been de-
veloped or implemented over the course of this study are summarized as follow:
1. Implementation of the three-element PI controller within a Siemens S7-400 DCS
using the Simatic engineering workstation software and modification of the existing
experimental platform to interface in real-time with various external control systems.
2. Identification of the model for an existing experimental platform.
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3. Application, analysis, and evaluation of the use of a digital filter within a Microchip
PIC micro-controller to analytically compensate the dynamics of the existing exper-
imental platform towards matching the dynamic behaviour of the steam generator
level.
4. Implementation of the digital filter within the Microchip PIC micro-controller using
the MPLAB integrated development environment and modification of the existing
experimental platform by analytical compensation so that the behaviour of the plat-
form mimics that of the steam generator water level dynamics.
5. Construction of a simulation platform for the conventional and predictive shutdown
algorithms using MATLAB.
6. Implementation of the conventional and predictive shutdown algorithms within the
Invensys Triconex Tricon v9 safety-PLC using the Tristation engineering workstation
software.
7. Application, analysis, and evaluation of the operating conditions and initiating events
associated with NPP accident, shutdown, or trip conditions and construction of a
simulation environment for these conditions and events in MATLAB.
8. Development of various other software for data collection and hardware interfacing.
1.4 Organization
Chapter 2 includes a literature review that covers prediction theory, prediction under uncer-
tainty, NPP safety and shutdown, and optimal alarm theory. KF-based prediction is then
investigated in Chapter 3 where ALMF-based noise covariance estimation, and confidence-
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based predictive decision-making are combined within KF-based state and measurement
prediction algorithms. The recursive solution to the LS disturbance estimation problem
is then formulated in Chapter 4 and is also combined with the KF-based prediction algo-
rithm. The prediction algorithms are then incorporated within the PSDS designs through
the modular modification of a conventional SDS design in Chapter 5. These modular modi-
fications result in two PSDS designs referred to as point-PSDS and interval-PSDS whereby
predictive trip decisions are made by comparing either the mean or bound of a confidence
interval against the corresponding TSP. In addition, Chapter 5 formulates methods for
assessing prediction accuracy using various statistical tests for hypothesis testing, as well
as minimization of erroneous predictive decisions. These developments result in an en-
hanced PSDS design known as the optimal-PSDS. Chapter 6 describes the experimental
setup including the dynamic response of steam generator water level. The steam generator
is the target system being protected that is studied within Chapter 7. Chapter 6 also re-
veals the similarities and differences between the simulation and experimental platforms.
The simulation and experimental results are then presented in Chapter 7 where the three
PSDS routines are compared against a benchmark conventional SDS. Finally, Chapter 8




This chapter includes two sections; one for each of the two problems stated in Section
1.2. The publications that are reviewed within these sections form a foundation for the
contributions outlined in Section 1.3.
Individually, Section 2.1 establishes the framework for linear, nonlinear, and adap-
tive time-series estimation and prediction of dynamic processes or systems. Section 2.1
also reviews KF-based prediction methods that consider prediction error and prediction
reliability. Section 2.1 then concludes with publications that are directly related to the pre-
diction problem addressed by this dissertation work, i.e. the early detection of abnormal
conditions under uncertainty.
In contrast to prediction, Section 2.2 establishes the framework for safety instrumented
systems as well as safety systems. Section 2.2 also reviews publications that are related
to the enhancement of SDSs, including reductions in time-to-trip, and the development
of computerized safety systems. Section 2.2 includes an overview of one specific NPP
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safety system: CANDU SDS1. This chapter then concludes by connecting safety system
enhancement with the design of optimal alarm systems.
2.1 Time-series Prediction
The following review of prediction methodology includes three sections. Section 2.1.1
presents a background of linear, nonlinear, and adaptive estimation and prediction theory
with a particular focus on the KF. Section 2.1.2 reviews publications that investigate or
advance KF-based prediction methods. Finally, Section 2.1.3 reviews publications that go
beyondKF-based prediction to determine or compensate for prediction error and reliability.
2.1.1 Filtering and estimation
Prediction theory is composed of the fields of linear prediction and adaptive prediction.
Linear and adaptive prediction are in turn specializations within the fields of linear and
adaptive estimation. In the context of linear and adaptive estimation, the term estimation
refers to the extraction of information about a quantity of interest from noisy data [24].
Moreover, estimations are produced by functions that are referred to as estimators. These
estimators are also referred to as filters in reference to the filtering of noise from a signal.
The term adaptive specifies that the algorithms, estimators, or filters include parameters
that are adapted or adjusted as a function of the data that is input to the algorithm. In
other words, standard estimation algorithms calculate optimal approximations of either
unknown parameters or signal values whereas adaptive estimation algorithms update the
unknown parameters while at the same time approximating the signal values.
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Since the onset of estimation and prediction theory, many methods have been inves-
tigated for predicting the future behaviour of a dynamic process. The main purpose for
developing these new methods is to improve prediction algorithms with respect to:
• misadjustment or accuracy,
• rate of convergence,





within the context of a given application [24]. Moreover, prediction methods can be cate-
gorized by the following attributes of the dynamic process for which the predictions are to
be made:













as well as the computational complexity of the algorithm, andwhether or not the prediction
algorithm is required to be implemented online in real-time or supports oﬄine execution.
These attributes are an extension of the list discussed in [42].
Although there are a vast number of textbooks covering estimation, filtering, and pre-
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diction, the citations and work within this dissertation often refer back to a few well known
texts. These texts are, in no particular order, summarized as follows. The first is by
Goodwin and Sin and presents adaptive filtering, prediction, and control methods for de-
terministic and stochastic processes in two separate parts [43]. The next text is by Haykin
and focuses on adaptive filter theory but dedicates an entire chapter each to the topics of
linear prediction as well as the KF [24]. Haykin also presents an extensive summary of the
history of linear estimation and adaptive filtering theory. The third is by Anderson and
Moore and presents optimal filtering including a chapter dedicated to the discrete-time
KF [44].
In addition to the above three texts, Sayed presents the fundamentals of adaptive
filtering in [45]. Brown and Hwang cover various practical aspects of the KF including
applications in MATLAB [46]. These concepts are also presented by Grewal and Andrews
where KF theory is applied within MATLAB [47]. These last two texts are at the center of
the KF-based prediction methodology presented in Chapter 3.
Linear estimation
Following the work of Gauss, early contributions to linear estimation theory include the
minimum mean-square estimation of stochastic processes that was performed throughout
the 1930’s and 1940’s by Kolmogorov and Krein [48,49], and independently byWiener [50],
Wiener and Hopf [51], and Levinson [52]. More specifically, Kolmogorov, having been
inspired by the work of Wold [53], developed a solution for the linear prediction of discrete-
time stochastic processes with Krein extending the work of Kolmogorov to derive the
continuous-time filter. In the meantime, Wiener and Hopf had derived an explicit formula,
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known as the Wiener-Hopf equation, for the optimum predictor of the continuous-time
linear prediction problem and had also considered the problem of filtering a process that
was corrupted by additive noise [50]. The discrete-time solution for the Wiener-Hopf
equation was subsequently derived by Levinson in 1946 [52].
The next major contribution to linear estimation and prediction theory occurred in the
late 1950’s when Kalman solved Wiener’s interpretation of the linear estimation problem
and developed what is now referred to as the Kalman filter (KF). To solve Wiener’s prob-
lem, Kalman used a well-known method from probability theory for optimal estimation
and orthogonal projection and then modified the representation of the process to be in the
state-space form in order to solve the linear estimation problem for growing and infinite
memory filters with stationary and nonstationary statistics [27]. The result is a mini-
mum mean squared error one step-ahead predictor for linear systems affected by additive
white Gaussian noise. As a filter, the KF calculates the mean and error covariance of the
state vector under the assumption that the state vector has a Gaussian distribution. This
assumption can, in general, satisfied as a result of the central limit theorem and can be
verified by analyzing the probability distribution of the corresponding signal or residual.
The continuous-time domain treatment of the KF was performed by Kalman and Bucy
and is sometimes referred to as the Kalman-Bucy filter [54].
In the decade that followed Kalman’s original publication, it became common practice
for the state vector to be augmented to include model parameters that are then estimated
along with the state [55]. Although the augmented state vector results in a nonlinear
filtering problem, it allows for the estimation of unknown or time-varying parameters as a
function of assumed additive white Gaussian noise. In addition, the KF was reformulated
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by Kailath et al. [56, 57, 58] in the late 1960s using an innovations approach introduced
by Kolgomorov [48] as well as Bode and Shannon [59]. In Kailath’s approach, the KF is
a causal and causally invertible filter with a white-noise process as input and a stochastic
process as output. Here the term innovation refers to the white-noise input providing
new information to the estimation problem where the input is statistically independent of,
or uncorrelated with, the filter output [24]. Kailath’s method isolates the predictable or
deterministic part of the filter from the new statistical information provided by the current
measurements.
Nonlinear dynamic processes
The KF is an extremely useful tool for many real-world prediction applications due to the
accuracy of the calculated estimations and relative ease in design and programming [60].
For some applications, however, computation of the state error covariance may not be
feasible due to a model that is of high dimension. In contrast, accuracy may be poor due to
nonlinearities from real-world dynamic processes or the assumption of an augmented state
vector. Thus, various extensions to the KF have been proposed to address the nonlinear
filtering problem.
The first modifications to the KF that considered nonlinearities were introduced within
years of Kalman’s original publication. The most prominent of these early modifications
is the class of filters known as the extended Kalman filter (EKF). The EKF propagates
state estimates using given nonlinear system functions in the same manner as the stan-
dard KF. State error covariances, however, are propagated using matrices of time-varying
parameters that are approximated by first- or second-order Taylor series evaluated at the
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current estimate of the state vector. Early contributions to the EKF are often credited
to multiple authors including Smith et al. [61], Kopp and Orford [62], and Cox [63] with
the second-order EKF being credited to Athans et al. [64]. There are now many different
interpretations of the EKF for various applications as discussed in [60] and [65]. No matter
the interpretation, the appeal of the EKF is that, given a nonlinear mathematical abstrac-
tion of system behaviour, it is simple to use a linear approximation to calculate the state
error covariance. Caveats of the EKF, however, include the online calculation of the state-
dependent matrix Riccati equation as opposed to oﬄine calculation for steady state KF
gains, and large errors due to linearization that sometimes cause the filter to diverge [65].
Possible divergence of the EKF has more recently lead to the development of a sampling
approach for propagating the state error covariance where the probability distribution of
the state estimate, with state error assumed to be Gaussian, is approximated using a
mathematical function known as the unscented transform. This approach is included in an
extension to the KF known as the unscented Kalman filter (UKF). The UKF propagates
state estimates in the same manner as for the EKF, however, the state error covariance is
propagated using the given nonlinear system functions as well as a set of carefully chosen
sample points representing the moments of the probability distribution for the state vector.
The UKF was first proposed by Julier and Uhlmann [66]. The appeal of the UKF is
that the state and state error covariance estimates are accurate to the third-order Taylor
series expansion for any nonlinear model representation [65]. Thus, the UKF achieves
superior performance compared to the, at most, second-order accuracy of the EKF. In
addition, the computational complexity of the UKF is roughly the same as for the first-
order EKF [60]. Thus, the UKF has better accuracy than the most accurate EKF and
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requires less computational complexity than the least complex EKF.
Another extension to the KF is the ensemble Kalman filter (EnKF). The purpose of
the EnKF is to avoid calculating and propagating the state error covariance for high-
dimensional processes where the state error is assumed to have a Gaussian probability
distribution. The EnKF instead propagates the state error covariance using the given non-
linear system functions as well as an ensemble set of sample points that then represent the
probability distribution of the state vector. This is similar to the UKF concept except that
in the case of the EnKF the sample points are randomly calculated and are not specifically
the moments of the probability distribution. Calculation of state estimates, however, re-
mains the same as for the EKF and UKF. The EnKF was first proposed by Evensen [67]
and Burgers et al. [68]. The appeal of the EnKF over the EKF is that, like the UKF, the
third- and higher-order moments of the error covariance are not discarded. In addition,
for high-dimensional processes, e.g. those found in meteorology and oceanography, the
sample mean and covariance is calculated from the propagated ensemble sample points.
This results in a reduction in computational complexity to be a function of the number of
ensemble sample points rather than the order of the process [69].
Non-Gaussian probability distributions
For some applications, estimation accuracy may be poor due to the assumption that the
additive noise iswhite andGaussian and that the state vector is aGaussian randomvariable.
For problems of this type, there exist two additional extensions to the KF. The first utilizes
a Gaussian mixture model or a weighted sum of Gaussian probability density functions
to approximate the true state error probability distribution. Essentially, a bank of KFs
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operate in parallel to obtain a suboptimal estimate of the state error covariance. This
method was developed by Alspach and Sorenson for both linear and nonlinear dynamic
processes [70, 71]. The second extension is referred to as a particle filter and is similar
to the EKF in that there exist many different interpretations of the filter. In general,
the particle filter approximates the non-Gaussian probability density of the state vector
using sample points as in the UKF and EnKF where the sample points, or particles, are
propagated using the given linear or nonlinear system functions. For the particle filter,
however, the sample points are selected in an efficient manner according to weights that
are calculated from an approximation of the state estimate probability distribution known
as a proposal distribution [72]. This sampling within the particle filter takes the form of a
sequential Monte Carlo approach. The particle filter is attributed to the work of Gordon
et al. [73]. For a more thorough review of particle filter development in relation to the KF
refer to Chen [72]. Although these twomethods are the focus of current research efforts, the
Gaussian mixture model or particle filter algorithms are generally more computationally
complex than the previously discussed algorithms that assume a Gaussian probability
distribution for the state error. These methods therefore require more computationally
powerful controllers and computer platforms in order to be implemented.
Adaptive filtering
The theory of adaptive filtering or adaptive estimation developed alongside that of linear
and nonlinear estimation. The difference between linear and adaptive filters is that the
latter are said to be self-designing through recursive updating of parameter estimates. This
feature is necessarywhere prior knowledge of the underlying dynamic process is incomplete.
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Although the parameter update mechanism results in adaptive filters being nonlinear,
adaptive filters are classified as linear if the input-output relationship obeys the principle
of superposition while the parameters are held constant. In contrast, if the linear input-
output relationship is not satisfied then the adaptive filter is classified as nonlinear [24].
In general, there are two primary methods of adaptive filtering. The first is the stochas-
tic gradient approach that includes the least mean square and gradient adaptive lattice
algorithms. These two algorithms are relatively simple and effective for adapting transver-
sal and lattice-based filters respectively. In addition, these algorithms are independent
of the process model, as opposed to the KF that relies on a given model of the pro-
cess. The least mean square algorithm was first proposed by Widrow and Hoff in the
late 1950s [74,75] whereas the gradient adaptive lattice algorithm was introduced by Grif-
fiths in the 1970s [76, 77]. The function of these two algorithms is to recursively iterate
the parameters or weights of the filter in the direction of the gradient of the mean squared
magnitude of error between the desired response and the filter output as a function of the
current parameters. In other words, the parameters are adapted so as to follow an error-
performance surface, e.g. a paraboloid, toward the optimum Wiener solution that is the
minimum point of the surface. Least mean square adaptation is made possible through an
iterative procedure based on themethod of steepest descent to solve theWiener-Hopf equa-
tions. Basically, the updated parameters are equal to the previous parameters summed
with the product of a learning-rate or step-size parameter, an error signal, and the input
to the filter. The appeal of the least mean square algorithm is that it is simple. The least
mean square algorithm does, however, suffer from a relatively slow rate of convergence
and sensitivity to the correlation matrix. These factors result in the least mean square
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algorithm being unsuitable for use with nonstationary, time-varying processes, unless the
input data vary slowly relative to the learning rate of the algorithm [24].
The second well-known adaptive filtering approach is based on the method of least
squares (LS). This approach provides a solution to adapting traversal filters that includes
both a block and a recursive formulation, i.e. the RLS filter. The recursive form of LS
filter is more common as it requires less memory and computational power. The RLS
method is model dependent and is therefore a special case of the KF. The RLS filter was
originally reported by Plackett in 1950 [78] although the algorithm was not popularized
until the work of Godard in 1974 [79]. The RLS filter recursively minimizes the sum of the
weighted squared error between the desired response and the filter output. It is assumed
that the filter weights can be estimated through recursive estimation whereby the updated
parameters are equal to the previous parameters, or weights, summed with the product
of cost minimizing gain vector and the error between the desired response and the filter
output.
The RLS algorithm is more computationally complex than the least mean square algo-
rithm. Various efforts have been made to reduce complexity and improve robustness of the
RLS filter and to relate the RLS algorithm to the KF. Reduction in complexity originated
with the work of Morf and the so-called fast RLS algorithm in 1974 [80]. These fast algo-
rithms take advantage of redundancy in the structure of the input data matrix. Further,
a numerically robust RLS algorithm was achieved through the use of QR-decomposition
for matrix algebra by Gentleman and Kung in 1982 [81]. These filters are also referred to
as square-root adaptive filters as they are the square-root form of the standard RLS algo-
rithm. Finally, in 1994 Sayed and Kailath [82] investigated the use of KF theory toward the
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adaptive filtering problem by demonstrating that the QR-decomposition and fast KF algo-
rithms are special cases of the KF. The RLS algorithm is appealing due to it corresponding
with KF theory and having faster convergence when the process model matches the actual
process behaviour. In contrast, model mismatch within the RLS filter may result in poorer
tracking performance when compared against the least mean square filter [24].
2.1.2 Kalman-filter-based prediction
Linear and adaptive estimation cover three major problem types: filtering, smoothing, and
prediction. Filtering is the calculation of estimates for the current time-step, smoothing
is the calculation of estimates for past time-steps, and prediction is the calculation of
estimates for future time-steps, i.e. forecasting. It is therefore natural for the estimation
methods of Section 2.1.1 to be extended to the prediction problem. When applied within
engineering problems, these three forms of estimation are assumed to be causal. In other
words, the filter output is a function of past and current but not future inputs.
Themost simple form of linear prediction involves the use ofmodel parameters that have
been optimized for predicting the future behaviour of a process given an assumed or derived
model structure, as well as, if necessary, future excitation signals. For systems and signals
that are completely documented with precisely known parameters, i.e. deterministic, the
resulting predictions are exact. In contrast, the predictionmechanism that is inherent to the
structure of the KF algorithm [27] accounts for non-determinism in a stochastic framework
through a measure of uncertainty in the initial state conditions, the model parameters, and
the input and output signals of the system. To calculate predictions, the KF propagates
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estimates of the state vector and error covariance into the future given assumed uncertainty
in the model and signals in addition to the assumptions as described above for the case of
linear prediction. State error covariance is a matrix representation of the multidimensional
variance for the state error including correlations between the variances along the multiple
dimensions. By propagating the state vector and covariance, the KF has a benefit over
deterministic prediction in that it can calculate point-predictions as well as a measure of
uncertainty or confidence interval in the point-predictions as a function of the calculated
standard deviation.
For both the exact and inexact KF-based prediction methods, parameter optimization
is assumed to be performed off-line by linear regression for a model that is at least partially
documented. Thus, neither of prediction method is considered to be adaptive [54]. There
are, however, many adaptive prediction methods that build upon the KF algorithm. This
subsection reviews and categorizes a small subset of related works from the vast number of
publications related to KF-based prediction in order to better understand how KFs may
be used to solve prediction problems.
Linear and nonlinear prediction
An obvious extension of the KF and also the state equation within the state-space model
of a system is to propagate the state vector beyond one time-step. In [27], Kalman states
that his solution to the Wiener problem may be applied to filtering or estimation as well
as smoothing and prediction problems. Kalman does not, however, include specific proce-
dures or equations for propagating the state error covariance within the KF. The following
are example applications of varying complexity that utilize the KF to solve a prediction
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problem. The accuracy of the KF-based predictions are provided for those publications
that quantify error or performance.
One of the earliest uses of the KF for prediction was by Toyoda et al. [83] to calculate
short-term predictions of the future load behaviour for on-line and real-time control of
complex power systems. This use of a KF for multi-step ahead prediction, in turn, cites
the work of Sorenson [84]. More specifically, Sorenson provides an extensive discussion
regarding Kalman filter theory as well as techniques for space navigation problems. In
addition, within the same text, Schmidt discusses prediction within the navigation problem
whereby error between the propagated future state and an impending reference trajectory
determines whether any control actions are required at present [85]. These publications do
not, however, state explicitly themulti-step-ahead prediction problem. At around the same
time as Toyoda et al., Galiana [86] also uses the KF for forecasting the future behaviour of
electric load. Thus, although the trajectories of celestial bodies and space travel may have
motivated solutions to the estimation and prediction problems, these solutions were soon
after adapted to various other applications.
To aid in the landing of aircraft while at sea, Sidar and Doolin [87] design a KF-based
predictor to predict in real-time the motion of an aircraft carrier. The study cites both
Sorenson [84] as well as Kalman and Bucy [54] for the multi-step ahead prediction method.
The strategy is reported to achieve reasonable error bounds of less than 60cm over a time
interval of up to 20s. Prediction quality is assessed by calculating the amount of time that
the actual ship movement differs in sign from that of the prediction. This amount of time
is reported to differ for less than 0.5s over an interval of 60s.
Chung et al. [88] use the KF to estimate a wave-excitation forcing input function in
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order to predict ship motion. Estimation of the forcing input function allows for future
values of the input to be predicted. The predictions are then input to the ship-motion
dynamic model to predict the motion of the ship for exact as well as uncertain parameters.
This method of prediction is referred to as prediction of state via input excitation and is
compared against predictions calculated using a standard KF. A comparison with standard
KF-based predictions reveals that the proposed input prediction method achieves mean
squared errors that are between 50 and 70% of the KF results at prediction horizons of up
to 20s.
Ten Brummelhuis et al. [89] use the EKF for online prediction of the water levels
in tidal estuaries. The EKF is implemented to linearize the model against a discrete
reference state trajectory for errors in the deterministic model. Linearization is performed
at every time-step. The EKF also simultaneously calculates parameter estimates and is
therefore essentially a dual-EKF. The performance of the dual-EKF implementation is
not quantitatively analyzed, although visual inspection of the included plots indicate a
maximum prediction error of under 50cm for peak to peak tides of 400cm.
Chen et al. [90] propose a particle predictor for nonlinear time-varying systems. The
task of fault prediction differs from fault detection in that the former predicts whether
a fault is going to occur at some time in the future whereas the latter detects whether a
fault has already occurred. The particle predictor utilizes sampling importance resampling
which is also known as Bayesian bootstrap filtering. In this manner, the predictor is able
to represent uncertainty in the predictions as a non-Gaussian probability density function.
This representation is achieved using a sequential Monte Carlo technique.
Moradkhani et al. use a dual state-parameter EnKF to estimate and predict streamflow
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given a documented hyrdological rainfall-runoff model [91]. The dual state-parameter
algorithm estimates both the states of the system as well as the parameters of the model.
The study discusses the identification of perturbation factors for ensemble generation and
for selection of ensemble size. The confidence interval for parameter-state estimation can
then be calculated at each time-step.
Mastali et al. [92] use an EKF as well as a dual EKF to estimate and predict the state
of charge for various battery types and configurations within the battery management
system of a hybrid vehicle. In addition, the dual EKF also estimates the parameters of
the battery management system. It is argued that the KF is necessary since the batteries
experience a dynamic operational environment, i.e. time-varying model parameters. The
study incorporates three competing models into the EKFs, the best of which achieves an
agreement of less than 4% error between the predictions and the experimental data.
Adaptive prediction
Alternatively, the KF can also be used to estimate the parameters and structure of an
assumed model to improve prediction quality rather than, or in addition to, propagating
the states of a state-space model. These strategies differ from those above in that the KF
adapts the model parameters and not a non-KF-based supporting parameter estimation
routine.
Sriyananda and Towill [93] augment the state vector within a standard KF to estimate
unknown parameters as well as to predict the future performance of a human operator. The
proposed KF predictor demonstrates that it is possible to calculate accurate predictions
for both time-invariant and time-varying model parameters. In the time-varying case, the
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parameters change in an infrequent and abrupt manner. It is found that large errors due
to erroneous initial conditions rapidly decrease as more data becomes available. The study
also suggests that improved estimations can be calculated through the use of parameter
smoothing. For the time-invariant case, an approximate error of 5% is observed in the
forecast performed on day 17 for day 70. For the time-varying case, there is said to be a
20 day period for readjusting the parameters before the predictions are considered to have
reasonable accuracy.
Heath [94] uses an autoregressive model to predict future heart inter-beat interval and
heart-rate observations with the parameters of the autoregressivemodel estimated by aKF.
The one-step ahead predictions are reported to have a mean squared error of 39.02ms over
a peak to peak range of approximately 70ms within an unspecified number of samples. In
addition, a change detection algorithm is presented. The detection algorithm is a function
of prediction error and the chi-squared distribution and is able to detect nonlinearities in
the autoregressive model following changes in a stimulus.
Mizumura andChiu [95] use an autoregressivemoving averagemodel of various orders to
predict snow melt runoff. The snow melt predictions are calculated for prediction horizons
of one and two time-steps using the optimal parameters as calculated by the KF. It is stated
that the predictions are effective although quantitative analysis of error is not included in
the article.
Hawthorne [96] uses a moving average propagation model to predict the future prop-
erties of an 800 megahertz radio signal for a mobile receiver. The prediction error for the
received signal is reported to have zero mean and a standard deviation of 5.08dB. These
statistics were determined to indicate good agreement between themodel and themeasured
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propagation losses.
Melgaard et al. [97] aim to calculate a maximum likelihood estimate of the system
parameters for a continuous-time model of a four-stroke spark ignition engine for the pur-
pose of predicting engine dynamics. A KF calculates the conditional mean and variance of
the one-step ahead predicted observations for both maximum likelihood estimation of the
model parameters as well as for forecasting the engine dynamics. Although no quantitative
analysis of prediction error is given, the prediction error is stated as well as demonstrated
through a plot to show good agreement with future observations.
2.1.3 Prediction under uncertainty
The above-mentioned publications aim to calculate predictions through the use of a KF.
These predictions may be inaccurate, however, when the model parameters or structure
that is provided to, or calculated by, the KF does not match that of the true system being
modelled, e.g. the system is experiencing uncertain conditions with respect to the nominal
model. Moreover, these uncertaintiesmay lead to, or indicate, impending abnormal, unsafe,
or even emergency conditions. According to Nimmo [98], industrial systems operate in one
of three modes: normal, abnormal, or emergency. The boundaries between these modes are
respectively referred to as alarm and emergency thresholdswithin a systembeing protected,
and more specifically within the nuclear power generating industry as included in Figure
1.1. A system being protected is one that is monitored by a protection system. Upon
detecting an abnormal condition, a protection system activates a sequence of events that
prevent an unsafe or hazardous condition from occurring. In some industries, additional
56
protection or mitigation actions may also occur upon detection of unsafe or emergency
conditions.
In the following discussion, the terms abnormal and emergency conditions are not
necessarily interchangeable yet it is possible to predict either an abnormal or an emergency
condition given either threshold. The difference between the two detections being that
the prediction of an abnormal condition can only occur during normal operation whereas
the prediction of an emergency condition may occur within either normal or abnormal
operation. In the context of NPP shutdown, the trip event is initiated as the result of
an abnormal condition being detected. It is imperative, throughout the development of a
predictive safety or protection system, that an impending emergency condition be predicted
whether the system is operating within or beyond the normal operating mode, including
operation under uncertainty conditions. Thus, the effectiveness of the protection system
can only be ensured if the predictions remain accurate while the system is operating under
uncertainty.
Of the publications that address KF-based prediction of abnormal conditions under
uncertainty, that of Juricek et al. [40] is the most similar to the concepts covered within
this dissertation. In fact, the work of Juricek et al. is the foundation for the development
of the KF/LS-based prediction algorithms that are developed within Chapter 4. This is
especially true regarding the consideration of uncertainty due to the presence of abnormal
conditions. Juricek et al. [40] suggest that the following topics are related to the prediction
under uncertain conditions problem: fault detection and diagnosis based on linear process
models; and MPC methods that utilize state estimation and are concerned with assessing
prediction accuracy.
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MPC algorithms are able to optimize control inputs based on predictions of the future
dynamic response and control inputs of the system. These optimizations are performed
over predetermined intervals of time, known as horizons, extending from the present into
the future [99]. KFs have been investigated for use in fault detection algorithms within
the reactor regulating system of an NPP [100] as well as various other applications includ-
ing tracking, navigation, and environmental prediction [47]. The KF has therefore been
extensively studied and proven through use in a predictive application that resembles the
predictive shutdown problem, i.e. the model predictive portion of MPC.
In relating MPC to the prediction under uncertain conditions, Juricek et al. [40] state
that the concept of predicting abnormal conditions could be considered model predictive
monitoring. The prediction under uncertainty problem is therefore addressed through
various robust MPC strategies. That said, MPC has the added benefit of being closed loop
with respect to the system being protected. These methods are often not applicable within
protection systems. For more information regarding MPC refer to [99, 101].
The other suggested topic of fault diagnosis can be extended to fault prognosis given the
predictive nature of the current problem, e.g. early fault detection or predictive diagnostics.
In general, diagnostics and prognostics differ in that the former are performed posterior
to the occurrence of an event while the latter are performed prior to occurrence of the
event. More specifically, diagnostic methods are utilized to classify and possibly isolate
faults whereas prognostic methods predict future conditions and remaining useful life. For
predictive shutdownwithin anNPP, the prediction under uncertainty problem is concerned
with the detection of an impending emergency condition given the potential presence of
an abnormal condition. Thus, both prognostic and diagnostic methods are related to
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the current problem. In other words, prognosis of the impending condition is considered
necessary to achieve an earlier time of detection. The initiating event, however, may
have occurred at some time-step previous to the time of detection, hence diagnostics. An
overview of prognostics is provided at the end of this section.
Prediction and abnormal conditions
In practice, inaccurate predictions result from the inability to obtain an exact model of
the system and environmental conditions, and also from assumptions made during the
modelling and system identification process. These assumptions affect the accuracy of,
and sometimes define, the statistical properties related to the system and signals. More
specifically, inaccurate predictions may be caused by:
1. disturbances in system input, output, and state signals;
2. system-model mismatch due to unanticipated operating conditions, unmodelled dy-
namics, linearization, nonlinearities, aging, degradation, etc.; or
3. erroneous initial conditions or anticipated future signal values.
Each of these causes may be more prominent during abnormal conditions. To improve
prediction accuracy, robust prediction algorithms include mechanisms which compensate
for prediction error or calculate a bounds within which the predictions are expected to
occur.
Juricek et al. [40] state that the following two issues are important when calculating
predictions under uncertain conditions:
• interpreting the predictions with respect to decision-making; and
59
• assessing the reliability, herein referred to as quality, of the predictions.
Here, interpretation of the predictions refers to obtaining an understanding of how and
why an individual prediction can be used to make a decision. In addition, quality refers to
both the overall consistency as well as the accuracy of the predictions with respect to the
eventual parameter, measurement, or signal of interest. Having considered the above-listed
issues, Juricek et al. combine a steady state KF with an LS filter to calculate predictions
for a linear stochastic state-space model. The purpose of the KF is to propagate the
state estimates over a prediction horizon, and the purpose of the LS filter is to estimate
an unknown disturbance input that is referred to as a pseudo-disturbance. The resulting
predictions provide a means to determine whether an emergency limit will be violated
within the prediction horizon.
The work of Juricek et al. [40] aims to predict whether future process variables will
reach a predetermined emergency threshold. Predictions are calculated using a KF as
well as a model of the process or system. Prediction accuracy is improved through LS
estimation of an unmeasured disturbance input as a function of prediction error using a
modified form of a fault detection method developed by Basseville and Nikiforov [102].
More specifically, the LS estimation algorithm is a component of the generalized likelihood
ratio method of Basseville and Nikiforov [102]. This LS method differs from conventional
LS methods in that it considers the effect of the disturbance input on the dynamics of
both the system response and the KF-based predictions. LS estimation of the disturbance
inputs accounts for nonrandombias as has also been investigated in [55,103]. The LS filter is
preferred over utilizing anEKFand augmenting the state vector due to the augmented state
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vector requiring that fictitious statistical noise descriptions be specified for an otherwise
deterministic disturbance. A preliminary investigation of the augmented state form of KF
estimation of the disturbance revealed that the predicted outputs were sensitive to the
selected values of uncertainty, or fictitious noise [40].
Regarding the implementation of LS estimation, Juricek et al. [40] state that it is more
important to predict accurate future measurements than to estimate the true disturbance.
The result is a modified set of KF mean and covariance equations which account for the
estimated disturbance input. The bounds or limits of the confidence interval for the pre-
diction are compared against the emergency threshold. Finally, an emergency condition is
detected when both the upper and the lower bounds of the confidence interval reach the
emergency threshold.
The following conditions, assumptions, and constraints apply to the research presented
in [40]. Predictions are calculated after a fault or abnormal situation has been detected.
Prediction error compensation only considers large sustained disturbances, e.g. ramp and
step, as input to the state equation. The use of two forms of disturbances is justified since
they are more likely to cause an emergency limit to be reached. The process is assumed to
be described by a linear stochastic state-space model. Additive noise terms are assumed to
be white and Gaussian. The state vector is assumed to be observable. The future inputs
are assumed to be known and the disturbance estimate is assumed to be constant over the
prediction window. The steady state implementation allows for the LS parameters to be
computed oﬄine. The LS estimation results in more accurate predictions. In simulation,
the initial time-step of the fault is assumed to be known.
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The simulation results presented by Juricek et al. [40] indicate, for a process that can be
described by a linear model, that the combined LS/KF method provides good predictions
under the condition that the model and the noise statistics are known and there is sufficient
data for accurate estimation of the pseudo-disturbance. In contrast, the presence of process
nonlinearities, model mismatch, and nonstationary disturbances may result in erroneous
predictions. Thus, amechanism for detecting erroneous predictions is developed. Juricek et
al. evaluate the accuracy of previously performed predictions through theT2 statistic. This
statistic determines if the residual is zero mean under the assumption that the covariance
matrix is correct. The T2 statistic is then compared against a confidence bound for the
T-squared distribution. Predictions are ignored if the prediction accuracy is determined
not to be suitable. Other statistical tests regarding the forecasting problem are described
in [104]. Although the strategy proposed by Juricek et al. is not suitable for complex
processes with time-varying disturbances, it is suitable for those that are locally linear and
are subject to sustained disturbances, the strategy is useful as long as prediction error and
quality are monitored.
Other related works
The research presented in [105] is a minor extension to the work of [40]. Predictions are
calculated using an EKF as well as a nonlinear model of the process instead of a KF and
a linear model of the process. The first time-step of the unmeasured disturbance input
is then calculated by comparing the covariance of the compensated residual against the
scaled covariance matrices of the additive noise terms. The EKF method is only partially
presented. The LS estimation is derived for a steady state KF and does not consider
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process nonlinearities. Moreover, a measure of prediction reliability is not considered. This
thesis does not consider the extensions presented in [105] since they are not as thoroughly
developed as those of [40].
Lagarias and Aminzadeh [106] solve a linear quadratic Gaussian control problem for
multi-stage planning processes through the use of multi-step ahead KF prediction. The
proposed strategy differs from the linear quadratic Gaussian problem through the use of
matrix weighted linear combinations of KF estimates where the weights account for both
prediction accuracy as well as stability. In other words, the method penalizes forecasts for
a particular instant in time that vary significantly between successive time-steps.
Yang et al. [107] present a predictive maintenance strategy for a DC motor whereby
time of failure is predicted using a KF. The proposed strategy propagates predictions over
a prediction horizon of one and two time-steps with a sampling interval of one hour. Alarm
signals are generated when the KF-based predictions indicate the speed of the DC motor
has reached the predetermined failure threshold. The study finds that there should be
some margin between the failure threshold and the nominal value of the process. Further,
the study finds that the sampling interval should be as short as possible in order to react
to abrupt disturbances. Otherwise, the study determines that the observed prediction
errors are acceptable by comparing the mean prediction error interval for a specific level of
confidence against the prediction horizon.
Prognostics
With respect to prognostics, Juricek et al. cite Nomikos and MacGregor [108] for perform-
ing predictive monitoring of a batch process using multiway principal component analysis.
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A similar strategy is employed for continuous processes by Chen and McAvoy [109]. The
purpose of the multiway principal component analysis method is to detect and eliminate
faults from progressing and to achieve a more consistent production quality. First, the
algorithm extracts information from all historical process variable signals and projects this
information onto a lower-dimensional space composed of principal components. Then, as
in statistical process control, the future behaviour of the process is monitored by comparing
it against limits obtained from past batches that are known to have performed well. This
form of multiway principal component analysis is a data-driven prediction technique that
requires the batch process to have comparable runs and the detected events to be observ-
able. The multiway principal component analysis method does not, however, calculate
time-series predictions of impending conditions in real-time. Moreover, although labelled
as such by Juricek et al., the multiway principal component analysis method is not strictly
a prognostic method since neither the probability of failure or the remaining useful life are
calculated.
More broadly, prognostic methods for dynamic systems are either classified into three
major types: experience-based; data-driven; and model-based, or are a hybrid of two or
more of the listed types [110,111]. With the exception of the research performed byNomikos
as well as MacGregor and Frank, Juricek et al. also cite various publications related to
diagnostics rather than prognostics. A better understanding of the state-of-the-art in
prognostics is obtained in the survey performed by Jardine [29] and the literature review
performed by Butler [110].
Jardine presents a thorough review of machinery diagnostics and prognostics [29]. Jar-
dine states that predictivemaintenance decisions are based on one of twomeasures: remain-
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ing useful life, or probability of operating without a failure over some prediction horizon.
The majority of prognostic papers cited by Jardine relate to measuring remaining useful
life. Further, Jardine categorizes prognostic methods into three categories: statistical,
artificial intelligence, and model-based.
Butler presents a thorough background on condition-based maintenance and prog-
nostic methods [110]. In condition-based maintenance, maintenance activities are only
performed when there is objective evidence of an impending fault or failure condition.
Further, condition-based maintenance takes into consideration safety, reliability, and cost.
Condition-basedmaintenancemay incorporate diagnostic and/or prognostic strategies and
often employ some form of remaining useful life estimation. Thus, as in [29], Butler also
focuses on remaining useful life rather than probability of operating within a safe operating
region. Butler discusses the requirement for prognostics incorporating “real” predictions
that describe the evolution of either a signal of interest or a fault indicator. Butler states
that uncertainty is the primary difficulty for calculating predictions. Moreover, there are
two issues when considering uncertainty: representation andmanagement. Representation
is the ability to model uncertainty in various forms from various sources whereas manage-
ment is the ability to shrink the uncertainty bounds as a fault evolves [111].
As with Jardine, Butler categorizes prognostic methods into three categories by citing
Vachtsevanos et al. [111]: experience-based, data-driven, and model-based approaches.
These categories parallel those listed in Jardine with the artificial intelligence category of
Jardine including hybrid methods that are both data-driven and model-based. Finally,
Butler lists three metrics for comparing the performance of prognostic algorithms as: prog-
nostic horizon, relative accuracy, and Alpha-Lambda performance, i.e. a measure that
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evaluates whether the algorithms remain within the desired performance levels relative to
the actual remaining useful life.
2.2 Safety Instrumented and Shutdown Systems
Within the nuclear industry, safety systems are responsible for:
• ensuring the return to a safe state of a potentially hazardous system;
• removing residual energy from a potentially hazardous system; or
• limiting the consequences of anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs) and design
basis accidents (DBAs) [10].
In other words, safety systems are responsible for actuating fail-safe components that
conform to the “Control, Cool and Contain” principle: control the reactor power level, cool
the residual heat produced by the fission chain reactions, and contain the radioactivity.
Safety systems can be grouped into those that are for protection, actuation, and sup-
port. Protections systems, as introduced in Section 1.1, are those systems that monitor the
operation of the reactor, and, upon detecting abnormal conditions, automatically initiate
actions to prevent unsafe conditions from occurring [10]. In general, protection systems
utilize simple algorithms or functions whenmaking safety-critical decisions, e.g. threshold-
crossing events [112]. That said, the complex task of designing a protection system must
not be understated. Although the functionality within the protection system is simple,
protection system design takes into consideration a variety of other safety-related criteria,
including those of defence in depth. Moreover, the calculation, or best estimate, of thresh-
olds for the detection of abnormal and accident conditions involves complex safety analysis
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code, including thermal-hydraulic and neutron-kinetics codes, as well as uncertainty anal-
ysis [113].
One of the primary objectives of this research is to investigate the functional enhance-
ment of protection systems that are responsible for shutdown. This section presents a
review of literature related to nuclear safety, regulations and standards, the enhancement
of SDSs with respect to response time, and the development and design of CANDU SDS1
protection systems. This section also introduces literature related to optimal alarms, as
these methods can be utilized to assess and improve upon the quality of safety-related
decisions. This material is an extension of the background included in Section 1.1, e.g. the
concepts of safety margins, TSPs, safety limits, and operating conditions.
2.2.1 Regulations and standards
Protections systems can be considered as a form of SIS. These SISs are prominent in the
transportation, energy, aerospace, medicine, and defence industries. An SIS is defined as
“implementation of one or more safety instrumented functions. An SIS is composed of
any combination of sensor(s), logic solver(s), and final element(s) [114].” This defini-
tion is consistent with that of International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard
IEC61508 and IEC61511, with IEC61508 providing general requirements for functional
safety whereas IEC61511 focuses on SISs for the process industry sector [115, 116]. The
definition of SISs ismore complete alongside the definition of a safety instrumented function
(SIF). An SIF is defined as “a safety function with a specified safety integrity level which
is necessary to achieve functional safety [114].” Moreover, a safety function is defined
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as “a function to be implemented by an SIS, other technology safety-related system, or
external risk reduction facilities which is intended to achieve or maintain a safe state for
the process with respect to a specific hazardous event [114].” It is further stated within
IEC61508 that the logic solver of an SDS may include software and is assumed to be ei-
ther electrical, electronic, or programmable electronic. IEC61508 also provides guidance
regarding the life-cycle requirements for hardware and software of the logic solver, e.g. risk
analysis and system realization.
In addition to the above IEC standards, there exist two standards that are more specific
to the nuclear industry: IEC61513 and IEC62138 [117,118]. IEC61513 provides general re-
quirements for instrumentation and control systems that are important to safety within the
NPP. This standard covers systems that may include hard-wired electro-mechanical, solid-
state, or even computer-based equipment. Moreover, IEC61513 includes requirements that
range from broad recommendations to component level specifications. IEC62138 instead
focuses on the software aspects of computer-based systems that may perform SIFs within
NPPs. More precisely, IEC62138 provides requirements for software that is considered
either category B or C as per IEC62304, i.e. systems for which non-serious injury, serious
injury, or death is possible. These software aspects relate to IEC61513 in the same manner
as the third section of IEC61508 relates to the first section of IEC61508.
Another somewhat related IEC standard is IEC61131 since it specifies requirements for
programmable controllers, including programming languages and functional safety [119].
Although IEC61131 is a more general standard, it is the standard for the programming lan-
guages that are available within the Tricon v9 PLC that is utilized within the experiments
of this dissertation. Thee above IEC standards are generally well agreed upon through-
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out the international nuclear power generating community. The standards are therefore
often reinterpreted within the country-specific regulations and guidelines for NPP design,
development, research, and operation.
The IAEA also provides a number of publications that are specific to the nuclear indus-
try with application to power generation as well as medical isotope production. A variety
of power generation related IAEA publications are cited in Section 1.1. These publications
explicitly define, describe, and discuss all matters related to the appropriate use of nuclear
energy. The publications also include country-specific cases, and experience with all as-
pects of design, development, and operation. For example, safety related instrumentation is
discussed in [9], modernization of instrumentation and control system is covered in [32,33],
the calculation of safety margins in [120], and a glossary of safety definitions is even pro-
vided in [10]. Although there are no technical documents related to the use of prediction
algorithms in SDSs, numerous documents guide the development of instrumentation and
control systems that are important to safety including [121] and one report addresses the
problem of prognostics with respect to structures, systems, and components [31].
2.2.2 CANDU shutdown systems
Within an NPP, control systems may provide some degree of safety protection since these
systems are responsible for maintaining the operation of the plant. Special safety systems,
however, are more specifically defined as systems that implement one or more SIFs and
are composed of a combination of sensors, logic solvers, and final elements, i.e. an SIS as










Figure 2.1: The conventional SDS trip logic within the context of safety instrumented
systems (SISs).
related SISs in CANDU NPPs. The primary system, SDS1, consists of mechanical shut-
off rods while the secondary system, SDS2, injects a neutron absorbing solution into the
moderator via liquid poison injection system. Each SDSmonitors a set of safety parameters
that include neutronic as well as process signals. Further, either system is capable of
shutting down the reactor and maintaining shut down for all design basis events [7].
The two shutdown systems, SDS1 and SDS2, of CANDU NPPs are designed in compli-
ancewithCanadianNuclear SafetyCommission (CNSC) regulations. General performance
and design requirements state that the two SDSs are to [7]:
• be independent, diverse, redundant, and testable;
• incorporate diverse, physical and operational independence;
• demonstrate a target unavailability of less than 10−3 years per year including avail-
ability, testing, and maintenance;
• provide shutdown capabilities regardless of electrical power supply condition;
• have consistent safety capabilities in all operating and failure modes, i.e. failed
components must fail to a safe state;
• prevent disabling of manual operator shutdown capabilities, and respond to redun-
dant and remote location manual shutdown; and
70
• be effective and independent of normal process, safety, or special safety systems.
Acting alone, each SDS ensures that: the reactor is rendered and maintained sub-critical;
the reference dose limits are not exceeded; and a loss of primary heat transport system
integrity shall not result from any fuel failure mechanism, in the event prompt shutdown is
required. In addition, shaking due to a design basis earthquake must not prevent nor slow
shutdown system actuation beyond predetermined safety analysis limits. This shaking is
not, however, monitored as a safety parameter within the CANDU SDS [122].
SDS1 is the primary method of terminating reactor operation when specific safety pa-
rameters are detected to have reached an abnormal condition. SDS1 reduces the capability
of nuclear fission reactions within the core through the release of spring-assisted gravity-
drop shut-off rods [7]. The shut-off rods are composed of the neutron absorbing material
cadmium. SDS1 has three independent channels designated D, E and F. Each channel is
responsible for detecting an abnormal condition given a predetermined set of safety pa-
rameters. In addition, each channel is responsible for de-energizing a set of relays that
control direct current clutches for the release the shut-off rods into the reactor core. This
triplicated design ensures that a trip occurs even when a component from a single channel
or a power supply fails. By these means, a single failure can not incapacitate or spuriously
initiate shutdown actions. Moreover, the triplicated design allows for periodic testing of
the individual channels [7].
The redundant outputs of the SDS are generally combined using either local or general
coincidence voting. These two voting configurations differ in that k-out-of-n, abbreviated
koon, channels of the SDS must trip via either: k of the same safety parameters; or a
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combination of any k safety parameters, over the n channels respectively for the local and
general configurations. In referring to coincidence trip logic, the variables k and n are
separate from the definitions provided in the nomenclature. The logic for CANDU SDS1
operates using general coincidence. General coincidence logic requires, prior to initiating
the shutdown procedure, that two out of three (2oo3) channels have detected an abnormal
condition. Moreover, the detected abnormal conditions are not required to occur for the
same safety parameter over the two channels. Thus, if any two parameters are beyond
the corresponding TSPs, SDS1 initiates the shutdown procedure [7]. SDS1 and SDS2
operations differ when more than one trip parameter is beyond normal operating range.
Although both SDS1 and SDS2 use a 2oo3 voting mechanism, SDS2 requires that the
two parameters that indicate and abnormal condition be produced by the same parameter
within each of the separate channels, i.e. local coincidence [7].
The trip signal of SDS1 includes a seal-in logic circuit in order to prevent the trip decision
from being reversed. The seal-in logic is the same as those of ladder logic circuits and is
essentially a latch. For de-energize to trip, a trip input is connected to the normally closed
trip signal. The trip input opens the final trip action contact as well as a corresponding
normally closed seal-in trip contact that is installed in series with the trip signal. Upon
de-energizing the trip signal, the normally closed seal-in trip contact opens and, no matter
the value of the trip signal, the trip action remains de-energized and active. The three
independent channels of SDS1, D, E and F, have completely independent power supplies,
parameter sensors, and other instrumentation, trip computers, and annunciation devices
[7]. Shutdown rods are divided into two banks. Each bank is supplied with redundant




















Figure 2.2: CANDU SDS1 safety parameters and related subsystems.
current clutches and coincident logic. Each clutch coil is held energized by the contacts of
a separate relay. If a single relay fails, the remainder of the shut-off rods will drop into the
reactor core [7].
The safety parameters that are monitored by SDS1 include neutron power, rate log
neutron, heat transport system flow, heat transport system pressure, reactor building
pressure, pressurizer level, steam generator level, steam generator feed-line pressure, and
moderator level. These parameters and associated systems are illustrated in Figure 2.2.
There are therefore nine measured variables which must remain within predetermined
ranges or corresponding TSPs in order for the NPP to remain in a non-shutdown state.
Moreover, some of these nine parameters include both high and low TSPs. The selection
of these variables is performed to protect against all categories of process failures [7]. In
addition, SDS1 may be activated manually by an operator from the main control room or
secondary control area [123].
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This research focuses primarily on the steam generator level safety parameter as well
as the corresponding SGLL trip condition. The SGLL condition is specifically effective for
protecting against secondary side failures including secondary side heat removal. Without
secondary side heat removal, the energy transfer from the primary heat transport system to
the steam generators, and subsequently the turbines, is disabled. Further, the mechanical
structure of the steam generators may be compromised. This parameter is conditioned out
at low neutron power level.
Within SDS1 and SDS2, one trip computer is utilized per channel. The trip computers
are digital platforms that have replaced analog trip comparators and relay logic used in
previous plants. Final 2oo3 voting, seal-in routines and shut-off mechanism actuation is
performed using various relay circuits [124]. The relay circuits are controlled directly from
the digital outputs of SDS1 and SDS2. The required insertion time of the shut-off rods
following a trip detection is less than or equal to two seconds. Of this total time, the exe-
cution of the software within the logic solver of SDS1 is expected to be less than 100ms not
exceeding 200ms. When SDS1 is in a tripped state, not more than two shut-off rods should
be fully withdrawn. Reactor poison removal procedures and adjuster and mechanical con-
trol absorber withdrawal are disabled to ensure maximum shutdown capabilities. Also the
deuterium moderator system is isolated from the reactor core to prevent the addition of
pure moderator to the poisoned moderator. Conversely, when SDS2 is in a tripped state
the same measures are taken and shut-off rods withdrawal is disabled.
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2.2.3 Time-to-trip and shutdown system response time
Conventional NPP SDSs have relatively simple designs that rarely undergo functional
enhancement. This is true even when the underlying technologies are being replaced or
modernized. There are therefore limited number of events, reports, and studies related
to reductions in time-to-trip or for achieving early shutdown. Although the timely acti-
vation of protection systems has always been considered during NPP design, the earliest
known effort to reduce, or minimize, time-to-trip dates back only to the 1970s where re-
duced time-to-trip was stated as a benefit for modifying existing SDSs to include solid state
devices [125]. Since then, with regards to regulations, a reduction in the technical specifica-
tion for time-to-trip occurred as a result of response time testing at Peach Bottom NPP in
1980. This reduction resulted in excess critical power ratio without subsequent power up-
rating [126]. Another initiative to reduce time-to-trip was the removal of serially-connected
redundant time-delay relays to meet existing technical specifications at Kewaunee NPP in
1992 [127].
During the 1980s, computerized trip computers were introduced within the NPP au-
tomatic protection systems. These computerized SDSs differ in operation from non-
computerized systems in that they execute at predetermined regular intervals known as
scan, or execution, intervals. For example, the computerized SDSs of CANDU SDS1 de-
signs are required to produce a trip decision every 100ms [128, 129] in contrast to the
decisions produced by non-computerized SDSs that include only a propagation delay. In
either case, however, execution intervals and propagation delays demand only a small frac-
tion, approximately 100− 200ms, of the entire amount of time required to insert sufficient
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negative reactivity into the reactor core, between 1500− 2000ms for SDS1. The remainder
of the time is largely required for the mechanical drop or injection of neutron absorbing
materials.
Although computerized SDSs are designed to meet the same regulatory requirements
governing existing SDSs [130], delays in response time became a concern in the 1990s due
to the random nature of hardware failures within the trip computers, and the possibility
of programming errors during development [131]. As a result, verification and validation
(V&V) procedures were established to ensure clarity and traceability of SDS designs. At
the same time, major efforts were undertaken to develop safety-critical fail-safe software
that was of the highest possible quality. One such effort involved the development of SDS1
for the Darlington CANDUNPP [13]. Since then, many studies have investigated methods
for the testing as well as V&V of SDS software and hardware [132].
Most recently, a team of researchers developed a status and risk monitoring system
towards shortening protection system response time at Paks NPP in Hungary [133]. In
addition, anunspecified change in shutdown instrumentationhas been suggested to improve
safety margins with respect to a specific accident and to ultimately ensure an earlier trip
for an advanced CANDU reactor design [22]. Recent SDS research has also focused on
reducing time-to-trip by replacing CPU/software implementations with faster, application
specific FPGA/hardware implementations [18]. These replacements take advantage of the
parallel processing capabilities of FPGAs over the sequential/limited-parallel processing
capabilities of CPUs. Moreover, the use of FPGAs in NPPs has garnered commercial
interest from the company Radiy in Ukraine [134]. The replacement of CPU-based systems
with FPGA-based systems, however, is also generally performed without modification to
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the existing trip decision-making algorithm or structure of the SDS logic [16, 135,136].
Delays in time-to-trip or SDS response time
Although relatively small increases in time-to-trip can result in significant increases in heat
production within the reactor core, no major accidents in the nuclear power industry are
known to have resulted from delays in the shutdown decision-making process. That being
said, the sequence of events for the Chernobyl NPP accident of 1986 did include two events
that are related to time-to-trip. The events are: the intentional disregarding of trip signals
by personnel; and a temporary increase in fission reactions upon insertion of the control
and shut-off rods. Thus, the Chernobyl accident exemplifies the need for fast insertion of
negative reactivity into the reactor core. In fact, the “severe shocks” reported during the
accident occurred less than one minute after the manual trip button was pressed and the
rods became stuck half-way into the reactor core [137].
One far less catastrophic event that was the direct result of an increased time-to-trip
occurred at James A. FitzPatrick NPP in 1996 [138]. The root cause of the increase in time-
to-trip, detected during periodic protection system timing tests, was a generic issue with
the pilot solenoid valves for releasing neutron absorbing rods into the reactor core. The
plant was allowed to return to operation following a five day shutdown for repairs. Another
case of increased time-to-trip due to a generic issue was the slow response of reactor trip
breakers at Calvert Cliffs NPP and Oconee NPP in 1985 [139]. The root causes of these
increases in time-to-trip, which were also detected during response time testing, were the
mechanical slipping of an armature toward a pole face, and the improper replacement of
mounting hardware causing mechanical binding. The amounts of downtime for these cases,
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however, are not known.
2.2.4 Optimal alarms
The combination of prediction and safety critical systems requires the use of highly ac-
curate prediction algorithms. In a study by Martin, a KF-based predictor is combined
with an optimal alarm for detecting level-crossing events, herein referred to as threshold-
crossing events [41]. Optimal alarms are those which produce minimal false alarms for a
fixed detection probability. To accomplish this, Martin finds the optimal area under the
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve; ROC is a statistical tool that is used in
hypothesis testing and decisions making theory that essentially relates TPR to FPR. The
optimal alarm condition is a decision boundary based upon a likelihood ratio criterion.
Optimal alarm regions must be approximated since they cannot be expressed in closed
form when considering all of the time-steps within the prediction window. The optimal
alarm condition provides an upper bound on the false alarm probability. It is expected
that the prediction of an extreme value may be an alternative to using a single level based
on a decision rule as with cumulative sum, sequential probability ratio test, generalized
likelihood ratio, etc. The optimal threshold-crossing predictor has a null hypothesis which
includes a predictable critical event whereas, with the three aforementioned tests, the null
hypotheses are constructed to detect abrupt changes in model parameters [102].
This dissertation combines and expands on the two motivating works of Juricek et al.
and Martin towards the development of a predictive automatic protection system that
is able to make confident and reliable decisions. For this, the optimal alarm problem is
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re-framed in a manner similar to that of Martin to consider the ROC space. An optimal
sub-space is then selected as a function of the above-mentioned FPR and corresponding
conditional probability. The TPR is calculated for each prediction within the prediction
window, rather than for a combination of the predictions within the prediction window as
in the case of Martin. This optimization relies on the validity that of the assumption that
the prediction errors have a Gaussian probability distribution.
The foundations of optimal alarm theory for the optimal prediction of catastrophes
with applications to Gaussian processes are formulated by de Mar in [140], although a
KF is not used. The alarm system is said to be optimal if it detects the catastrophic
event with high probability, and simultaneously gives a minimum number of false alarms.
This statement corresponds directly with the current problem of predictive trip protection
for an NPP. The work of de Mar considers the problem of forecasting sea level height.
It is stated that the prediction of catastrophic sea levels alone is not a very interesting
research problem. It is, however, interesting to consider the detection of these catastrophes
without making too many false alarms. The predictive alarms are therefore determined to
either be correct if the catastrophe does actually take place at the prediction horizon, and
incorrect if the catastrophe does not take place. Thus, the predictive detections include a
hypothesis regarding an impending catastrophe. Moreover, the result of this hypothesis
can be measured once the system propagates forward in time to the prediction horizon,
although, to be clear, de Mar does not investigate the relationship between his work and
the theory of hypothesis testing.
Optimal alarms consider the proportion of detected or alarmed events as well as the
proportion of correct alarms [140]. The optimal alarm then finds the predictor process
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and alarm threshold that maximize the conditional probability of the event given the
alarm under the constraint that the detection probability is equal to or greater than some
predetermined value. Here, the detection probability is given as the conditional probability
of the alarm given the event. In other words, with respect to hypothesis testing, the
prediction horizon as well as the effective TSP can be selected as functions of the true and
false positive and negative event occurrences.
AlthoughMartin includes an example optimal alarm design, he does not specify the ap-
plication for the design and instead cites similar optimal alarm research for auto-regressive
moving average (with exogenous input) systems by Svensson [141]. Svensson, in turn, cites
the work of de Mar, and also cites the detection of abrupt changes work of Basseville and
Nikiforov [102]. Optimal alarm theory has more recently been applied or investigated for
various other applications including earthquake prediction in [142], mining alarms in [143],
and general industrial alarms in [144].
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Chapter 3
Prediction under Uncertainty for
Linear-Time-Varying Systems
The fundamental objective of this research is the development of an algorithm that predicts
future values of safety parameter measurements. Safety parameters are the signals that are
transmitted by safety sensors to be monitored by SDSs. The subsystems associated with
the safety parameters are herein referred to individually as a system. In general, prediction
algorithms may be composed of, but are not limited to, any one or a combination of the
linear, nonlinear, adaptive, data-, or model-based algorithms as discussed in Section 2.1.1.
Within this research, preference is given to model-based prediction algorithms that utilize
existing knowledge regarding themathematical models, operating conditions, and dynamic
characteristics of the system and associated safety parameters. Preference is also given
to prediction algorithms that consider stochastic descriptions of uncertainty, i.e. those
uncertainties that are not defined precisely but are instead defined statistically through
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the use of probability distributions. These descriptions of uncertainty, in turn, describe
the uncertain behaviour of the system at current and future time-steps.
It is expected that the above objective will result in a prediction algorithm that is able to
calculate themulti-step-ahead future values of safety parametermeasurements for a system
that may have time-varying parameters while taking into consideration various sources
of uncertainties. Towards this objective, this chapter focuses specifically on prediction
algorithms that are KF-based. TheKF is selected since it conforms to the criteria discussed
in the previous paragraph and is compatible with the state-space form of systemmodelling,
a form that is common within predictive control literature [99]. In addition, the KF is well-
established and is supported by vast bodies of related literature and applications, some of
which are reviewed in Chapter 2.
This chapter introduces discrete-time stochastic state-spacemodelling aswell as discrete-
time KF-based estimation of system states and measurements for a system with LTV
parameters. The KF-based state estimation procedure is then extended to both the multi-
step-ahead state and measurement prediction problems. This extension results in two
separate KF-based prediction algorithms. The first is a point-prediction algorithm that
calculates the mean value of the expected future state and measurement. The second is an
interval-prediction algorithm that calculates both the mean value as well as a confidence
or prediction interval as an upper and lower bound of the expected future state and mea-
surement. The selection of initial conditions for the estimation and prediction problem is
also discussed.
This chapter identifies a number of considerations that are to be addressed when ex-
tending KF functionality to the multi-step-ahead prediction problem. The primary focus
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of prediction is to obtain accurate descriptions of the uncertainty between the true and
assumed model. This accuracy is improved through the use of the ALMF algorithm to
estimate the state and measurement noise covariance. This chapter also investigates the
effect that these descriptions of uncertainty have on the accuracy of the calculated mean
estimates and predictions as well as the associated covariances, a consideration that is often
overlooked within the KF-based state estimation literature. These considerations prompt
further prediction algorithm development within subsequent chapters.
In summary, this chapter combines KF-based state and measurement prediction as
well as ALMF-based noise covariance estimation to address the multi-step-ahead point-
and interval- prediction problem. This combination of KF andALMF algorithms allows for
the KF to consider time-varying model parameters as well as time-varying descriptions of
uncertainty. The ALMF noise covariance estimation algorithm also provides a mechanism
for ensuring accurate interval-predictions since both the mean value of the estimates as
well as the confidence intervals are functions of the estimated noise covariances. This
is the first known study that applies the ALMF noise estimation procedure within the
multi-step-ahead interval-prediction problem for time-varying systems.
In order to be somewhat succinct, this chapter does not cover the vast body of literature
including extended methods, implementation considerations, and applications that are
related to the KF. For a more complete treatment of KF-based estimation and prediction
please refer to one of the following [44,46,47].
83
3.1 State-space Modelling, Prediction, and
Uncertainty
This section investigates the relationship between uncertainty descriptionswithin the state-
space form of modelling and the safety parameter prediction problem. This section begins
by introducing state-space models for systems that have LTV parameters. The state-space
model is then applied to the prediction problem. This section concludes with discussion
regarding the effect of the uncertainties on the quality of prediction. These uncertain-
ties include mismatch between the assumed and true system model parameters as well
as discrepancies between the measured and true system signals. The former of these two
uncertainties is often referred to as model mismatch.
Parameters differ from signals in that signals generally transfer variables between com-
ponents of a system, e.g. inputs, outputs, states. In contrast, parameters describe the
attributes of the various components within the system, e.g. amplitude, phase, or fre-
quency of a sine wave. Signals therefore describe the manoeuvres that are provided to, and
actions that are taken by, the components within a system. Signals are assigned values at
all points in time, e.g. measurements. Meanwhile, parameters most often have constant
values, or alternatively, have values that change as a function of some predetermined signal.
Parameters are not necessarily assigned values at all time steps, e.g. parameters that are
globally constant or have constant values that are assigned by operating point or region.
It is first assumed that the system can be modelled in the following discrete-time LTV
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state-space form
x [k + 1] = A [k] x [k] + B [k] u [k] (3.1)
y [k] = C [k] x [k] +D [k] u [k] (3.2)
where k ∈ Znk×1 is the discrete time-step or time-index with units s/Ts and Ts is the chosen
sampling time. The state-space signals are as follows: x ∈ Rnx×1 is the system state vector,
u ∈ Rnu×1 is the system input vector, and y ∈ Rny×1 is the system measurement vector.
Moreover, the state-space parameters are as follows: A ∈ Rnx×nx is the state matrix,
B ∈ Rnx×nu is the input-to-state matrix, C ∈ Rny×nx is the state-to-measurement matrix,
andD ∈ Rny×nu is the feed-through matrix. The two equations (3.1) and (3.2) are referred
to respectively as the state and measurement equation. Here, the term measurement refers
to the fact that signal y is generally the output that is transmitted by a physical sensor and
is therefore measurable.
The state and measurement equations are combined in the block diagram of Figure 3.1
where q−1 is the backward time-shift operator. This diagram illustrates the predictive form
of the state equation where the time dependence is between the future state, x [k + 1], and
the current state, x [k], rather than between the current, x [k], and past, x [k − 1], states as is
common within KF literature. One interpretation of the state and measurement equations
assumes that the system matrices represent the following specific system components: A
for the process dynamics, B for the actuator dynamics, C for the sensor dynamics, and D
as a direct feed-through of the manipulating system input, u.
The LTV state-space form of (3.1) and (3.2) differs from the LTI state-space form
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Figure 3.1: Combined state and measurement equations in (3.1) and (3.2) respectively.
that is usually assumed for the standard KF. More specifically, the parameters within the
system matrices, A,B,C, and D, vary with time rather than being time-invariant. The
LTV form is selected for study since it is a generalization of the linear parameter varying
(LPV) system that is the main application studied within Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. In
addition, the LTV form allows for a broader range of dynamic processes to be considered
as a potential system when compared against either the LTI or LPV forms.
LTV systems are generally assumed to have parameters that are known functions of
time whereas LPV systems have time-varying parameters that are dependent on some
exogenous input, e.g. an element of the system input, uθ. Both LTV and LPV systems do,
however, have parameters that vary with time. An equivalence between the parameters of
the LTV and LPV systems can therefore be established. First, the time-varying system
matrices are defined in terms of a time-varying parameter vector. For example, the time-
varying state matrix, A, is defined as a function of the time-varying parameter vector, θ,
as follows.
A [k] , A (θ [k]) (3.3)
The values of the time-varying parameter vector, θu, are then defined as the values of an
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θ (uθ [k]) (3.4)
where uθ is the exogenous input that determines the values of parameter vector, θ. The rela-
tionship between the LTV state matrix,A, and the exogenous input, uθ, is then established
directly as follows
A [k] = A (θu [k]) (3.5)
where parameter vector, θu [k], is the time-dependent equivalent of the exogenous-input-
based parameter vector, θ (uθ [k]). These definitions and relationships hold for the remain-
ing system matrices, B,C, and D.
In representingLPVsystems asLTV it is not possible to calculate the parameters of LPV
systems in advance if the future exogenous inputs, on which the parameters are dependent,
are not known. This contrasts the parameters of the LTVmodel which are known functions
of time and are therefore able to be calculated within the current time-step, k, for future
time-steps, k + i where i = 1, . . . ,Np and Np is a positive integer representing a number
of time-steps that is the length of the prediction window. It is assumed within this work,
therefore, that the parameters of the LTV system are not explicit functions of time and
cannot be calculated in advance.
Regarding the prediction problem, the state equation in (3.1) inherently provides a
means for propagating the state vector to future time-steps, i.e. state predictions, as
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follows










A [k + i− 1− j2]B [k + j1] u [k + j1] (3.6)
where
∏−1
j=0 = 1 and i = 1, . . . ,Np is the time-step of prediction withNp again representing
the length of the moving prediction window. This final time-step, Np, is also referred to
as the prediction horizon. Given state predictions, it is possible to calculate measurement
predictions by modifying the measurement equation in (3.2) as follows
y [k + i] = C [k + i] x [k + i] +D [k + i] u [k + i] (3.7)
where i is as defined for (3.6).
The difficulty in calculating predictions using (3.6) and (3.7) is that the two equations
are functions of an unknown and unmeasurable state vector, x [k]. In addition, the future
model parameters,A [k + i] ,B [k + i] , etc., are not known because the values of the param-
eters are dependent on unknown future system inputs, uθ [k + i]. It is therefore necessary
to:
• approximate the unknown states of the system at the current time-step;
• make assumptions regarding the future model parameters and system inputs; and
• quantify or describe uncertainties within the state vector predictions that are a result
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of the aforementioned assumptions.
First, given that state-space model of the underlying system can be constructed and
the parameters of the model estimated, it is possible to approximate the unknown state
vector, x [k], through the use of a state observer. More precisely, state observers estimate
the unknown state vector, xˆ [k], as a function of system measurements and model parame-
ters given that the LTV system model meets the following condition for uniform NO-step
observability [145]






C [k −NO + 1]A [k −NO]
...






where O is the observability matrix and NO ≥ nx.
The KF is one form of state observer, or estimator, that calculates state estimates which
are optimal in the minimal mean square sense of the state estimation error [27]. Thus, the
KF is introduced within the prediction algorithm as a state observer rather than more
directly as a state or measurement predictor. The function of the KF is then extended to
the state or measurement prediction problem.
In the role of state observer, the KF assumes a system that is similar to the state-
space form of (3.1) and (3.2) but also includes two additional additive noise terms. More
specifically, it is assumed within the KF that the system can be modelled in the form
of the following discrete-time LTV stochastic state-space model with additive state and
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measurement noise sequences
x [k + 1] = A [k] x [k] + B [k] u [k] + vx [k] (3.9)
y [k] = C [k] x [k] +D [k] u [k] + vy [k] (3.10)
where vx ∈ Rnx×1 is the state noise vector, vy ∈ Rny×1 is the measurement noise vector, and
all other parameters are as defined for the deterministic case in (3.1) and (3.2). Equations
(3.9) and (3.10) are referred to as the stochastic state and stochasticmeasurement equations
respectively. These equations are considered to be stochastic since the two noise terms are
assigned probability distributions rather than being deterministic, or precise, values like
those of the model parameter and the intended system input, u.
The stochastic state and measurement equations are combined in the block diagram
of Figure 3.2. This diagram differs from the deterministic case of Figure 3.1 in that the
two noise terms are added as inputs to the state and measurement signals. This diagram
illustrates that the state noise has a direct influence on the state vector. Alternatively, the
dimension of the state noise is sometimes assumed to differ from that of the state vector.
For example, if the state noise affects the system in the same manner as the system input u,
the state noise is multiplied by the input-to-state matrix B as vx = Bvu where vu ∈ Rnu×1.
Thus, the input noise vu may have different statistical properties than those of the state
noise vx.
The two additive noise terms, vx and vy, enable the KF-based state observer to consider
the following uncertainties:
• a model that may not be an exact parametric or structural representation of the true
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Figure 3.2: Combined stochastic state and measurement equations in (3.9) and (3.10).
system, i.e. model mismatch; and
• system input, state, and measurement signals that may include disturbances or noise
with respect to the true signals of the system.
Within the standard KF, the two additive noise terms are assumed to belong to a white
Gaussian probability distribution. More precisely, the KF is provided only the statistical
properties or moments of the probability distribution for each of the additive noise terms
and not the exact values of the noise samples. In addition, within certain elements of the
state vector, it is not possible to measure the additive noise since the noise signals are
internal to the system, i.e. unmeasurable. Thus, the KF-based state observer utilizes the
structure of the model to estimate the state vector. The observer also uses the statistical
descriptions of noise to filter the uncertaintieswithin in themodel parameters andmeasured
signals with respect to the true system parameters and signals.
Returning to the prediction problem, the multi-step-ahead prediction equation of (3.6)
is able to propagate, in a deterministic manner, an uncertain but optimal KF-based state
estimate to a future time-step, i.e. an uncertain state prediction, xˆ [k + i]. This state
prediction is not optimal, however, due to the predictions being calculated within the
current time-step, k, when the assumed future model parameters and signals are not known
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and may not represent exactly the true future system and signals. The result of these
assumptions is an equation for propagating the state vector that is different than the true
behaviour of the system, i.e. xˆ [k + i] is not expected to be equal to x [k + i]. For example,
state propagation may be performed by assuming that the future system matrices and
inputs are equal to the values within the current time-step, k, as follows.
xˆ [k + i] = A [k] xˆ [k + i− 1] + B [k] u [k] (3.11)
Moreover, measurement predictions calculated using (3.7) are also not optimal, i.e. yˆ [k + i]
is not expected to be equal to y [k + i], for the same reasons as for the state prediction and
also since the measurement prediction is a function of the uncertain state prediction.
The assumptions that cause the predictions not to be optimal are similar to the mod-
elling assumptions that are listed above for the KF-based state observer. In fact, during
state estimation the state estimate xˆ [k] is not expected to be equal to the true system
state x [k]. It is possible, therefore, to extend the functionality and stochastic uncertainty
descriptions of the KF-based state observer to the measurement prediction problem. This
is accomplished in the same manner as for state estimation. In other words, by including
various model and signal uncertainties within the statistical properties that are defined for
the additive noise signals, vx and vy, for the stochastic state-spacemodel of (3.9) and (3.10).
In this manner, the KF is not only able to quantify a probabilistic description of uncertainty
in the state estimates but can also quantify the uncertainties in the propagated state and








Figure 3.3: Connectivity between the system and a state observer, whichmay beKF-based,
within the context of state estimation.
3.2 Kalman-Filter-Based State Estimation
The KF is able to perform state estimation by minimizing the mean squared error between
the true values and the estimates of the system states. This minimization is a function
of the system input and measurement as well as the model parameters as defined in (3.9)
and (3.10). A simplified diagram of the state estimation problem is included in Figure 3.3.
This diagram identifies the connections that are made between the state observer and the
signals of the system. This diagram also indicates that the state observer is provided model
parameters and receives system signals or variables that are not necessarily exact to the
true system. More specifically, the true parameter and variable symbols are denoted by
a bar accent, •¯, whereas the model parameter and measured signal symbols are included
without accent marks.
KF state estimation accounts for uncertainties in the model parameters and input
signals of the system through state noise covariance Rx ∈ Rnx×nx , and for uncertainties in
the measurement signals through measurement noise covariance Ry ∈ Rny×ny . These two
parameters are the covariance matrices for the two additive noise terms vx and vy, from
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(3.9) and (3.10) respectively. The effects of input noise vu are assumed to be combined into
vx as a function of the input-to-state matrix,B, as stated in the discussion regarding Figure
3.2. The two noise vectors, vx and vy, are assumed to be white Gaussian noise sequences
that satisfy the following statistical properties
E {vx [k]} = E {vy [k]} = 0
E {vx [k] v′x [j]} =


0 k 6= j
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= 0 for all k and j (3.12)













, and noise covariancematricesRx andRy respectively.
In addition, •′ indicates the transpose of a matrix or vector.
The noise sequences, vx and vy, are white in that the sequences are composed of serially
uncorrelated samples and the sequence also has zero-mean and finite variance, i.e. a power
spectral density that is constant for all frequencies [24]. Further, the noise sequences are
Gaussian in that the samples within the sequence are statistically independent with a prob-
ability distribution that is completely specified using only the first and second statistical
moments, i.e. mean and variance. The noise sequences are assumed to have Gaussian
probability distributions due to the central limit theorem. In short, the central theorem
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states that the sum of a sufficiently large number of independent random sequences has a
Gaussian probability distribution with mean and variance equal to the sum of the means
and variances of the sequences [146]. For the case where vx and vy are coloured noise, the
structure of (3.9) and (3.10) may be achieved by extracting the coloured noise dynamics
from the noise terms and augmenting the dynamics into the system state vector [46]. In
addition, for non-linear dynamics or non-Gaussian error probability distributions the EKF
and UKF may be utilized as discussed in Section 2.1.2.
KFs execute two stages within each time-step; update and predict [47]. Each stage has
an associated state estimate xˆ ∈ Rnx×1; the updated, or a posteriori, state estimate xˆ [k|k]
and; the predicted, or a priori, state estimate xˆ [k|k − 1]. The notation [k|k − 1] follows
conditional probability where the a priori estimate is conditioned on information that is
available prior to and including time-step k − 1. The covariance of the state estimation
error is then defined as follows
Px˜ [k|k] = E {x˜ [k|k] x˜′ [k|k]} (3.13)
Px˜ [k|k − 1] = E {x˜ [k|k − 1] x˜′ [k|k − 1]} (3.14)
for the a posteriori, x˜ [k|k] = x [k]− xˆ [k|k], and a priori, x˜ [k|k − 1] = x [k]− xˆ [k|k − 1],
state vectors respectively where Px˜ ∈ Rnx×nx . These state error covariances quantify
the second statistical moment or variance of the state estimation error. In other words,
the state estimate quantifies the mean expected value, whereas the state error covariance
describes the probability distribution within the state-space over which the true system
state is expected to belong.
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3.2.1 The Kalman filter
TheKF includes five equations in total. The first three equations update the state estimates
as well as the state error covariances and the latter two equations propagate the state
estimates and error covariances forward in time. Within the update stage, the KF gain,
K ∈ Rnx×ny , is first calculated as follows.
K [k] = Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] (C [k]Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] +Ry [k])−1 (3.15)
This is the optimal gain thatminimizes themean squared estimation error as the trace of the
a posteriori state error covariance, Px˜ [k|k]. The Kalman gain also maps the measurement
space to the state-space. Next, the a posteriori state estimate is calculated as follows.
xˆ [k|k] = xˆ [k|k − 1] +K [k] (y [k]− (C [k] xˆ [k|k − 1] +D [k] u [k])) (3.16)
This equation calculates the optimal state estimate given the error between the newly
acquired systemmeasurements and the a priori KF-basedmeasurement estimates. Finally,
the a posteriori state error covariance matrix is calculated as follows
Px˜ [k|k] = E {x˜ [k|k] x˜′ [k|k]}
= E
{
(x [k]− xˆ [k|k]) (x [k]− xˆ [k|k])′}
= (I−K [k]C [k])Px˜ [k|k − 1] (I−K [k]C [k])′ +K [k]Ry [k]K ′ [k] (3.17)
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where the covariance is updated as a function of the KF gain, and I is an identity matrix of
appropriate dimension. Of these three equations, only the a posteriori state estimate is a
function of system measurements, i.e. is updated according to the system measurements,
whereas the two remaining equations are functions of model parameters and covariance
matrices only. In other words, the state estimates are updated as a function of the KF-
based state estimation accuracy whereas the elements of the Kalman gain vector and the
state error covariance matrix are not.
The predict stage includes two equations. The a priori state estimate is calculated as
follows.
xˆ [k + 1|k] = A [k] xˆ [k|k] + B [k] u [k] (3.18)
This is the model-based propagation of the a posteriori state estimate one time-step into
the future. The a priori error covariancematrix is calculated in a similar manner as follows.
Px˜ [k + 1|k] = E {x˜ [k + 1|k] x˜′ [k + 1|k]}
= E
{
(x [k + 1]− xˆ [k + 1|k]) (xˆ [k + 1|k]− xˆ [k + 1|k])′}
= A [k]Px˜ [k|k]A′ [k] +Rx [k] (3.19)
This propagation is also model-based. Thus, the two predict stage equations are based
solely on the parameters of the stochastic state-space system are not optimized or updated.
For the full derivation of theKF-based state estimation equations, please refer to [44,46,47].






Figure 3.4: Combined a posteriori and a priori state estimation equations in (3.16) and
(3.18) respectively; the angled arrow indicates an adaptive parameter, in this case K [k].
diagram of Figure 3.4. In addition, the combined Kalman gain calculation as well as a
posteriori and a priori state error covariance equations are included in Figure 3.5. The
connectivity included in Figure 3.4 illustrates that the state estimates are a function of the
error between the system measurements and the a priori estimate of the system measure-
ment. Thus, the minimization performed by the KF, as illustrated in Figure 3.5, causes
the state estimates to track, to some degree, the measurements that are received from the
safety sensors installed within the system.
A summary of the KF-based state estimation procedure is provided in Algorithm 3.1
while an overview of the estimation procedure is illustrated in Figure 3.6. Algorithm
3.1 includes a count of the number of operations per loop (OPL) that are required to be
calculated for a system with a single output or measurement. The measurement vector is
assumed to be scalar for comparison of computational complexity against the algorithms
that are developed in subsequent subsections. In addition, a non-scalarmeasurementwould
require calculation of the covariance matrix and cross covariances between measurements




Figure 3.5: Combined Kalman gain equation in (3.15) as well as the a posteriori and a
priori state estimation equations in (3.17) and (3.19) respectively; (•) indicates where the
input variable is substituted within the equation of the corresponding block.
assumption allows for flexibility in selecting one of various methods for calculating the
inverse within the Kalman gain equation e.g. processing the measurements separately [46].
The OPL tallies the number of multiplication and addition operations for all equation
within the repeated loop of the algorithm. This loop includes only the equations that are
executed within each time-step of the state estimation procedure. The OPL result may
also be referred to as the arithmetic complexity of the algorithm.
A reduction in the number of total multiplication is utilized to improve algorithm
performance when calculating symmetric matrices, e.g. A [k]Px˜ [k|k]A′ [k], where the 2n3x
multiplications can be reduced to (3n3x + n
2
x) /2 operation and 2 (n
3
x − n2x) additions can
be reduced to (3n3x − 2n2x − nx) /2 operations. Moreover, scalar division is assumed to
be performed by the Newton-Raphson method where for double-precision floating-point








Figure 3.6: Connectivity between the system and the KF-based state estimation procedure
of Algorithm 3.1.
Algorithm 3.1 Kalman-filter-based (KF) state estimation, KFe.
Require: A,B,C,D, u, y,Rx,Ry
Initial conditions: xˆ [0|0] ,Px˜ [0|0]
Result: xˆ [k|k] ,Px˜ [k|k]
k = 0
[Initialization]
xˆ [1|0] = A [0] xˆ [0|0] + B [0] u [0]
Px˜ [1|0] = A [0]Px˜ [0|0]A′ [0] +Rx [0]
{propagate x [0] to x [1]}
loop
k = k + 1
{measure y [k]}
[State estimation (update)]
K [k] = Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] (C [k]Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] +Ry [k])−1
xˆ [k|k] = xˆ [k|k − 1] +K [k] (y [k]− (C [k] xˆ [k|k − 1] +D [k] u [k]))
Px˜ [k|k] = (I−K [k]C [k])Px˜ [k|k − 1] (I−K [k]C [k])′+K [k]Ry [k]K ′ [k]
[State propagation (predict)]
xˆ [k + 1|k] = A [k] xˆ [k|k] + B [k] u [k]
Px˜ [k + 1|k] = A [k]Px˜ [k|k]A′ [k] +Rx [k]
{propagate x [k] to x [k + 1]}
end loop
OPL for scalar y: 6n3x + 10.5n
2





and seven additions are performed. The count included in Algorithm 3.1 reveals that the
computational complexity of the KF-based state estimation routine is cubic with respect
to the dimension of the state vector, or KFe ∈ O (n3x) using big O notation.
For the LTI case, with jointly Gaussian distributed state and measurement, the KF
is a minimum variance unbiased estimator and is therefore considered to be an efficient
estimator [147]. Moreover, under the previously stated conditions, the KF is the best
unbiased estimator. This may not, however, be the true in the case of KF-based state
estimation for an LTV system. The ability of the KF to efficiently estimate the state of an
LTV system must therefore be monitored. It is difficult to monitor directly the efficiency
of the filter as efficiency is generally a relative metric. The ability of the filter to produce
unbiased as well as consistent estimates can be monitored through the use of statistical
testing as is presented in Chapter 5.
3.2.2 Related equations
Aside from the five standard equations, the KF enables the calculation of signals that
provide additional information regarding the quality or accuracy of the state estimations.
These signals also extend the usefulness of the KF to include measurement estimation and
prediction. Three of the additional signals are extracted from the standard KF equations
whereas two signals are alternative a posteriori interpretations of the standard a priori
equations.
The first signal is the a priori measurement error that is embedded in (3.16). The a
priori measurement error is equal to the difference between the current measurement and
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the a priori measurement estimate as follows.
y˜ [k|k − 1] = y [k]− yˆ [k|k − 1]
= y [k]− (C [k] xˆ [k|k − 1] +D [k] u [k]) (3.20)
This measurement error is commonly used in statistical evaluations of KF performance.
More precisely, in the case of optimal KF state estimates, the a priori measurement error
is a white Gaussian sequence. This error is referred to as the innovation, a term that refers
to the fact that new information regarding error statistics can be obtained from (3.20) at
each time-step given independence between subsequent measurement errors.
The second signal is the a priori measurement estimate. This signal is embeddedwithin
the innovation calculation of (3.20) and, in turn, the state update equation of (3.16). The
a priori measurement estimate applies the measurement equation of (3.10) to the a priori
state estimate as follows.
yˆ [k|k − 1] = C [k] xˆ [k|k − 1] +D [k] u [k] (3.21)
This estimate is also a one-step-ahead measurement prediction for time-step k where the
state estimate is calculated using only information that is available prior to and including
time-step (k − 1). Measurement prediction differs from state estimation in that the param-
eters C [k] and D [k] as well as signal u [k] are assumed to be known. The one-step-ahead
measurement prediction can also be calculated within the current time-step, k, for future
time-step, (k + 1), as yˆ [k + 1|k] given again that the future parameters and signals are
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assumed to be known.
The equivalent of the a priori measurement estimate within the update stage of the KF
is the a posteriori measurement estimate. The a posteriori measurement estimate is the
result of applying the measurement equation in (3.10) to the a posteriori state estimate as
follows.
yˆ [k|k] = C [k] xˆ [k|k] +D [k] u [k] (3.22)
The a posteriori measurement estimate is a filtered estimate of the system measurement
that is optimal given that the model parameters and noise covariances provided to the KF
accurately represent the true system and additive noise terms. In other words, the a pos-
teriori measurement estimate provides an estimate of the measurement that is influenced
to some degree by the assumed model on which the KF is based. These properties are also
present within the a priori measurement estimate of (3.21).
The degree to which the estimates are influenced by either the model or the measure-
ments is determined by the values of Rx and Ry. For example, assuming scalar state and
measurement vectors and equal values of innovation, smaller values of Ry, i.e. Ry ≪ Rx
will result in a larger magnitude of correction being applied to the state estimate. This
increase in correction is due to the measurements being more uncertain with respect to the
model as specified by the state noise covariance, Rx. This increase in correction may not
necessarily, however, result in a reduction in error between the measurement estimate and
the true system measurement, y¯ − yˆ, where y is the true system measurement.
The final two related equations are reinterpretations of the state error covariances in
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the measurement domain rather than the state domain. The result is a measurement error
covariance for each of the a posteriori and a priori measurement errors as follows
Py˜ [k|k] = C [k]Px˜ [k|k]C ′ [k] +Ry [k] (3.23)
Py˜ [k + 1|k] = C [k + 1]Px˜ [k + 1|k]C ′ [k + 1] +Ry [k + 1] (3.24)
where Py˜ ∈ Rny×ny . While measurement estimates quantify mean expected values, the
measurement error covariance matrices describe the probability distribution over which
within the measurement domain the true system measurements are expected to belong.
The a priori measurement error covariance is included in the Kalman gain equation of
(3.15).
3.2.3 Initial conditions, convergence, model selection, and
bumpless transfer
The KF state estimation procedure includes two initial conditions; state, xˆ [0|0], and state
error covariance, Px˜ [0|0] as provided in the calculation of xˆ [1|0] and Px˜ [1|0] in Algorithm
3.1. The initial state estimate is by definition an approximation of the true initial state
within the system, whereas the initial state error covariance is an approximation of the
error covariance that is consistent with the initial state estimate [148].
Due to the recursive form of the calculations within the KF, the initial conditions have
a direct effect on the quality of the KF-based state estimates within the initial time-steps of
estimation. This effect fades, however, with every iterative calculation of the Kalman gain
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given that the estimations are convergent. The criteria for convergence of KF-based state
estimates are discussed by Anderson and Moore [149] where it is stated that the uniform
detectability of the following state and state-to-measurement matrix pair, (A [k] ,C [k]) is
sufficient for there to exist a bounded sequence ofKalman gains,K [k], such that the a priori
state estimates are exponentially stable. In addition, the pair (A [k] ,C [k]) is uniformly
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where constant b > 0, (•)2 = (•) (•)′,∏−1j=0 = 1. Moreover,NO is the length of the window
over which uniform detectability is calculated which is the same definition as provided for
observability in (3.8), and ζ ∈ Rnx×nx is an arbitrary matrix, e.g. ξ = I [149].
The detectability condition is weaker than the full rank criteria for uniform observability
in (3.8). Thus, under the conditions of either detectability or observability, after the
initial time-steps of convergence, the initial conditions will have little effect on estimation
quality or accuracy. That being said, the computational complexity of calculating uniform
detectability is quartic, i.e. •4, with respect to the dimension of the state vector, or D ∈
O (n4x), for the minimum possible window length that is equal to the dimension of the
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state vector. It is more common, therefore, to monitor for divergence as a function of
the state error covariance as discussed in Section 3.6 since the complexity of calculating
detectability for an LTV system would add significant complexity to the KF-based state
estimation algorithm [47].
The state estimates of a convergent KF are eventually independent of the initial con-
ditions due to the asymptotic stability of the equations within the update stage as well
as the Kalman gain [47]. That said, the following are recommended best practices for the
selection of initial values for state and state error covariance. Given limited knowledge
regarding the value of the initial state for the system, it is suitable to assign the initial
estimate of the state as the zero-vector with appropriate dimensions as follows.
xˆ [0|0] = 0nx×1 (3.27)
The zero-vector is chosen so as not to excite the free-response of the system in amanner that
contradicts the unknown system conditions. In addition, for a state domain with known
extents or admissible range, xR ∈ Rnx×1, it is possible to assume that the initial state at
the center of state domain space. This case is covered more specifically in the following
paragraphs as it is related to the initial condition for state error covariance.
For a system that is asymptotically stable with a system input that is known to have
been constant for some time, the initial state vector can be approximated by solving the
following set of linear equations associated with the steady state of the system.
xˆ [0|0] = (I− A [0])−1B [0] u [0] (3.28)
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If the assumed conditions are accurate within the true system, the above initial state vector
will result in a reduction in the number of time-steps within which the KF will converge to
the true state.
In contrast, the initial value for the state error covariance must not be equal to zero,
Px˜ [0|0] 6= 0nx×nx . The initial state error covariance represents prior knowledge regarding
the initial state of the system [147]. This concept is supported in [148] where it is suggested
that the initial state error estimate should be at most two times the expected standard
deviation of error, σx˜ ∈ Rnx×1, as follows
x˜ [0|0] ≤ 2σx˜ (3.29)
where for the initial conditions it can be assumed that Px˜ [0|0] = σx˜ [0|0] σ′x˜ [0|0]. Although
not included in equation form within [147] or [148], these suggestions result in the following
condition regarding the initial state error covariance.
Px˜ [0|0] ≥ 4E
{
(x [0]− xˆ [0]) (x [0]− xˆ [0])′} (3.30)
Alternatively, the initial state error covariance can consider a relative amount of error
within the initial state estimate with respect to the admissible range of the state domain,
xR ∈ Rnx×1, as follows
Px˜ [0|0] = r2xxRx′R (3.31)
where rx is a scaling parameter representing uncertainties in the initial condition as a
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function of the expected admissible range for the state vector, e.g. rx = 0.001 represents
0.1% full scale error in the assumed initial state.
By considering only the admissible range within the domain of the state vector, the
following relationship can be established
Px˜ [0|0] = r2xxRx′R ≥ 22 · E
{
(x [0]− xˆ [0]) (x [0]− xˆ [0])′} (3.32)
where for a maximum possible initial state error equal to the admissible range, the scaling
parameter will be equal to two, rx = 2. Alternatively, for known admissible range within
the state domain, xR, an initial state estimate of xˆ [0|0] = 0.5xR results in the initial state
error covariance being one quarter of the case presented in (3.32), or P [0|0] = xRx′R. When
compared to using the zero-vector of (3.27), these two sets of initial conditions improve
the ability of the state error covariance to accurately describe the probability distribution
of the true system state over the first few time-steps if there is little knowledge of the true
initial state.
For KF-based state estimation of LTV systems, it is common for the system param-
eters to switch between operating points given some exogenous input to the system, e.g.
the parameter-specifying exogenous input uθ. This switching affects the accuracy of the
KF-based estimates and predictions. For this reason, the developed KF estimation and
prediction algorithms employ a quadratic transition between the previous and current
model parameters that represent the system upon detecting a change, or switch, in the
parameters as a function of the exogenous input. In other words, the KF undergoes a con-
tinuous, smooth, or bumpless transfer during conditions that are otherwise discontinuous,
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potentially disruptive, or misleading.
The transfer is quadratic in that only a fraction of the state estimate for the current
or newly selected parameters is combined with the state estimate for the previous model
parameters. This fraction of the current state estimate increases as a quadratic function of
time over the transfer window whereas the fraction of the previous state estimate decreases
as a quadratic function of time where the sum of the two quadratic functions is equal to
one within each time-step. The length of the window for this transition is a function of
the change in the exogenous input. Thus, the transition window is longer for a parameter
change that occurs during ramp manoeuvres whereas the transition is shorter for step
changes in the exogenous input that is responsible for model selection. This is a simple
form of bumpless transfer that is suitable for use in controllers that are limited in terms of
computational power. For controllers that are more powerful, it may be advantageous to
implement multiple KFs, one for each of the multi-model operating points or ranges.
3.3 Kalman-filter-based point-prediction
It is straightforward to extend the KF-based state observer to both the state and measure-
ment point-prediction problems. In fact, the a priori state estimate equation of (3.18) is
by definition the one-step-ahead prediction of the state estimate, hence the predict stage.
A one-step-ahead point-prediction of the measurement can therefore be calculated directly
from the a priori state estimate as follows
yˆ [k + 1|k] = C [k + 1] xˆ [k + 1|k] +D [k + 1] u [k + 1] (3.33)
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where the future values of C [k + 1], D [k + 1], and u [k + 1] are assumed to be known,
e.g. equal to values at the current time-step k, or C [k], D [k], and u [k]. Here, the term
point-prediction refers to the fact that the predictions are quantified using only a single
value rather than a range of values that have been assigned a probability distribution. In
other words, point-predictions do not consider the error covariances associated with either
the state or measurement estimates or predictions.
State estimates are propagated beyond one time-step, e.g. to a prediction horizon of
Np time-steps, by repeatedly iterating the a priori state estimate equation provided in
(3.18). These repeated calculations result in an i-step-ahead state point-prediction for
each time-step within the prediction window, i = 1, . . . ,Np, as follows
xˆ [k + i|k] = A [k + i− 1] xˆ [k + i− 1|k] + B [k + i− 1] u [k + i− 1] (3.34)
where the values of A [k + i− 1], B [k + i− 1], and u [k + i− 1] are assumed to be known
for i = 2, . . . ,Np. This equation is essentially the deterministic state equation of the state-
space system model given in (3.1). Thus, the minimization of mean squared error that
is performed within the a posteriori stage of the KF is not considered during the predic-
tion process. Nor do the KF-based state estimates consider the state and measurement
predictions that are propagated beyond one time-step into the future.
An i-step-ahead measurement point-prediction can be calculated directly using the
i-step-ahead state predictions for each time-step within the prediction window as follows
yˆ [k + i|k] = C [k + i] xˆ [k + i|k] +D [k + i] u [k + i] (3.35)
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Figure 3.7: The a priori state estimate equation in (3.18) under the assumption that the
future model parameters and system inputs have the same values as for current time-step,
k.
where C [k + i], D [k + i], and u [k + i] are assumed known. As for state propagation, this
equation is essentially the deterministic measurement equation of the state-space system
model given in (3.2).
The state and measurement point-prediction equations of (3.34) and (3.35) are com-
bined in the block diagram of Figure 3.7 under the assumption that the future model
parameters and system inputs have the same values as for current time-step, k. A block
diagram of the more general case of (3.34) and (3.35) can be established through the re-
placement of C [k] and D [k] with values at time-step (k + i), as well as A [k], B [k], and
Rx [k] with values at time-step (k + i− 1). It is not necessary to propagate the state error
covariance in Figure 3.7 since the KF-based state and measurement point-predictions are
independent of these future values.
A summary of the KF-based state and measurement point-prediction procedure is pro-
vided in Algorithm 3.2 under the same assumption of known future model parameters and
system inputs as for Figure 3.7. Moreover, an overview of the point-prediction procedure








Figure 3.8: Connectivity between the system and the KF-based measurement prediction
procedure of Algorithm 3.2.
be established by implementing the changes to time-indices as described for Figure 3.7. In
addition, the state error covariance is not propagated beyond one time-step in to the future
in the predict stage of Algorithm 3.2.
Algorithm 3.2 includes a count of the number of operations, or OPL, that are required to
perform the point-prediction procedure for a scalar measurement. This count reveals that
the computational complexity of the KF-based state and measurement point-prediction
routine remains cubic with respect to the dimension of the state vector, or KFp ∈ O (n3x).
The complexity of KF-based point-prediction is therefore of the same order as the KF-
based state estimation presented in Algorithm 3.1. In other words, the added complexity
that results from propagating the state vector and calculating the measurement prediction
is relatively insignificant compared to the complexity of KF-based state estimation.
Although convergence is of concern within the KF state estimation portion of the KF-
based prediction algorithm, the prediction equations provide no additional stability or
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Algorithm 3.2 Kalman-filter-based (KF) state and measurement point-prediction, KFp,
under the assumption that the future model parameters and system inputs remain at the
same values as for current time-step, k.
Require: Np,A,B,C,D, u, y,Rx,Ry
Initial conditions: xˆ [0|0] ,Px˜ [0|0]
Result: yˆ [k + i|k] ∀i = 1, . . . ,Np
k = 0
call [Initialization] from Algorithm 3.1
loop
k = k + 1
{measure y [k]}
call [State estimation (update)] from Algorithm 3.1
[Np-step state propagation (predict)]
for i = 1, . . . ,Np do
[ith-step state propagation (predict)]
xˆ [k + i|k] = A [k] xˆ [k + i− 1|k] + B [k] u [k]
yˆ [k + i|k] = C [k] xˆ [k + i|k] +D [k] u [k]
end for
Px˜ [k + 1|k] = A [k]Px˜ [k|k]A′ [k] +Rx [k]
{propagate x [k] to x [k + 1]}
end loop
OPL for scalar y: 6n3x +
1
2




convergence concerns. This is due to the predict stage effectively being an open-loop
propagation of the state vector to future time-steps. Convergence and stability only become
a concern when prediction error is considered within the prediction algorithm since the
current prediction error can have an destabilizing effect on the future prediction error. The
potential for the modified forms of the KF-based prediction algorithm to become unstable
is discussed further in Chapter 4.
Prediction error
It has been identified that KF-based point-predictions are not updated as a function of
the prediction error for predictions that are propagated beyond one time-step. This lack
of update remains true even after after the previous prediction horizons have passed and
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the measurements corresponding to the predictions have been transmitted by the sensors
and measured by the KF. In short, the KF-based point-prediction algorithm does not
consider or even monitor whether or not the previously calculated predictions agree with
the future system measurements. In contrast, the KF-based state estimates are updated
as a function of the a priori measurement estimation error or innovation. There exists an
opportunity, therefore, to compensate the calculated predictions for the error between the
previous predictions and the future system measurements once measured, even if the cause
of these prediction errors is unknown. Thus, a method for prediction error compensation
is formulated in Section 4.1. In addition, Section 5.3 investigates various methods to
statistically quantify the agreement between the calculated measurement predictions and
the future system measurements.
Prediction with unknown future inputs
The KF-based point-prediction procedure presented in Figure 3.7 and Algorithm 3.2 is
optimal in the mean squared sense with respect to estimation error for the LTI case with
constant model parameter values and known future system inputs. For unknown future
system inputs, however, the resulting point-predictions may no longer be optimal. These
non-optimal conditions also apply when the model parameters are either explicit functions
of time or functions of an exogenous system input, i.e. the LTV and LPV cases. Thus,
the calculated point-predictions are only approximations of the future states or measure-
ments. Given that the calculated predictions are eventually measured, it is possible to
compensate the predictions for the known unknowns that are the assumed future model
parameters and system inputs. This compensation is addressed along with the prediction
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error compensation problem stated in the previous paragraph in Section 4.1.
Confidence in point-predictions
Finally, the measurement predictions returned by Algorithm 3.2 are single-valued mean
estimates that correspond to each time-step within the prediction window. These single-
valued estimates can then be used to make predictive decisions regarding the future be-
haviour of the system. In fact, each point-prediction represents, utilizing knowledge that
is available up to the current time-step k, the value below which 50% of the future states
and/or measurements are expected to occur and also above which 50% of the future states
and/or measurements are expected to occur for each time-step within the prediction win-
dow. In other words, for a point-prediction that is equal to an arbitrary threshold, e.g.
an alarm threshold or TSP, there is a 50% level of confidence at the current time-step, k,
that the true future value will reach the threshold, i.e. that a threshold-crossing event will
occur. There is also a 50% level of confidence at the current time-step, k, that the true
future value will not reach the threshold and a threshold-crossing event does not occur.
Thus, Section 3.4 and Section 3.5 extend the point-prediction problem to instead consider
future state and measurement error covariances in order to make increasingly confident
decisions regarding the future behaviour of the system and the probability of an impending
threshold-crossing event.
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3.4 Confidence and prediction intervals
State error covariances quantify uncertainties in the state estimates, xˆ, given that the state
and measurement noise covariances accurately reflect the true uncertainties in the model
and signals. Similarly, the measurement error covariances, Py˜ in (3.23) and (3.24), quantify
uncertainties formeasurement estimates, yˆ. More specifically, state andmeasurement error
covariancematrices include variances fromwhich confidence and prediction intervals can be
calculated for a predetermined and fixed one-tailed significance level, α, and corresponding
percentage confidence level equal to 100 (1− α)%. The significance level is sometimes
referred to as the confidence coefficient, [146].
Confidence intervals, as illustrated in Figure 3.9a), provide upper and lower limits
or bounds for the estimates above and below which, given a population of estimation
samples, it is expected that either 100α% or 100 (1− α)% of the estimated values occur.
Confidence intervals are therefore related to the probability density function (PDF) of a
random variable.
The two confidence intervals that are included in Figure 3.9 have one-tailed significance
levels of α ≈ 2.3% and α ≈ 15.9%. The upper bound of Figure 3.9b) is the value at which
100α% of the estimates are expected to be greater than whereas 100 (1− α)% are expected
to be less than or equal to the bound as indicated by the shaded region. The shaded
area is equal to the value of the cumulative distribution function (CDF) calculated for the
interval between−∞ and the upper bound for the specified significance level. The expected



























y˜ α ≈ 0.159 α ≈ 0.023 Pr (y˜ ≤ 2σy˜) Pr (−σy˜ < y˜ ≤ σy˜)
Figure 3.9: Confidence intervals of significance levels α ≈ 0.023 and α = 0.159 for the
a) respective outer and inner bounds of a sequence of measurement errors, y˜, and corre-
sponding b) one-tailed bound as well as, c) two-tailed bound including probability density
function (PDF).
CDF. These two probabilities are respectively calculated for the measurement error as
follows
Pr (y˜ ≤ zασy˜) = 100 (1− α) (3.36)
Pr (y˜ > zασy˜) = 100α = 1− Pr (y˜ ≤ zασy˜) (3.37)
where zα is the score associated with the two-tailed significance level α, Pr (•) is the prob-
ability for the occurrence of event •, σy˜ ∈ Rny×1 is the estimated standard deviation of the
measurement error and σy˜σ
′
y˜ = Py˜. Alternatively, although a lower bound is not included
in Figure 3.9, 100 (1− α)% of the estimates are expected to be greater than the lower limit
of the interval whereas 100α% are expected to be less than or equal to the limit. This lower
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bound example has the following probabilities for the state error
Pr (x˜ > −zασx˜) = 100 (1− α) (3.38)
Pr (x˜ ≤ −zασx˜) = 100α = 1− Pr (x˜ ≤ −zασx˜) (3.39)
with σx˜ as defined for (3.29).
The upper and lower limits are also the bounds within which, given a population of
estimation samples, it is expected that 100 (1− α)% of the estimated values occur, where
α is the two-tailed significance level calculated as follows
α = 2α. (3.40)
The two-tailed confidence interval is illustrated in Figure 3.9c) with the probability of an
estimate being within the bounds represented for measurement error as follows
Pr (−zασy˜ < y˜ ≤ zασy˜) = 100 (1− α) (3.41)
Pr (y˜ ≤ −zασy˜ or y˜ > zασy˜) = 100α = 1− Pr (−zασy˜ < y˜ ≤ zασy˜) (3.42)
where zα is the score associated with the two-tailed significance levelα. These concepts also
apply to the limits of prediction intervals for predictions within a population of prediction
samples. In general, the term confidence interval refers to both the confidence interval
for estimates as well as the prediction interval for predictions. Within this work the term
confidence interval is used in place of prediction interval. This allows for emphasis to be
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placed on the level of confidence in the calculated predictions; this metric is considered
valuable to the predictive decision-making process.
The two-tailed significance level, α, is a statistic that is symmetric about the mean of
the estimate or estimation error. This is in contrast to the one-tailed significance level,
α, that has different probabilities assigned for either the upper or the lower bounds. The
majority of this section therefore refers the two-tailed significance level with the one-tailed
statistic becoming of more importance within the one-tailed confidence calculations of
Chapter 5. Moreover, the score, z, is also a symmetric statistical measure and is therefore
often specified using the two-tailed significance level, zα
For both the a posteriori and a priori state estimates, the upper and lower limits of
the 100 (1− α)% confidence interval are respectively calculated as follows [146]
xˆu,α [k|•] = xˆ [k|•] + zα (Px˜ [k|•])
1
2 (3.43)
xˆl,α [k|•] = xˆ [k|•]− zα (Px˜ [k|•])
1
2 (3.44)
where zα is as defined for (3.42), • is equal to (k − 1) for the a priori case and as k for the
a posteriori case, and (Px˜ [k|•])
1
2 is the square root of the state error covariance that can
be calculated using singular value decomposition (SVD) and/or various other eigendecom-
position methods that utilize eigenvalues and eigenvectors to solve the multidimensional
standard deviation problem [150] e.g. diagonalization or Cholesky decomposition. This
square root is also the solution of σx˜ [k|•] σ′x˜ [k|•] = Px˜ [k|•], if it exists. In other words,
matrix σx˜ [k|•] is said to be a square root of Px˜ [k|•] is σx˜ [k|•] σ′x˜ [k|•] is equal to Px˜ [k|•].
For single-dimensional spaces the square root reduces to the standard arithmetic operation,
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√•.
Within (3.43) and (3.44), the score, zα, represents the number of standard deviations
between the mean state estimate and the upper and lower limits of the confidence interval
within which it is expected that 100 (1− α)% of the estimates occur. The score is therefore
calculated as a function of two-tailed significance level, α, as follows
zα =
√






where erf−1 (•) is the inverse Gaussian error function and Φ−1 (•) is the inverse cumulative
Gaussian distribution function. The score is a fixed parameter that can be calculated in
advance of executing KF-based algorithms as it is a function of only the fixed significance
level, α.
Upper and lower limits of the 100 (1− α)% confidence interval can also be calculated
for either the a priori or a posteriori measurement estimates as follows [146]
yˆu,α [k|•] = yˆ [k|•] + zα (Py˜ [k|•])
1
2 (3.46)
yˆl,α [k|•] = yˆ [k|•]− zα (Py˜ [k|•])
1
2 (3.47)
where zα and [k|•] are as defined for (3.43) and (3.44). Here, the square root of the
measurement error covariance can, in general, be calculated in the same manner as for
the state interval-estimates as discussed for (3.43) and (3.44). More often, however, the
square root is calculated as the arithmetic square root,
√•, for a single output system with
scalar measurement, or as multiple individual square roots for a multiple output system
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by considering individually each system measurement within the measurement along with
the diagonal elements of the measurement error covariance matrix.
Extension of the confidence interval calculations to multi-step-ahead measurement pre-
diction results in the following calculation for the upper and lower limits of the 100 (1− α)%
prediction interval for the measurements
yˆu,α [k + i|k] = yˆ [k + i|k] + zα (Py˜ [k + i|k])
1
2 (3.48)
yˆl,α [k + i|k] = yˆ [k + i|k]− zα (Py˜ [k + i|k])
1
2 (3.49)
with all variables as defined for 3.47. This extension can also be applied to (3.43) and
(3.44) in order to calculate prediction intervals for the state vector. These i-step-ahead
interval-predictions now require that the a priori state error covariance, Px˜, is propagated
to future time-steps. For the measurement interval-predictions, this propagation is due to
the measurement error covariance, Py˜, being a function of the state error covariance, Px˜.
In Section 3.3, comparison of point-predictions against alarm thresholds resulted in only
50% confidence of a threshold-crossing actually occurring within the prediction horizon and
an equal 50% confidence of a threshold-crossing not occurring. Using the confidence-based
methods of this section, however, it is now possible to improve the confidence of predictive
decision-making by considering the upper and lower bounds of the prediction interval as
given in (3.48) and (3.47) respectively. In this manner, predictive decisions can be made
with respect to specific levels of confidence as a function of the one-tailed significance level,
α. More precisely, the use of one-tailed significance levels allows the prediction algorithm
to consider, for impending threshold-crossings, levels of confidence that are greater than
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50%. In addition, one-tailed significance levels of confidence that are less than 50% can be
utilized to decide against a particular opposing decision regarding an impending threshold-
crossing.
As in the case of point-predictions, interval-predictive decisions can be made within
the domain of either the state or measurement. Within the state domain, the prediction
intervals are functions of the square root of state error covariance as included in the a priori
state predictions of (3.43) and (3.44). This square root, in turn, requires the calculation of
the computationally complex SVD; SVD computations significantly affect the arithmetic
complexity of the prediction algorithm. That being said, predictive decisions within the
domain of the state are generally able to provide additional information regarding the im-
pending conditions of the system and may be worth the added computational complexity.
In contrast, under the assumption that the ny signals of the measurement vector are inde-
pendent, the matrix square roots included in the measurement predictions of (3.48) and
(3.49) can be reduced to ny individual square root operations, one for each element along
the diagonal of the measurement error covariance matrix, Py˜. The measurement domain is
therefore the preferred domain for calculation of interval-predictions due to the prediction




To extend theKF-based point-prediction procedure to themeasurement interval-prediction
problem, it is required that the confidence intervals of the multi-step-ahead predictions be
calculated. These intervals are, in turn, a function of the propagated a priori state error
covariance. This propagation is straightforward since the a priori state error covariance of
(3.19) is by definition the one-step-ahead prediction of the state error covariance, i.e. the
predict stage within the KF-based state estimation procedure.
The state error covariance is propagated beyond one time-step, e.g. to a prediction
horizon of Np time-steps, by repeatedly calculating the a priori state error covariance
provided in (3.19). This propagation is similar to that of the a priori state estimate in
Section 3.3. These repeated calculations result in the following i-step-ahead state error
covariance predictions for each time-step within the prediction window, i = 1, . . . ,Np, as
follows
Px˜ [k + i|k] = A [k + i− 1]Px˜ [k + i− 1|k] (A [k + i− 1])′ +Rx [k + i− 1] (3.50)
where the future values of A [k + i− 1] and Rx [k + i− 1] are assumed to be known for
i = 2, . . . ,Np. This equation is a function of the state-space model parameters as defined in
(3.9) as well as the state noise covariance that is provided to the KF-based state observer as
defined in (3.12). Thus, in addition to the multi-step-ahead predictions, the minimization
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of mean squared error that is performed within the a posteriori stage of the KF does
not consider the state or measurement error covariances that are propagated beyond one
time-step into the future.
The upper and lower bounds of the i-step ahead measurement interval-prediction can
then be calculated as given in (3.48) and (3.49) respectively. These bounds are the summa-
tion of the mean KF-based measurement point-prediction, yˆ [k + i|k], and the sign-specific
half-width of the confidence interval; positive for the upper bound and negative for the
lower bound. The half-width of the prediction interval is a function of a fixed significance
level, α, where the upper and lower limits of the interval provide a bounds within which
100 (1− α)% of the predicted values are expected to occur as illustrated in Figure 3.9c).
The half-width is also a function of the measurement error covariance that is calculated for
the i-step-ahead measurement prediction as follows
Py˜ [k + i|k] = C [k + i]Px˜ [k + i|k]C ′ [k + i] +Ry [k + i] (3.51)
where Px˜ [k + i|k] is defined in (3.50) and C [k + i] and Ry [k + i] are assumed known.
Finally, the square root of the measurement error covariance is calculated using multiple
individual square roots for a multiple output system where the system measurements are
assumed to be independent and therefore have corresponding covariances that are the
diagonal entries of the measurement error covariance matrix.
The i-step-ahead state andmeasurement error covariance equations of (3.50) and (3.51)
are combined to calculate KF-basedmeasurement interval-predictions in the block diagram




Figure 3.10: The a priori state error covariance equation in (3.19) under the assumption
that the future model parameters and system inputs remain at the same values as for
current time-step, k.
main at the same values as for the current time-step, k. In addition, the interval-predictions
are a function of the i-step-ahead measurement point-prediction in Figure 3.7. A block di-
agram of the more general case formulated in (3.50) and (3.51) can be established through
the replacement of C [k],D [k], and Ry [k] with values at time-step (k + i), as well as A [k],
B [k], and Rx [k] with values at time-step (k + i− 1).
A summary of the KF-based measurement interval-prediction procedure is provided in
Algorithm 3.3 under the same assumption of known future model parameters and system
inputs as for Figure 3.10. Moreover, an overview of the interval-prediction procedure is
illustrated in Figure 3.11. An algorithm for the more general case that is formulated in
(3.50) and (3.51) can be established by implementing the time index changes as described
for Figure 3.10. In contrast to the point-predictive algorithm, the state error covariance is
now propagated beyond one time-step into the future. In addition, the measurement error
covariance, Py˜, the half-width of the confidence interval, h
y,α, and the upper and lower










Figure 3.11: Connectivity between the KF-based measurement prediction as well as confi-
dence interval calculation procedures of Algorithm 3.3.
each time-step of the prediction window.
Algorithm 3.3 includes a count of the number of operations, or OPL, that are required
to perform the interval-prediction procedure for a scalar measurement. This count reveals
that the computational complexity of KF-based measurement interval-prediction remains
cubic with respect to the dimension of the state vector, or KFip ∈ O (n3xNp). The complex-
ity does, however, increase in proportion to the length of the prediction window given as
the prediction horizon Np and is therefore greater than that of either the KF-based state
estimation of Algorithm 3.1 or the KF-based point-prediction of Algorithm 3.2. This in-
crease in complexity is due to the propagation of the state error covariance to the prediction
horizon which alone is O (n3xNp).
In order to calculate the complexity of the scalar square root operation, the square root
is assumed to be performed using the reciprocal square root form of the Newton-Raphson
method where double-precision floating-point accuracy is estimated to be achieved by
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Algorithm 3.3 Kalman-filter-based (KF) measurement interval-prediction, KFip, under
the assumption that the future model parameters and system inputs have the same values
as for the current time-step, k.
Require: Np,A,B,C,D, u, y,Rx,Ry
Initial conditions: xˆ [0|0] ,Px˜ [0|0]
Result: yˆ [k + i|k] , yˆu,α [k + i|k] , yˆl,α [k + i|k] ∀i = 1, . . . ,Np
k = 0
call [Initialization] from Algorithm 3.1
loop
k = k + 1
{measure y [k]}
call [State estimation (update)] from Algorithm 3.1
[Np-step state propagation (predict)]
for i = 1, . . . ,Np do
[ith-step propagation (predict)]
xˆ [k + i|k] = A [k] xˆ [k + i− 1|k] + B [k] u [k]
yˆ [k + i|k] = C [k] xˆ [k + i|k] +D [k] u [k]
Px˜ [k + i|k] = A [k]Px˜ [k + i− 1|k]A′ [k] +Rx [k]
Py˜ [k + i|k] = C [k]Px˜ [k + i|k]C ′ [k] +Ry [k]
[ith-step interval calculation]
hy,α = zα (Py˜ [k + i|k])
1
2
yˆu,α [k + i|k] = yˆ [k + i|k] + hy,α
yˆl,α [k + i|k] = yˆ [k + i|k]− hy,α
end for
{propagate x [k] to x [k + 1]}
end loop














performing fifteen multiplications and ten additions. The number of required square root
computations is halved, however, by performing a single half-width calculation, denoted
as hy,α, rather than within each of the upper and lower interval equations.
Algorithm 3.3 returns, within each time-step of the prediction window, a range of
measures on which to make decisions regarding the future behaviour of the system. This
range of values is in contrast to the single-value that is produced within each time-step
of the prediction window for the point-prediction algorithm of Algorithm 3.2. The upper
and lower bounds of the interval-predictions are the two values within which 100 (1− α)%
of the measurements are expected to occur as illustrated in Figure 3.9c). This percentage
is also the level of confidence that the future measurement will occur within the upper
and lower limits. In contrast, there is 100α% level of confidence that the measurement
will occur outside the upper and lower bounds of the prediction interval. These are the
confidence levels for a two-tailed symmetric predictive decisionwhere a futuremeasurement
may either be greater than or less than alarm thresholds that are equal to the respective
upper and lower bounds of the prediction interval, as in [41].
More specifically, a two-tailed predictive decision is illustrated in Figure 3.12 for a
significance level of α = 0.0004 and corresponding confidence level of 99.96%. In this
example, the innovations of Figure 3.12a) do not reach the upper or lower bounds. In fact,
at a sample rate of one sample per day, the data confidence intervals plotted in Figure
3.12 correspond with a single sample reaching the confidence interval once every six years.
The upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval provide measures by which to make
decisions regarding an alarm-high as well as alarm-low thresholds. In Figure 3.12b), there























y˜ α = 0.0004 Pr
(−zασy˜ < y˜ ≤ zασy˜)
Figure 3.12: Confidence interval of significance level α = 0.0004 and level of confidence
equal to 99.96% for the a) bounds of a sequence ofmeasurement errors, y˜, and corresponding
b) two-tailed predictive decision problem including probability density function (PDF) and
the value of the cumulative probability outside of the bounds.
alarm-low thresholds.
For one-tailed predictive decisions, however, the upper and lower bounds are assigned
confidence levels that correspond instead with the one-tailed significance level, α. In this
case, the upper and lower bounds can each be assigned either 100α% or 100 (1− α)%
levels of confidence depending on one of two conditions for the decision being made. For
example, there is 100α% level of confidence in a one-tailed decision regarding whether the
future measurement will be less than an alarm threshold that is equal to the lower bound of
the prediction interval. There is also 100 (1− α)% level of confidence in deciding whether
the future measurement will be greater than the same alarm-low threshold.
The lower bound illustrated in Figure 3.13 has a one-tailed confidence interval that
corresponds to the case of Figure 3.12, i.e. one-tailed significance level α = 0.0002 and a
level of confidence of 99.98% that the innovation will be greater than a low-alarm threshold

























y˜ α = 0.0004 Pr
(−zασy˜ < y˜ ≤ zασy˜)
Figure 3.13: Confidence interval of one-tailed significance level α = 0.0002 and level of
confidence equal to 99.98% for the a) bounds of a sequence of measurement errors, y˜, and
corresponding b) one-tailed lower bound, as well as c) one-tailed upper bound including
probability density function (PDF) and values of the cumulative probability within and
outside of the bounds.
the upper bound, there are 100 (1− α)% and 100α% levels of confidence that the future
measurements will be less than and greater than the alarm-high threshold respectively. In
this case, the upper bound of Figure 3.13, corresponds with a one-tailed significance level
of α = 0.9998 and a level of confidence of 0.02% that the innovation will be greater than an
alarm-high threshold that is equal to the upper bound. Thus, as stated in Section 3.4, the
one-tailed significance level requires that specific probabilities be assigned for the upper or
the lower bounds with respect to alarm-high and alarm-low thresholds. In Figure 3.13b),
it is very likely that the innovations will reach an alarm-high threshold that is equal to the
lower bound. In contrast, in Figure 3.13c) it is very unlikely that the innovations will reach
an alarm-high threshold that is equal to upper bound.
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Accuracy of state noise covariance, Rx
The KF-based interval-prediction procedure, as presented within this subsection, requires
that the assumed noise covariance values of Rx or Ry represent the true uncertainty within
the states, inputs, and measurements to ensure the calculated error covariances provide
valid probability distributions and confidence intervals. The purpose of these two noise
covariancematrices is to quantify uncertaintieswithin the state andmeasurement equations
respectively. Moreover, the noise covariances also balance, within the KF, the uncertainty
between the assumed model parameters, system inputs, and system measurements. In
general, the diagonal elements of the measurement noise covariance matrix, Ry, can be
calculated as the variances of the individual measurement signals at the output of the
system at steady state or after detrending themeasurement signal to remove any bias, drift,
or other anticipated dynamics. In addition, the off-diagonal elements of this covariance
matrix are equal to zero for independent measurements and are otherwise calculated as the
covariances between each pair of elements within the measurement vector. In contrast, it
is often difficult to calculate the state noise covariance matrix, Rx, due to the fact that the
state noise covariance includes uncertainties for both the inputs as well as the state vector
which is not necessarily entirely measurable [151]. These effects are therefore investigated
in the following section, Section 3.6.
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3.6 Noise covariances and uncertainty
KFs are able to perform state estimation through the use of a model that is a mathematical
abstraction of the true system dynamic. The parameters of the model can be identified
through system identification and parameter estimation procedures for an assumed sys-
tem structure. Moreover, the parameters may also be assigned by first principles from a
theory-based understanding of the individual components of the system or by black-box
modelling and parameter estimation for which there is no assumption regarding system
structure. No matter what method is used, the parameters are often uncertain and may
not necessarily be an exact representation of the actual system parameters. This is espe-
cially true for systems that have LTV parameters where the parameters may be accurate
for one operating condition but differ when the operating conditions change. Moreover,
in the case of prediction, the conditions may differ from those that are anticipated. In
addition to model uncertainties, there may also be uncertainties within the signals that are
provided to, or measured by, the KF. This uncertainty may, for example, be the result of
noise within the process or manipulating signals, poor placement or installation of sensors,
signal processing and quantization, or interference within communication channels. Both
modelling as well as signal uncertainties are annotated in the state observer of Figure 3.3.
As stated in Section 3.2, KF-based state observers account for uncertainties through
the state and measurement noise covariances, Rx and Ry, as defined in (3.12) for the
state and measurement noise vectors, vx and vy respectively. The resulting KF-based
state estimates are optimal in the minimum mean squared sense, given that these noise
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covariances accurately describe the true uncertainty of the identified model parameters
and structure as well as the state and measurement signals. For LTI systems, the state
and measurement noise are generally assumed to be time-invariant. For the LTV model
of (3.9) and (3.10), however, it is more appropriate to consider noise covariances that are
time-varying.
The state and measurement noise covariance matrices establish a respective balance
between uncertainty in the model and inputs to the state equation against uncertainty
in the system measurements and inputs to the measurement equation. This balance can
be evaluated by determining the effect that changes in the magnitudes of the state and
measurement noise covariances have on the resulting state estimates for scalarmeasurement
vector, y ∈ R1×1. Regarding the system measurements, the state estimate is a function of
the measurement noise covariance, Ry [k] ∈ R1×1, through the Kalman gain equation in
(3.15). In contrast, the state estimate is effected by the state noise covariance, Rx [k] ∈
R
nx×nx , through the a priori state error covariance equation in (3.19).
Any changes to the elements of theKalman gain vector, ∆K [k], that result from changes
in the scalar measurement noise covariance, Ry [k] to (Ry [k] + ∆Ry [k]), can be defined in
the following as a function of the a priori state error covariance (3.19)
∆K [k] , K∆ [k]−K [k]
= Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] (C [k]Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] +Ry [k] + ∆Ry [k])−1
− Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] (C [k]Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] +Ry [k])−1 (3.52)
whereK∆ [k] is the modified Kalman gain that results from the change in the noise covari-
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ance. The change inKalman gain can then be simplified by factoring the initialmultiplicand
Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k], finding a common denominator, and reorganizing the equation, although
this is only possible for the scalar measurement case
∆K [k] = Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] ((C [k]Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] +Ry [k] + ∆Ry [k])−1
− (C [k]Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] +Ry [k])−1)
= Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] (C [k]Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] +Ry [k])−1
· (−∆Ry [k]) (C [k]Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] +Ry [k] + ∆Ry [k])−1 (3.53)
where the change in Kalman gain elements are inverse in sign with respect to the change
in the magnitude of uncertainty in the system measurement, ∆Ry. The modified Kalman
gain is then equal to the summation of the original Kalman gain, K [k], and the change in
Kalman gain of (3.53) as follows.
K∆ [k] = Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] (C [k]Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] +Ry [k])−1
·
(




I−∆Ry [k] (C [k]Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] +Ry [k] + ∆Ry [k])−1
)
(3.54)
The elements of the Kalman gain vector,K [k] ∈ Rnx×1 are therefore equal to the elements
of the original gain minus the original gain elements multiplied by a function of the change
in the measurement noise covariance, Ry [k].
Thus, all else equal, an increase in uncertainty in a scalarmeasurement noise covariance,
Ry [k], results in the magnitude of the Kalman gain being reduced and the updated state
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estimate tracking more closely the dynamic of the system model rather than the measure-
ments. This relationship is restated in the following by calculating the limits of (3.54) with














CPx˜C ′ +Ry +∆Ry
)
= 0nx×1 (3.56)
Alternatively, an increase in uncertainty in the state noise covariance, Rx [k], results
in the updated state estimate more closely tracking the measurement rather than the
dynamic of the system model. To support this claim, the following equation defines the
change in the Kalman gain, ∆K [k], for a change in the state noise covariance from Rx [k]
to (Rx [k] + ∆Rx [k]) as a function of the a priori state error covariance (3.19) and scalar
noise covariance, Ry [k].
∆K [k] = (Px˜ [k|k − 1] + ∆Rx [k − 1])C ′ [k]
· (C [k] (Px˜ [k|k − 1] + ∆Rx [k − 1])C ′ [k] +Ry [k])−1
− Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] (C [k]Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] +Ry [k])−1 (3.57)
Moreover, the original state noise covariance term, Rx [k], is embedded within the a priori
state error covariance Px˜ [k|k − 1] as follows
P∆,x˜ [k|k − 1] = A [k − 1]Px˜ [k − 1|k − 1]A′ [k − 1] +Rx [k − 1] + ∆Rx [k − 1]
= Px˜ [k|k − 1] + ∆Rx [k − 1] (3.58)
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where P∆,x˜ is the state error covariance that has been affected by the change in state noise
covariance, ∆Rx. The change in Kalman gain can then be expanded to the following form
∆K [k] = Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] (C [k] (Px˜ [k|k − 1] + ∆Rx [k − 1])C ′ [k] +Ry [k])−1
− Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] (C [k]Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] +Ry [k])−1
+∆Rx [k − 1]C ′ [k] (C [k] (Px˜ [k|k − 1] + ∆Rx [k − 1])C ′ [k] +Ry [k])−1
(3.59)
where for a positive-definite state noise covariance and a change in state noise covariance,
∆Rx, representing an increase in uncertainty within the state, the first two terms reduce
the magnitude of the elements of the Kalman gain vector and the third term negates the
aforementioned reduction. The effects of the three terms in (3.59) are combined in the
following equation.
∆K [k] = ∆Rx [k − 1]C ′ [k]Ry [k] (C [k] (Px˜ [k|k − 1] + ∆Rx [k − 1])C ′ [k] +Ry [k])−1
· (C [k]Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] +Ry [k])−1 (3.60)
Thus, for a positive-definite∆Rx [k], themagnitude of each elementwithin theKalman gain
vector is increased with respect to the sign included in the state-to-measurement matrix,
C.
In other words, all else equal, an increase in uncertainty in the state by ∆Rx results in
the updated state estimate trackingmore closely themeasurement rather than the dynamic
of the system model. As in (3.55) and (3.56), this relationship is restated in the following
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by calculating the limits of (3.59) with time-indices again omitted for readability.
lim
∆Rx→0nx×nx+






























Thus, as the magnitude of ∆Rx grows, so do the elements of the effected Kalman gain
K∆ [k].
ALMF-based noise covariance estimation
Noise covariances, Rx and Ry, affect the state estimation equation within the standard KF
equations of Section 3.2.1. For the purpose of calculating state point-estimates, however, it
is not essential that the assumed noise covariances reflect the model or signal uncertainties
exactly. This is a result of the KF-based state observer updating the state estimates as a
function of the system measurements [152]. In short, KFs have a structure that causes the
state estimates to converge with the true system states even for gains that are not optimal.
State noise covariances are often therefore assumed to be equal to the covariance of the
input to the system [153], or calculated through trial and error or heuristic procedures [154].
In contrast, accurate noise covariances are essential when KF-based state estimation is
being utilized to obtain an accurate description of the probability distribution for the state
estimates as is required within the KF-basedmeasurement interval-prediction procedure of
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Section 3.5. Various techniques have been developed to address the estimation of state noise
covariance. One technique uses an LS filter to estimate the covariance after calculating the
time-lagged auto-covariance of the operational data [155,156]. Another technique assumes
that the inverse of a function of the state-to-measurement matrix, or (C ′C)−1, exists; an
assumption that is very strong and is rarely satisfied in practice [151]. This research instead
employs the ALMF presented by Myers and Tapley in [157] as it is more computationally
efficient and makes fewer assumptions regarding model structure when compared to the
aforementioned algorithms. Moreover, the ALMF is suitable for systems that have LTV
parameters as well as time-varying noise covariances.
The ALMF includes four equations that estimate the state and measurement noise as
well as the state and measurement noise covariance matrices. These four equations are
supported by four additional equations that are calculated directly from the standard KF
equations. Regarding measurement noise, the first of the two supporting equations is the
a priori measurement estimation error of (3.20). The second supporting equation is the
following modified a priori measurement error covariance that excludes the measurement
noise covariance, Rˆy, of the previous time-step, (k − 1).
P y [k|k − 1] = Py˜ [k|k − 1]− Rˆy [k − 1] = C [k]Px˜ [k|k − 1]C ′ [k] (3.63)
The next two equations form an ALMF for estimation of the measurement noise co-
variance. First, the mean measurement estimation error is calculated as an estimate of the
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measurement noise, vˆy ∈ Rny×1, as follows
vˆy [k] = vˆy [k − 1] + 1
Nv
(y˜ [k|k]− y˜ [k −Nv|k −Nv]) (3.64)
where Nv is the length of the window over which the covariance matrices are calculated,
referred to hereafter as the covariance estimation window. The initial value of the mea-
surement noise, vˆy [0], is set equal to zero due to the assumption within the KF that mea-
surement noise is serially uncorrelated or zero mean. This equation is a moving or rolling
average of the a posteriori measurement estimation error over the covariance estimation
window. Given the above estimate, the measurement noise covariance estimation can then
be calculated as follows
Rˆy [k] = Rˆy [k − 1] + 1
Nv − 1
(









P y [k|k − 1]− P y [k −Nv|k −Nv − 1]
)
(3.65)
where (•)2 represents the square of the variable within the parentheses multiplied by the
transpose of the same variable, or (•) (•)′.
The initial value of the measurement error covariance, Rˆy [0], is set equal to the mea-
surement noise covariance that is calculated oﬄine for the standard KF as described in
Section 3.2.3. The following equation introduces the rolling or moving form of unbiased
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(y˜ [j|j]− vˆy [Nv])2 − Nv − 1
Nv
P y [j|j − 1]
)





(y˜ [Nv|Nv]− vˆy [Nv])2 − Nv − 1
Nv
P y [Nv|Nv − 1]
)
(3.67)
For the next time-step, the above equation is modified to be recursive by incorporating the
moving estimate as follows





(y˜ [Nv + 1|Nv + 1]− vˆy [Nv])2 − Nv − 1
Nv













(y˜ [Nv + 1|Nv + 1]− vˆy [Nv + 1])2
− (y˜ [1|1]− vˆy [1])2 + 1
Nv




P y [Nv + 1|Nv] + P y [1|0]
))
(3.68)
where the fourth term of 1
Nv
(y˜ [Nv + 1|Nv + 1]− y˜ [1|1]) compensates for the forgotten or
lost mean measurement noise estimate, vˆy [1], in the third term. The above equations
are initialized within the first Nv time-steps as an accumulation of average values. This
initialization procedure is deferred to the algorithms that are presented later on within this
section.
The above ALMF procedure is also performed for the estimation of state noise covari-
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ance. In this case, the first of the two supporting equations is the one-step-ahead state
prediction error calculated as the following difference between the a posteriori and a priori
state estimates
˜ˆx [k] = xˆ [k|k]− xˆ [k|k − 1] (3.69)
where ˜ˆx is the mean state estimation error. The second supporting equation is a function
of the a priori and a posteriori state error covariances as well as the state noise covariance
estimate, Rˆx, from the previous time-step, (k − 1), and is calculated as follows.
P˜x [k] = Px˜ [k|k − 1]− Rˆx [k − 1]− Px˜ [k|k] (3.70)
The remaining two equations formanALMF for estimation of the state noise covariance.
The mean state estimation error is calculated as an estimate of the state noise, vˆx ∈ Rnx×1,
as follows
vˆx [k] = vˆx [k − 1] + 1
Nv
(
˜ˆx [k]− ˜ˆx [k −Nv]
)
(3.71)
whereNv is again the covariance estimation window. Although it is not necessary that the
covariance estimation window for the state noise estimate be equal to the window for the
measurement noise estimate, within the work the two windows are assumed to be equal.
Given the above estimate, the state noise covariance estimation can then be calculated in
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a second equation as follows
Rˆx [k] = Rˆx [k − 1] + 1
Nv − 1
((








Nv (Nv − 1)
(





P˜x [k]− P˜x [k −Nv]
)
(3.72)
where (•)2 is as defined for (3.65) with this form derived in the same manner as for the
measurement noise in (3.67) and (3.68).
The initial value of Rˆx [0] may be calculated to include the known system input noise.
This initial value may also be estimated by considering the a priori measurement error or
innovation as discussed in Section 3.2.3. As with the measurement noise covariance, the
above two equations are also moving averages and are therefore required initialized within
the first Nv time-steps of calculation. This initialization is presented in addition to the
ALMF noise covariance estimation algorithms in the following paragraphs. The diagonal
elements of the estimated covariance matrices are reset to absolute values at every time-
step. This reset is performed due to the potential for negative definite noise covariance
matrices to occur as a result of numerical applications, especially when a small amount of
data has been processed [157].
Summaries of the state andmeasurement covariance estimation procedures are provided
as subroutines in Algorithm 3.4. The two subroutines are called from within any of the
previously listed KF-based algorithms, e.g. state estimation or measurement prediction.
Algorithm 3.4 includes a count of the number of operations, or OPL, that are required to
perform state and measurement covariance estimation for a scalar measurement. These
counts are assumed tobe called from theKF-basedmeasurement interval-prediction routine
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of Algorithm 3.3. A reduction in the number of total multiplication is again utilized when
calculating symmetric matrices, where n2x multiplications can be reduced to (n
2
x + nx) /2
for the calculation of (•)2.
Algorithm 3.4 Adaptive-limited-memory-filter-based (ALMF) measurement ALMFy
and state ALMFx noise covariance estimation
[Measurement noise covariance estimation]
y˜ [k|k − 1] = y [k]− (C [k] xˆ [k|k − 1] +D [k] u [k])
P y [k|k − 1] = Py˜ [k|k − 1]− Rˆy [k − 1]
vˆy [k] = vˆy [k − 1] + 1Nv (y˜ [k|k]− y˜ [k −Nv|k −Nv])
Rˆy [k] = Rˆy [k − 1] + 1
Nv − 1
(









P y [k|k − 1]− P y [k −Nv|k −Nv − 1]
)
OPL for scalar y: 17 ∈ O (1)
[State noise covariance estimation]
˜ˆx [k] = xˆ [k|k]− xˆ [k|k − 1]
P˜x [k] = Px˜ [k|k − 1]− Rˆx [k − 1]− Px˜ [k|k]
vˆx [k] = vˆx [k − 1] + 1Nv
(
˜ˆx [k]− ˜ˆx [k −Nv]
)
Rˆx [k] = Rˆx [k − 1] + 1
Nv − 1
((








Nv (Nv − 1)
(





P˜x [k]− P˜x [k −Nv]
)




(•)2 = (•) (•)′
The first count reveals that the computational complexity for estimating the measure-
ment covariance of a scalarmeasurement is less than the previously investigated algorithms,
including KF-based state estimation. Moreover, the second count reveals that the com-
putational complexity for estimating the state covariance is quadratic with respect to the
dimension of the state vector, or ALMFx ∈ O (n2x). Again, this estimation is rather insignif-
icant when compared against the standard KF equations. The subroutines of Algorithm
3.4 do, however, require the storage of 2Nv and Nvn
2
x+Nvnx variables within the memory
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of the controller for measurement and state covariance estimation respectively.
Initialization of the ALMF is performed within the subroutines of Algorithm 3.4 for
both state and measurement covariance estimation. The two subroutines perform the cal-
culations of Algorithm 3.4 but for a window of increasing length up to that of the noise
estimation window, Nv. The initialization procedure begins after the KF gain and state
estimates have somewhat converged from the assumed initial conditions, otherwise, the
covariances will capture uncertainty due to the initial conditions. Thus, the subroutines
are executed for Nv time-steps following the first Nv time-steps of executing the KF-based
prediction algorithm. The number of operations that are required to execute each subrou-
tine are not reported in Algorithm 3.5 since these subroutines are not regularly executed
after the initialization procedure.
Algorithm 3.5 Initialization of the noise covariance estimation subroutines using adaptive
limited memory filter (ALMF)
[Initialize measurement noise covariance estimation]




vˆy [k − 1] + 1k y˜ [k|k]
Rˆy [k] =
k−2
k−1Rˆy [k − 1] + 1k−1 (y˜ [k|k]− vˆy [k])2 − 1kP y [k|k − 1]
[Initialize state noise covariance estimation]




vˆx [k − 1] + 1k ˜ˆx [k]
Rˆx [k] =
k−2
k−1Rˆx [k − 1] + 1k−1
(





(•)2 = (•) (•)′
Along with delaying initialization of the noise covariance estimation procedure for con-
vergence of the KF state estimation, it is also important to select a covariance estimation
window length that satisfies the assumed properties of the stochastic uncertainty between
the model, signals, and system. The state noise window should be relatively long in com-
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Error cov. estimation (x)
ALMF
ALMF
Figure 3.14: Connectivity between KF-based state estimation and the error covariance
procedures of Algorithm 3.5.
will not be able to track the true dynamic response of the system and the estimates will not
converge. In addition, the noise statistics should change relatively slowly in comparison to
the system dynamic. Finally, as illustrated in Figure 3.14, the ALMF and KF work in a
closed loop. Thus, the stability of the combined algorithm is dependent on the convergence
of the KF while using the estimated noise covariances. This stability is a function of the
covariance estimation window length.
A sample implementation of ALMF-based measurement and state noise covariance
estimation within KF-based state estimation is provided in Algorithm 3.6. Moreover, an
overview of the noise covariance estimation procedure is illustrated in Figure 3.14. This
algorithm includes fewer assumptions regarding the noise covariance values in comparison
to the standard KF-based state estimation routine of Algorithm 3.1, where the initial
conditions for the covariance and the noise vector estimates are all that is now required to be
specified. These initial conditions can be estimated by applying theALMFnoise covariance
estimation algorithm to a set of training data. The training data may be obtained by
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monitoring the dynamic response of the system under the different modes of operation for
which estimates or predictions are to be calculated. Alternatively, the algorithm can be
allowed to operate in a stand-alone mode at the onset of execution in order for the noise
covariances to converge to values that are representative of the true uncertainties within
the model parameters, system inputs, and system measurements.
Algorithm 3.6 ALMF/KF-based state estimation
Require: A,B,C,D, u, y,Nv
Initial conditions: xˆ [0|0] ,Px˜ [0|0] , Rˆx [0] , Rˆy [0] , vˆx [0] , vˆy [0]
Result: xˆ [k|k] ,Px˜ [k|k] , Rˆx [k] , Rˆy [k]
k = 0
call [Initialization] from Algorithm 3.1
with Rx [0] replaced by Rˆx [0]
loop
k = k + 1
{measure y [k]}
if k > Nv then
call [Measurement noise covariance estimation] from Algorithm 3.4
else
call [Initializemeasurement noise covariance estimation] fromAlgorithm 3.5
end if
call [State estimation (update)] from Algorithm 3.1
with Ry [k] replaced by Rˆy [k]
if k > Nv then
call [State noise covariance estimation] from Algorithm 3.4
else
call [Initialize state noise covariance estimation] from Algorithm 3.5
end if
call [State propagation (predict)] from Algorithm 3.1
with Rx [k] replaced by Rˆx [k]
{propagate x [k] to x [k + 1]}
end loop
146
3.7 Monitoring for nonconvergence and divergence
The material of this section is largely based on the discussion regarding the detection and
correction of anomalous behaviours that is included in [47]. These strategies provide an
alternative to calculating observability at each time-step for LTI and potentially also LTV
and LPV systems. Although, in the case of LPV systems, observability may be calculated
oﬄine for all known operating points prior to implementation of the model within the KF.
Convergence is first defined for a sequence of real vectors, denoted η [k], with k > kε for
some kε and |η [k]− η [∞]| < ε, by the following behaviour.
lim
k→∞
η [k] = η [∞] ∀ε > 0 (3.73)
In other words, the sequence of real vectors converges to a limit η [∞] if the norm of the
difference between the limit and the current value of the vector is less than some finite
positive value, ε. For finite length sequences this convergence can instead be represented
by substituting (kε +N) for ∞ in (3.73), where N is a positive integer representing a
number of time-steps. Moreover, two vector sequences are said to converge if the difference
between the sequences approaches the zero vector.




η [k] =∞∀ε > 0 (3.74)
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where |η [k]| is said to grow without bound. It is more common, however, that the KF
does not converge, rather than being strictly divergent. Nonconvergence is defined for a
sequence of real vectors, η [k], and |η [k]− η [∞]| < ε by the following behaviour
lim
k→kε+N
η [k] = η [kε +N ] ∀ε > 0 (3.75)
In other words, the sequence of real vectors converges to a limit, η [kǫ +N ], that is different
than the true or desired limit of the sequence.
Within the KF, the following sequences may or may not converge or may even be
divergent: the state vector, x, the mean-squared state, xx′, the state estimate, xˆ, the
estimation as well as prediction errors, x− xˆ, the error covariances, Px˜,Py˜, and in the case
of the ALMF filter, the estimated noise covariances, Rˆx and Rˆy.
For LTI systems, nonconvergence that is due to either the natural behaviour or un-
observability of the system can be predicted by calculating steady state error covariances
using the Riccati equation. The value of the error covariance can then either be determined
to be bounded or to be growing without bound by evaluating the characteristic values of the
covariance. For LTV systems, therefore, monitoring the magnitude of the error covariances
provides a means by which to determine whether a system is diverging. More specifically,
the characteristic values can be calculated by performing eigenvalue-eigenvector decompo-
sition on the error covariances to test for negative values or large condition numbers.
In the case of nonconvergence, the error covariances will not grow without bounds.
Moreover, in practice, it is not possible to measure state estimation error since the ele-
ments of the state vector cannot be measured. This unpredictable nonconvergence can be
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caused by bad data, numerical problems, or mismodelling. For bad data, i.e. misleading
measurements, it is not useful to monitor either the error covariance or Kalman gain since
these values are not affected by the measurements. The innovations, however, can be in-
spected for discrepancies through statistical testing. Then the state noise covariance, Rx,
may be artificially increased to improve recovery from erroneous measurement data if the
erroneous data are not detected before having been processed by the KF.
Numerical problems within the algorithm can be detected by monitoring the behaviour
of state error covariance. For example, larger a posteriori state error covariance than a
priori error covariance is indicative of a numerical problem within the algorithm. These
numerical problems can be remedied by improving the precision of the data within the
KF implementation, e.g. double instead of single precision. There are also various other
modifications to the standard KF equations that are considered to be more numerically
robust, see [47].
The potential for mismatch between the model and the system may also result in non-
convergence. Mismatch due to unmodelled state dynamics can be detected by Fourier
analysis of the innovations and remedied by the addition of fictitious state noise covari-
ance, as was the case for the numerical problems. Mismatch due to parametric modelling
errors can also be detectedwithin the innovation vectorwhere, for time-varying parameters,
either an EKF with unknown parameters as state variables, or the methods of Chapter 4
with the effects of the unknown parameters estimated as disturbance inputs can be utilized.
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3.8 Summary
This chapter presents the state-space form of modelling a system as well as the recursive
form of the KF state estimation equations, including the update and predict stages, for an
LTV system. This chapter also considers the statistical descriptions of uncertainty that are
provided as noise covariances to the KF and how these covariances relate to uncertainties
regarding the operating conditions of the system.
The KF-based state estimation equations are extended to the multi-step ahead pre-
diction problem with a focus on measurement rather than state prediction. The addition
of uncertain future parameter values and signals is considered within the prediction algo-
rithm through interval-prediction and adaptation of the noise covariances or uncertainty
descriptions. Two strategies for KF-based prediction are therefore investigated. The first
calculates only a single point-prediction for each time-step within the prediction window
while the second instead calculates the bounds of the interval-prediction for each time-step.
In utilizing the interval-based measurement prediction, decisions regarding the uncertain
future measurements may be made by considering the bounds of the confidence interval for
the predicted measurements rather than a single point-prediction. The result is a decision
that corresponds with some level of confidence in the predicted measurement.
Adaptation of the noise covariances is achieved through the use of the ALMF noise
covariance estimation algorithm. This adaptation of uncertainty descriptions allows theKF
to consider time-varying uncertainty within the time-varying parameters as well as signals
of the system. In addition, this chapter investigates the effect of state and measurement
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noise and error covariances on the measurement predictions, confidence intervals, and
Kalman gain. These aspects of theKF are often overlooked for the state estimation problem
since the state estimates are, in general, point-estimates, the KF is in the Luenberger
observer form, and the Kalman gain is updated according to the minimum mean squared
error of the updated state error. For safety applications, however, it is essential that the
interval-estimates are an accurate representation of prediction uncertainty as described by
the selected level of confidence.
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Chapter 4
Estimation of Disturbance Inputs
for Prediction Error Compensation
Beyond the stochastic descriptions of system uncertainties that are considered in Chapter
3, it is also possible that the system dynamics are altered in a more deterministic manner.
These deterministic discrepancies may be caused by the occurrence of an initiating event or
unanticipated operations during transient to an abnormal condition. Initiating events are
malfunctions, faults, or failures that result in a specific system dynamic operating beyond
the boundaries of a predetermined region of normal operation. These initiating events
and the resulting changes in the dynamic response of the system can also be considered
abnormal conditions with respect to the model that is assumed within the KF. Moreover,
the abnormal conditions or boundaries on the normal and safe operating regions are defined
by the TSPs and safety-margins that are functions of predetermined physical limits for the
system being protected as discussed in Section 1.1 and Section 2.2. In addition to the
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above disturbances, the system may include time-varying parameters that are not known
in advance and cannot be modelled in a stochastic or probabilistic form, e.g. using mean
and covariance. It may be possible, however, to represent these changes in dynamics due
to the time-varying parameters as deterministic disturbances to either the state or the
measurement.
The objective of this chapter is to compensate the KF-based predictions of Chapter
3 for prediction errors that are the result of abnormal behaviour within the system or
for safety parameter measurements that are otherwise diverging from predicted future
values. This error compensations is made possible by estimating the disturbances that are
affecting the state and measurement. In general, estimation algorithms may include, but
are not limited to, the algorithms discussed in Section 2.1.3. Within this research, however,
preference is given to estimation algorithms that consider deterministic models and signals.
The consideration of deterministic disturbances complements the stochastic modelling of
uncertainties that is considered by the KF-based prediction algorithm presented in Section
3. This concept is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Althoughdeterministic uncertaintymay seem tobe a contradiction of terms, these terms
are often used together when referring to unknown or unanticipated changes in input and
parameter values that are associated with systems that are defined precisely without the
need for probabilistic descriptions [145]. In other words, stochastic and deterministic un-
certainties are defined respectively as those values that are unknown but may be described
using a probability distribution and those that are unknown but may be described by spe-
cific values [158]. To be clear, the terms stochastic and deterministic uncertainty are not









Figure 4.1: Disturbance estimation and prediction error compensation to complement the
KF-based measurement prediction algorithms of Chapter 3.
therefore also be referred to by other names throughout literature.
The result of the above objective is a prediction algorithm that calculates the future
values of safety parameter measurements for a system that may have time-varying param-
eters. This calculation takes into consideration various sources of uncertainties as well
as the possible occurrence of abnormal conditions that may be uncertain with respect to
the nominal system dynamic. In other words, the methods of this chapter allow for the
prediction algorithm to consider that, during transient to an alarm threshold or TSP, the
dynamic of the system may become a modified form of the model that is provided to the
KF.
This chapter focuses specifically on disturbance estimation algorithms that are LS-
based. The LS algorithm is chosen because it conforms to the criteria discussed in the
previous two paragraphs and is compatible with the state-space form of modelling the
system. In addition, LS estimation is a well-established method that is supported by vast
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bodies of related literature and applications, some of which are reviewed in Chapter 2. The
LS filter is combined with the KF in a KF/LS-based prediction algorithm where the LS
disturbance estimates compensate for prediction error. This chapter therefore introduces
a method of compensating for KF-based prediction error through LS-based estimation
of disturbances in both the state and measurement signals of the system. This strategy
is preferred over an augmented KF state or parameter estimation algorithm, as studied
in [55], due to the augmented form requiring the specification of fictitious noise covariances
or statistics, as R• for the KF, for disturbances that are assumed to have deterministic
dynamics.
Of the topics covered in this chapter, the formulation of LS-based disturbance input
estimation is considered a major contribution since it is performed to compensate not only
for possible disturbance inputs but also for the potentially unanticipated changes in the
LTV parameters of the system. In addition, the LS-based estimation is performed from the
perspective of compensating for prediction error as an unknown disturbance signal within
themeasurement equation. This is in addition to the state equation as performed by Juricek
et al. [40]. This LS-based estimation is a simplification of the generalized likelihood ratio
method performed by Basseville and Nikiforov [102].
More specifically, the method of this chapter allows for the originating time-step of
occurrence for the initiating event to be reset rather than solving an optimization problem
for a particular fault occurrence, as in the generalized likelihood ratio algorithm. This
work also presents a solution to the LS estimation problem that considers disturbances
that occur at an unknown time rather than at a known time as considered by Juricek et
al. [40]. In addition, RLS solutions are formulated for the state and the measurement
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disturbance input estimation problems. The two RLS solutions are then combined and
the equations for prediction error as well as error covariance compensation are formulated.
The KF, which is also a recursive algorithm, is considered throughout the development of
the LS disturbance estimation procedures in order to achieve the combined KF/RLS-based
prediction algorithm.
In summary, this chapter combines KF-based state and measurement prediction with
ALMF-based noise covariance estimation and prediction error compensation through RLS-
based disturbance input estimation. This chapter does not attempt, however, to cover the
vast body of literature and applications that are related to the LS methods. For a more
complete treatment of LS estimation of disturbance inputs refer to the text by Basseville
and Nikiforov [102].
4.1 Least-Squares-based Estimation of Disturbance
Inputs
It is expected that estimating and then compensating for prediction error will improve the
accuracy of the predicted measurements and, in turn, the reliability of making predictive
decisions. This section therefore introduces LS-based estimation of disturbances within the
state and measurement equations of a system. More specifically, this section investigates
the use of the LS filter to estimate a disturbance input with an assumed deterministic
disturbance model or profile that is optimal with respect to the LS error between the
current measurement and the a priori measurement estimate or prediction as defined in
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(3.20). The estimated disturbances are then utilized to compensate for estimation error.
These efforts are in support of extending the disturbance estimation problem to estimate
and compensate for prediction error in Section 4.1.2 by propagating the disturbances to
a predetermined prediction horizon. This work does not consider the robustness of the
estimation and prediction error compensation routines to the selection of the disturbance
model. The models are chosen to represent reasonable deviations in the system dynamic
response over relatively short periods of time that may lead an abnormal condition.
Error between a predicted measurement and the true measurement may be caused
by an additive disturbance within either the state or the measurement equation. It is
therefore assumed that the system is modelled as a modified form of the discrete-time
LTV stochastic state-space model in (3.9) and (3.10) that includes additive state and
measurement disturbance sequences as follows
x [k + 1] = A [k] x [k] + B [k] u [k] + vx [k] + Γx [k, kwx ]wx [k, kwx ] (4.1)









where Γx ∈ Rnx×nwx and Γy ∈ Rny×nwy are the assumed deterministic dynamic profiles of
the state and measurement disturbance respectively, wx ∈ Rnwx×1 and wy ∈ Rnwy×1 are
the respective state andmeasurement disturbance inputs, and kw• is the time-step at which
the disturbance is assumed to have initiated. In addition, system input, u as well as the
disturbance profile, Γ•, are assumed to be deterministic. All other parameters and signals
are as defined for the stochastic state-space model in (3.9) and (3.10). In this form, the
disturbances provide a mechanism for estimating errors that are due to uncertain inputs
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and system parameters, e.g. A¯ [k] 6= A [k] and u¯ [k] 6= u [k], that are not easily described
by probability distributions.
The above disturbance profile and input pairs, Γ• and w•, represent an accumulation
of a set of l ≥ 1 disturbances that can be modelled in the following state-space form for the
state input disturbance
Γ• [k, kw• ]w• [k, kw• ] = Γ•,1 [k, kw• ] γ•,1 [k, kw• ] + · · ·+ Γ•,l [k, kw• ] γ•,l [k, kw• ]
γ•,1 [k, kw• ] =
k∏
j=kw•






Γ•,1 [k − 1− j2, kw• ]w•,1 [k, kw• ]
...





Γ•,l [k − 1− j2, kw• ]w•,l [k, kw• ] (4.3)
where
∏−1
j=0 = I, γ•,• ∈ Rn•×1 are the individual disturbance profile components, e.g. bias,
ramp, sinusoid, Γ•,• ∈ Rn•×1 and Γ•,• ∈ Rn•×1 are the individual disturbance models that
are representative of state and state-to-measurement matrices respectively, and w•,• ∈
R
n•×1 are the individual disturbance inputs.
The disturbance profile representation requires that the initial condition for each indi-
vidual disturbance be equal to the zero vector γ = 0n•×1, hence the first term series product
reducing to zero in the latter component of (4.3). These dynamics are written as functions
of free and forced response due to the disturbance profiles including the assumption of
constant input, w [k, kw• ], over the duration of the dynamic response, i.e. from kw• to k.






γ•,1 [k, kwx ]
γ•,l [k, kwx ]
= Γ•,1 [k − 1, kwx ] γ•,1 [k − 1, kwx ] + w•,1 [k − 1, kwx ]
...




























for the indicated set of state equations and the combined measurement equation.
The disturbance profiles, Γx and Γy, are usually in one of two forms; an offset that
represents bias, or a ramp that represents drift, although any profile that can be modelled
using (4.3) may also be included [40]. For example, the disturbance profile Γx = I injects
an offset in state excitation with magnitude equal to the elements of the estimated state
disturbance input. This profile is equivalent to a single component disturbance model of
Γx,1 = 0
nx×nx where the disturbance is equal to the individual disturbance input, w•,•.
In contrast, the disturbance profile Γy =
[
I Ts (k − kw•) I
]
injects a ramp in the mea-
surement with both the offset and rate of change provided by the estimated disturbance
input. This model is the combination of the previous component for bias disturbance,
Γy,1 = 0
ny×ny , along with the ramp component of the disturbance model as Γy,2 = I.
For a system that is operating abnormally or with time-varying parameters the error
between measurement, y, and the compensated measurement estimate, yˆw, can be decom-
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posed into the following three terms





where ρx ∈ Rny×1 and ρy ∈ Rny×1 are the respective cumulative effects of the unknown
state and measurement disturbances on the measurement estimation error, and y˜ is the
a priori measurement innovation or residual that is not necessarily zero-mean due to the
presence of the disturbance. In other words, it is assumed in the above equation that a non-
zero mean measurement innovation, y˜, is caused by some deterministic modification to the
input of the system. This error is to be compensated for by LS estimation of the disturbance
input where the compensated error is denoted, y˜w. The LS problem is then formulated to













where each of the state andmeasurement disturbance canbe processed individuallywith the
latter of the disturbance estimations taking into consideration the compensation performed
by the former disturbance estimation.
4.1.1 Estimation and estimation error compensation
The disturbance estimation procedures are developed separately formeasurement and state
disturbances within the first and second halves of this section respectively.
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Disturbance to the measurement
In (4.2), the measurement, y, is affected by a known measurement disturbance profile,
Γy, and an unknown measurement disturbance input, wy. This measurement disturbance
affects the a priori measurement estimate as a result of being propagated through the KF
by the state update equation (3.16). The cumulative effect of themeasurement disturbance
on the a priori measurement estimate is therefore a function of known system parameters





= (y [k]− yˆ [k|k − 1])− (y [k]− yˆwy [k|k − 1])












Ay [k − j2]K [k − j1] Γy
[
k − j1, kwy






j=1 = I, with the partial cumulative effect of the propagation
through the KF, denoted Ay [k], given in [102] as follows.
Ay [k] = (I −K [k]C [k])A [k − 1] (4.8)
The measurement disturbance is then simplified to be the product of a known time de-
pendent matrix, ρ
y
∈ Rny×nwy , that represents the cumulative effect of the measurement

















The objective function, S, for LS estimation of the measurement disturbance input is
the following sum of the squared error between the a priori measurement error and the















The solution to theLSdisturbance input estimation problem is then definedby the following
criteria or quadratic minimization





operates to find the value of wy for which the objective function attains a
minimum value. The solution to this minimization problem for the objective function in
(4.10) is the estimated measurement disturbance input, wˆy, given in the weighted LS form



































whereP −1y˜ scales the estimate with respect to the covariance of themeasurement innovation,
or a priori measurement residual, and Λy is a matrix with time-invariant forgetting factor,
λy, and Λy = λyI. These forgetting factors give exponentially diminishing weight to the
measurement error samples, y˜, resulting in the most recent sample having the greatest
effect on the LS estimation whereas the sample from time-step kwy has the least effect.
More precisely, the filter defined in (4.12) is the Markov form of the weighted LS estimator
as it utilizes the a priori covariance matrix, Py˜, to maximize the probability that the a
priori KF-based measurement residual is equal to zero. This minimal solution considers
each of the a priori measurement estimation errors or innovations over the estimation
window, kwy , . . . , k.
Having estimated the measurement disturbance input, the KF-based a priori mea-
surement prediction is then compensated as follows to include the cumulative effect of the
LS-basedmeasurement disturbance estimate that is assumed to have initiated at time-step,
kwy .









The combined KF/LS-based measurement estimate is therefore a modified form of (4.5)
whereby only the measurement disturbance term is considered. In other words, the above
compensation ignores for the time-being the cumulative effect of the state disturbance on
the measurement estimation error, ρx [k, kwx ], as included in (4.5). Although the com-
pensated measurement prediction is a more accurate prediction of the true future mea-
surements, the prediction does not replace the a priori measurement estimate, yˆ [k|k − 1],
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within the KF-based estimation and prediction procedure of Section 3.2. This separation of
the compensated and original estimates is necessary for the LS objective function to capture
the accuracy of the a priori KF-based estimates within each time-step of operation.
In addition to compensating themeanmeasurement estimate, the a priori measurement
error covariance of (3.19) is compensated for the newly calculated measurement estimate,
yˆwy , as follows
Py˜wy [k|k − 1] = E
{




y [k]− yˆwy [k|k − 1]
) (


































]− P ′wˆy ,y˜′ [k, kwy] ρ′y [k, kwy] (4.14)
where Pwˆy ∈ Rnwy×nwy is the covariance of the estimated measurement disturbance input,
wˆy, and Pwˆy ,y˜′ ∈ Rnwy×ny is the cross-covariance between the estimated disturbance input
and the original a priori measurement innovation, y˜ [k|k − 1]. Here, the cumulative distur-
bance estimate is negative as a result of the disturbance being added to the measurement
estimate and then subtracted from the measurement sample.
The calculation of these covariances is necessary to allow interval estimation and pre-
diction problems to also consider the potential disturbances. The following covariances
represent uncertainties in the estimated disturbance inputs. Thus, although the distur-
bance model or profile is deterministic and no noise statistics are assumed, the estimated
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input has a defined covariance that results from noise within the (k−kwy) innovations that
are considered over the LS estimation window.
The covariance of themeasurementdisturbance input, wˆy, is formulated for theweighted
Markov estimator as a function of the cumulative measurement disturbance, ρ
y

































































In addition, the cross-covariance between the measurement disturbance input, wˆy, and the


























y˜ [j|j − 1] (y [j]− yˆ [j|j − 1])



















y˜ [k|k − 1]
· (C [k] (x [k]− xˆ [k|k − 1]) + vy [k])






















where the summation over j is reduced to only the term associated with time-step, k, due to
the measurement innovations at different time-steps being uncorrelated [159]. Moreover,
the measurement innovation covariance cancels with the inverse measurement innovation
covariance.
Disturbance to the state
In (4.1), state, x [k + 1], is affected by a known state disturbance profile, Γx, and an un-
known state disturbance input, wx. The state disturbance also indirectly affects the a
priori measurement estimate as a result of being propagated through the KF by the state
update equation (3.16). The cumulative effect of the state disturbance on the a priori
measurement estimate is calculated as the following function of known system parameters
and KF gain














nx×nx , and Ax [k] is calculated as follows [102].
Ax [k] = A [k] (I−K [k]C [k]) (4.18)
This formulation of state disturbance is then simplified to be the product of a known time
dependent matrix, ρ
x
∈ Rny×nwx , and an unknown state disturbance input, wx, as follows
ρx [k, kwx ] = C [k] ρ
x
[k, kwx ]wx [k − 1, kwx ]
= ρ
x
[k, kwx ]wx [k − 1, kwx ] (4.19)
where ρ
x
is the cumulative effect of the state disturbance profile on the measurement, and
ρ
x
∈ Rnx×nwx is the cumulative effect of the state disturbance profile on the state. The
initial effect of the state disturbance profile on the measurement is as follows
ρx [kwx + 1, kwx ] = C [kwx + 1] Γx [kwx , kwx ]wx [kwx , kwx ] (4.20)
where the cumulative effect of the disturbance profile at time-step (kwx + 1) is a function
of the state-to-measurement matrix of the same time-step multiplied by the disturbance
profile and input of the previous time-step as established in (4.1) and (4.5). In addition,
the zero-step-ahead value of the cumulative value is ρx [kwx , kwx ] = 0
ny×nwx , since the
measurement is not affected by the disturbance which is assumed to have initiated at
time-step kwx .
Although the disturbance input from the previous time-step, wx [k − 1, kwx ], affects
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the measurement, y [k], the estimate of the disturbance input is represented using the
time-step of estimation as wˆx [k, kwx ]. Thus, the current estimate of the state disturbance
input is the expectation of the state disturbance input from the previous time-step, or
wˆx [k, kwx ] = E {wx [k − 1, kwx ]}. The same representations are used for the cumulative




. These relationships are established in the
state equation definition of (4.1).
The weighted Markov estimate of the unknown disturbance input, wˆx, is calculated in







y˜ [j|j − 1]− ρ
x
[j, kwx ]wx [j, kwx ]
)2
(4.21)
where λ• is the forgetting factor for each time-step within the estimation window. The
quadratic minimization problem for LS estimation of state disturbance input is therefore
as follows.
wˆx = arg min
wx
S (wx) (4.22)
The unique solution to this minimization problem is the estimated measurement distur-
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bance input, wˆx, given in the weighted LS form as follows























y˜ [j|j − 1] y˜ [j|j − 1]

 (4.23)
where P −1y˜ again scales the estimate with respect to the covariance of the measurement
innovation and Λx is a matrix with time-invariant forgetting factor, λx, where Λx = λxI.
This state disturbance estimation procedure is a modified form of the disturbance estima-
tion that is presented for the prediction of abnormal conditions in [40] which, in turn, cites
methods for the detection of abrupt changes in [102].
Having estimated the state disturbance input, the KF-based a priori measurement
prediction is then compensated in the following equation to include the cumulative effect
of the LS-based state disturbance estimate that is assumed to have initiated at time-step,
kwx .
yˆwx [k|k − 1] = yˆ [k|k − 1] + ρx [k, kwx ] wˆx [k, kwx ] (4.24)
The above compensation ignores for the time-being the effect of the measurement distur-




, in (4.5). In addition to affecting
the a priori measurement estimate, the state disturbance also affects the a priori state
estimate, xˆ [k|k − 1]. The updated a priori state estimate is therefore compensated as
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follows.
xˆwx [k|k − 1] = xˆ [k|k − 1] + ρ
x
[k, kwx ] wˆx [k, kwx ] (4.25)
As in the case of estimating the measurement disturbance, the compensated a priori mea-
surement and state estimates remain separate from the standard KF procedure. This state
compensation may be useful when considering the effect of disturbances within the state
domain. It is not necessary, however, to compensate the state estimates while at the same
time compensating the measurement predictions since in doing so the compensation would
be doubled.
The a priori measurement error covariance in (3.19) is compensated for the newly
calculated measurement estimate, yˆwx , as follows
Py˜wx [k|k − 1] = E
{




y [k]− yˆ [k|k − 1]− ρ
x
[k, kwx ] wˆx [k, kwx ]
)2}
= C [k]Px˜ [k|k]C ′ [k] +Ry [k] + ρx [k, kwx ]Pwˆx [k] ρ′x [k, kwx ]
− ρ
x
[k, kwx ]Pwˆx,y˜ [k]− P ′wˆx,y˜ [k] ρ′x [k, kwx ] (4.26)
where Pwˆx ∈ Rnwx×nwx is the covariance of the estimated state disturbance input, wˆx, and
Pwˆx,y˜ ∈ Rnwx×ny is the cross-covariance between the estimated disturbance input and the
original a priori measurement innovation, y˜ [k|k − 1].
The covariance of the state disturbance input, wˆx, is calculated for the weightedMarkov
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estimator as the following function of the cumulative state disturbance, ρ
x
.
Pwˆx [k, kwx ] = E
{












y˜ [j|j − 1] ρx [j, kwx ]

−1 (4.27)
In addition, the cross-covariance between the state disturbance input, wˆx, and the a priori
measurement estimation error, y˜ [k|k − 1], is calculated as follows
Pwˆx,y˜ [k, kwx ] = E
{
(wˆx [k, kwx ]) (y [k]− yˆ [k|k − 1])′
}
= Pwˆx [k, kwx ] ρ
′
x
[k, kwx ] (4.28)
where, again, the summation over j is reduced to only the term associated with time-step
k and the measurement innovations cancel [159].
4.1.2 Prediction error compensation
In this section, the LS-based disturbance input estimation procedure is extended to esti-
mate and compensate for prediction errors over the prediction window. The development
of disturbance prediction and prediction error compensation procedures are presented sep-
arately for prediction error that is due to a measurement and state disturbances within the
first and second halves of this section respectively.
171
Disturbance to the measurement
The objective of prediction error compensation is to predict and compensate i-step-ahead
measurement predictions for the error between the i-step-ahead KF-based measurement
prediction and the corresponding eventual future measurement given an assumedmeasure-
ment disturbance profile. Prediction error compensation is performed in the same manner
as for the compensation of measurement estimation error in (4.13) or as follows.
yˆwy [k + i|k] = yˆ [k + i|k] + ρy
[







In addition, the propagated cumulative effect of the disturbance profile, ρ
y
, on the mea-








k + i, kwy






Ay [k + i− j2]K [k + i− j1] Γy
[







For predictions that are beyond one time-step ahead, the Kalman gain is equal to zero,
K [k + i] , 0nx×ny∀i > 1. Thus, the cumulative effect of measurement disturbance profile
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k + i, kwy







Ay [k + i− j2]K [k + i− j1] Γy
[







Ay [k + i− j2]K [k + i− j1] Γy
[




k + i, kwy






Ay [k + i− j2]K [k + i− j1] Γy
[
k + i− j1, kwy
]
(4.31)
where substitution of a KF gain equal to zero has reduced the number of terms within
the series summation by (i− 1). In addition, the remaining series product includes initial
multiplicands, Ay [k], that are equal to A [k − 1], e.g. Ay [k + i− 1] through Ay [k + 1].
This is also due to the Kalman gain in Ay [k + i], as defined in (4.8), being equal to zero.
Thus, the simplified series product and resulting cumulative effect of the measurement
disturbance profile are calculated as follows
i−1∏
j=1
Ay [k + i− j] =
i−1∏
j=1








k + i, kwy
]− C [k + i]A [k + i− 1] i−1∏
j=1






Ay [k + i− j2]K [k + i− j1] Γy
[





k + i, kwy
]− C [k + i]A [k + i− 1] i−1∏
j=1






Ay [k + 1− j2]K [k + 1− j1] Γy
[
k + 1− j1, kwy
]
(4.33)
where the system matricesA [k + i− 1] and C [k + i] are assumed to be equal to the values
of the current time-step k. For example, the one time-step ahead cumulative effect of









k + 1, kwy






Ay [k + 1− j2]K [k + 1− j1] Γy
[
k + 1− j1, kwy
]
(4.34)
The i-step-ahead measurement error covariance of the compensated measurement is
calculated by propagating the a priori measurement error covariance for measurement
disturbance estimation in (4.14) as follows.
Py˜wy [k + i|k] = E
{(
y [k + i]− yˆwy [k + i|k]
) (
y [k + i]− yˆwy [k + i|k]
)′}
= Py˜ [k + i|k] + ρy
[


















k + i, kwy
]
− P ′wˆy ,y˜
[













, has the exact same
value as is used for the weighted Markov estimator in (4.15) since the disturbance input
estimate remains a function of the current time-step k. In contrast, the cross-covariance




, and the i-step-ahead KF-based
measurement prediction error, y˜ [k + i|k], is required to be propagated as follows
Pwˆy ,y˜
[






















y˜ [k|k − 1]
· (C [k] (x [k]− xˆ [k|k − 1]) + vy [k])















y˜ [k|k − 1] (C [k] x˜ [k|k − 1] + vy [k])
·
(
C [k + i]
i−1∏
j=0
A [k + j] ((I−K [k]C [k]) x˜ [k|k − 1]−K [k] vy [k])′











P −1y˜ [k|k − 1]





A [k + j]
)′
C ′ [k + i] (4.36)
where the i-step-ahead measurement innovation is rewritten as a function of the a priori
state error, x˜ [k|k − 1], and measurement noise covariance, vx.
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Disturbance to the state
Alternatively, the following extension of the state disturbance estimation procedure results
in a method by which to predict the error between the i-step-ahead KF-basedmeasurement
prediction and the corresponding future measurement given an assumed state disturbance
profile. The i-step aheadKF-basedmeasurement prediction is then compensated to include
the cumulative state disturbance. This extension to the prediction problem is, again,
considered to be relatively straightforward with respect to the estimation procedure. The
following methods are, however, necessary for the eventual development of a recursive
solution to the LS problem as presented in Section 4.2.
Prediction error compensation is performed in the samemanner as for the compensation
of state estimation error in (4.24) and as follows.
yˆwx [k + i|k] = yˆ [k + i|k] + ρx [k + i, kwx ] wˆx [k, kwx ] (4.37)
where the cumulative effect of the disturbance profile, ρ
x
, on the measurement prediction
is calculated as the propagated form of (4.17), or
ρ
x









To simplify the estimation of prediction error for predictions that are beyond one time-
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step ahead, the cumulative effect of state disturbance profile is expanded as follows.
ρ
x







Ax [k + i− j2] Γx [k + i− j1, kwx ] + Γx [k + i− 1, kwx ]
)
(4.39)
Moreover, as is the case during propagation of the measurement disturbance in (4.31),
the series product includes initial multiplicands, Ax [k], that are equal to A [k] due to the
Kalman gain in Ax [k + i] as in (4.18) being equal to zero. Thus, the cumulative effect for
a state disturbance profile is simplified as follows
ρ
x










Ax [k + i− j2] Γx [k + i− j1, kwx ] + Γx [k + i− 1, kwx ]
)
(4.40)
using the equivalent series product of (4.32) where the state-to-measurement matrix,
C [k + i], is assumed to be equal to the value of the current time-step k. For example,









Ax [k + 1− j2] Γx [k + 1− j1, kwx ] + Γx [k, kwx ] (4.41)
The i-step-ahead measurement error covariance of the compensated measurement is
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calculated by propagating the a priori measurement error covariance for state disturbance
estimation in (4.26) as follows.
Py˜wx [k + i|k] = E
{
(y [k + i]− yˆwx [k + i|k]) (y [k + i]− yˆwx [k + i|k])′
}
= Py˜ [k + i|k] + ρx [k + i, kwx ]Pwˆx [k, kwx ] ρ′x [k + i, kwx ]
− ρ
x
[k + i, kwx ]Pwˆx,y˜ [k + i, kwx ]
− P ′wˆx,y˜ [k + i, kwx ] ρ′x [k + i, kwx ] (4.42)
The covariance of the state disturbance input, Pwˆx [k, kwx ], is a function of time-step k and
therefore retains the exact same value as for the weighted Markov estimator in (4.27). In
contrast, the cross-covariance between the state disturbance input, wˆx, and the i-step-ahead
KF-based measurement prediction error, y˜ [k + i|k], is propagated in the same manner as
for the measurement disturbance in (4.36) as follows.
Pwˆx,y˜ [k + i, kwx ] = E
{
wˆx [k, kwx ] (y [k + i]− yˆ [k + i|k])′
}





y˜ [k|k − 1]





A [k + j]
)′
C ′ [k + i] (4.43)
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4.2 Recursive Least Squares Formulation of
Disturbance Estimation and Prediction Error
Compensation
This section formulates recursive algorithms for the LS or Markov disturbance estimators
and predictors that are presented in Section 4.1. The recursive form of the LS algorithm
provides the benefit of requiring less computational power and a smaller amount of data
storage; these two resources are limited within the chosen safety-PLC in comparison to
high performance CPUs with near limitless amounts of data storage. The RLS algorithm
achieves reduction in computational requirements by processing the measurement sample
of the current time-step rather than the entire block of (k − kw•) measurement samples
as performed by the standard LS filter. The RLS algorithm also avoids the calculation of
matrix inverses through the use of the matrix inversion lemma. As a recursive algorithm,
the RLS estimates do, however, suffer from error due to initial conditions as the LS estimate
converges to the optimal solution over the initial estimates.
Although the RLS algorithm is stated in the following, the derivation of the RLS algo-
rithm from the standard LS filter is left to the cited literature [24]. The following sections
instead focus on the extension of the RLS algorithm to the state and measurement dis-
turbance estimation problem. This formulation differs from conventional RLS in that the
given cumulative effect of the disturbance does not inherently support recursion and is
therefore modified. Moreover, the time-step of initiation for the disturbance input is pe-
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riodically reset. This resetting function allows for the disturbance estimation algorithm
to accurately reflect the potential for a disturbance to occur at any time-step. Moreover,
disturbance input resetting is made to coincide with the covariance reset procedure that is
performed within the standard RLS algorithm. An alternating RLS filter configuration is
then developed to eliminate inaccuracies in compensation due to erroneous initial estimates
during filter convergence.
The solution to the LS disturbance estimation problem of Section 4.1.1 is restated in the
following general form for disturbances within either the measurement or state equation,
i.e. • represents either x or y,








y˜ [j|j − 1] y˜ [j|j − 1]

 (4.44)
where Pwˆ• is the covariance of the respective disturbance inputs as defined in (4.15) and
(4.27). Given an initial estimate of the disturbance input, wˆ• [kw• , kw• ], the Markov esti-
mation problem has the following well-known recursive solution






y˜ [k|k − 1] y˜ [k|k − 1]− ̺• [k, kw• ] wˆ• [k − 1, kw• ]
)
(4.45)
where ̺• is the normalized cumulative effect ̺• [k, kw• ] = P
− 1
2
y˜ [k|k − 1] ρ•, and K• is the
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RLS gain matrix [24]. The RLS gain matrix is, in turn, calculated as follows
K• [k] = λ
−1
• P• [k − 1, kw• ] ̺′• [k, kw• ]
(
I+ λ−1• ̺• [k, kw• ]P• [k − 1, kw• ] ̺′• [k, kw• ]
)−1
(4.46)
where P• is the covariance of the disturbance estimate. Given an initial estimate of the
disturbance estimate covariance, P• [kw• , kw• ], the covariance is calculated as follows.
P• [k, kw• ] = (I−K• [k] ̺• [k, kw• ]) Λ−1• P• [k − 1, kw• ] (4.47)
Within the above equations,Pwˆ• andP• are both the covariance of the disturbance estimate,
wˆ•. The disturbance estimate covariance is conveniently calculated within the standard
recursive form of the LS filter as follows
Pwˆ• [k, kw• ] = P• [k, kw• ] (4.48)
and the two variables, Pwˆ• andP•, are therefore interchangeable throughout the remainder
of this work.
4.2.1 Disturbance to the measurement
The recursive nature of the RLS solution to the measurement disturbance estimation prob-
lem is only of value if the various parameters within the RLS solution can also be calculated
in a recursive manner. The cumulative effect of the measurement disturbance profile, as
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]− C [k]A [k − 1]ψy [k, kwy] (4.49)
where ψy is referred to as the pseudo cumulative effect of the measurement disturbance
profile. More precisely, ψy is the cumulative effect of the measurement disturbance on the
a posteriori state of time-step, (k − 1). The recursive calculation of the pseudo cumulative










Ay [k − j2]K [k − j1] Γy
[
k − j1, kwy
]
= K [k − 1] Γy
[
k − 1, kwy
]





Ay [k − j2 − 1]
·K [k − j1 − 1] Γy
[
k − j1 − 1, kwy
]
= K [k − 1] Γy
[
k − 1, kwy
]
+ Ay [k − 1]ψy
[












Ay [k − 1− j2]K [k − 1− j1] Γy
[





kwy − 1, kwy
]
= 0nx×nwy , Γy
[
kwy − 1, kwy
]
= 0ny×nwy and the cumulative effect,
ρ
y
, is now a function of values that are dependent only on the current time-step, k, as well as
the previous time-step, (k − 1). The RLS estimate of the measurement disturbance input
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kwy − 1, kwy
]
= 0nwy×1.
The recursive calculation of the a priori measurement error covariance,Py˜wy , is straight-









require any modifications to be calculated in a recursive manner. More specifically, from
(4.48), the covariance of the measurement disturbance estimate, Pwˆy , is given directly
within the RLS filter asPy, (4.47). In addition, the cross-covariance between the measure-
ment disturbance input, wˆy, and the a priori measurement estimation error, y˜ [k|k − 1],
is the product of the disturbance estimate covariance and the cumulative effect of the dis-
turbance profile as established in (4.14) and is not reliant on any parameters prior to the
current time-step k. Thus, this covariance is calculated in the same manner as for the LS
filter using (4.16).
For prediction, the combined KF/LS measurement prediction of (4.29) is a function of
the i-step-ahead cumulative effect of the measurement disturbance profile, ρ
y
[
k + i, kwy
]
.
For the one-step-ahead prediction, the cumulative effect is calculated as the following
propagated form of (4.49) under the assumption that the state-to-measurement matrix








k + 1, kwy
]− C [k]A [k]ψy [k + 1, kwy] (4.53)
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where the disturbance profile is assumed known and the one-step-ahead pseudo cumulative
effect is calculated as follows
ψy
[
k + 1, kwy
]














For propagation beyond one time-step, the Kalman gain,K [k + i− 1], is equal to zero
withinAy [k + i− 1] as defined in (4.8). The pseudo cumulative effect reduces, as in (4.33),
to the following form
ψy
[




k + i, kwy
]
(4.55)
with the future state matrices, A [k + i], replaced by the state matrix of the current time-
step,A [k]. The cumulative effect of the measurement disturbance profile is then calculated








k + i, kwy
]− C [k]A [k]ψy [k + i, kwy] (4.56)
where the values of the system matrices are assumed to be equal to those of the current
time-step k.
In the above formulation the current and future values of the disturbance profile are
assumed known. Although not a requirement for propagating the RLS disturbance es-
timates, it may also be assumed that the disturbance profile, Γy, can be calculated in a
recursive manner. For example, the disturbance profile corresponding with a ramp input
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can be recursively calculated as follows.
Γy
[













The i-step-ahead measurement error covariance, Py˜wy , as given in (4.35), is a function





well as the i-step-ahead cross-covariance between the disturbance input estimate and the
a priori measurement error, Pwˆy ,y˜
[
k + i, kwy
]
. In Section 4.1.2 it was determined that, for
prediction, it is only necessary to propagate the cross-covariance since the measurement
disturbance input covariance is equal to the value of the current time-step. Propagation















P −1y˜ [k|k − 1]
· (C [k]Px [k|k − 1] (I−K [k]C [k])′ +Ry [k]K ′ [k])
·A ′ [k + i]C ′ [k + i] (4.58)
where the product is replaced by the cumulative effect of the state matrix,A [k + i]. This
cumulative effect of statematrix is essentially the state transitionmatrix over the prediction
window and is calculated recursively using an initial value ofA [k] = I as follows.
A [k + i] =
i−1∏
j=0
A [k + j]
185
= A [k + i− 1]
i−2∏
j=0
A [k + j]
= A [k + i− 1]A [k + i− 1] (4.59)
Algorithm 4.1 reorganizes the RLS-based measurement disturbance input estimation
and prediction procedures into two stages, update and predict. This structure mimics














are calculated within the predict stage and then
returned to the update stage. The calculation of pseudo cumulative effect is then mod-
ified from (4.50) in an effort to reduce the computational complexity of extending RLS




k + i, kwy
]
= K [k + i− 1] Γy
[
k + i− 1, kwy
]
+ Ay [k + i− 1]ψy
[
k + i− 1, kwy
]
(4.60)
With this modification, the initial value of the pseudo cumulative effect, ψy, remains as
for the unmodified form since the initial value of the disturbance profile, Γy, is also equal
to zero. The initial value for the cumulative effect of the measurement disturbance pro-











Algorithm 4.1 includes a count of the number of OPL that are required to execute the
algorithm for a system with a single output, or scalar measurement. This assumption
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Algorithm 4.1 Update and predict stages of the recursive least squares (RLS) measure-
ment disturbance input estimation and prediction error compensation procedure, RLSy,ip.








k + i, kwy
]− C [k]A [k − 1]ψy [k, kwy]
P y˜, [k|k − 1] = P −1y˜ [k|k − 1]
P
y˜
[k|k − 1] = P
1
2




































































k − 1, kwy
]
OPL for scalar y: 2n3wy + 6n
2
wy
+ 2nwynx + 6nwy + 2n
2




[Measurement disturbance estimation (predict)]
ψy
[
k + i, kwy
]
= K [k + i− 1] Γy
[
k + i− 1, kwy
]
+ (I−K [k + i− 1]C [k + i− 1])A [k + i− 2]ψy
[













k + i, kwy
]− C [k]A [k]ψy [k + i, kwy]
A [k + i] = A [k + i− 1]A [k + i− 1]
Pwˆy ,y˜′
[











P y˜ [k|k − 1]
· (C [k]Px [k|k − 1] (I−K [k]C [k])′ +Ry [k]K ′ [k])
·A ′ [k + i]C ′ [k + i]
yˆwy [k + i|k] = yˆ [k + i|k] + ρy
[






P y˜wy [k + i|k] = Py˜ [k + i|k] + ρy
[


















k + i, kwy
]− P ′wˆy ,y˜′ [k + i, kwy] ρ′y [k + i, kwy]
OPL for scalar y: 4Npn2wy + 4Npnwyn
2




















Figure 4.2: Connectivity betweenKF-basedmeasurement prediction and themeasurement
disturbance estimation and prediction error compensation procedure of Algorithm 4.1.
follows those that were made for the KF in the algorithms of Section 3.2. The count
does not include the operations required for updating the disturbance profile as this value
varies with the profile of the assumed disturbance. The computational complexity of
the RLS-based measurement disturbance interval-supporting estimation, prediction, and
compensation procedure is cubicwith respect to the dimension of the state vectormultiplied
by the prediction horizon, orRLSy,ip ∈ O (n3xNp). Finally, an overview of the measurement
disturbance estimation and prediction error compensation procedure is illustrated inFigure
4.2.
4.2.2 Disturbance to the state
The formulation of a recursive solution to the LS problem for a disturbance within the state
equation shares many similarities with that of the RLS solution for a disturbance within
the measurement equation presented in the previous section. That said, the equations
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are modified to consider effects of the state disturbance rather than the measurement
disturbance. For example, as in the case of the measurement disturbance, the cumulative




[k, kwx ] = C [k]ψx [k, kwx ] (4.61)
whereψx is referred to as the pseudo cumulative effect of the state disturbance profile on the
measurement estimate. More precisely, ψx is the cumulative effect of the state disturbance
on the a priori state of the current time-step, k. The pseudo cumulative effect can then be
calculated in a recursive manner that is similar to that of (4.50) as follows





Ax [k − j2] Γx [k − j1, kwx ]
= Γx [k − 1, kwx ]





Ax [k − j2 − 1] Γx [k − j1 − 1, kwx ]
= Γx [k − 1, kwx ] + Ax [k − 1]ψx [k − 1, kwx ] (4.62)





Ax [k − 1− j2] Γx [k − 1− j1, kwx ] (4.63)
where ψx [0, kwx ] = 0
nx×nw and the cumulative effect, ρ
x
, is now a function of values that
are dependent only on the current time-step, k, as well as the previous time-step, (k − 1).
The RLS estimate of the state disturbance input is then calculated using the general RLS
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solution of (4.45) as follows






y˜ [k|k − 1] y˜ [k|k − 1]− ̺x [k, kwx ] wˆx [k − 1, kwx ]
)
(4.64)
where wˆx [kwx − 1, kwx ] = 0nwx×1.
The recursive calculation of the a priori measurement error covariance, Py˜wx , has
the same formulation as for the measurement disturbance case. Basically, covariance
Pwˆx [k, kwx ] as well as cross-covariance Pwˆx,y˜ [k, kwx ] do not require any modification to be
calculated recursively: the covariance of the disturbance estimate, Pwˆx [k, kwx ] is given as
P [k, kwx ]; and the cross-covariance between the measurement disturbance input, wˆx, and
the a priori measurement estimation error, y˜ [k|k − 1], is calculated in the same manner
as for the LS filter using (4.28).
For prediction, the combined KF/LS measurement prediction of (4.37) is again a func-
tion of the i-step-ahead cumulative effect of the state disturbance profile, ρ
x
[k + i, kwx ]. For
the one-step-ahead prediction, the cumulative effect is calculated as the following propa-
gated form of (4.61) under the assumption that the state-to-measurement matrix C [k + 1]
is equal to that of the current time-step, or as follows
ρ
x
[k + 1, kwx ] = C [k]ψx [k + 1, kwx ] (4.65)
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where the one-step-ahead pseudo cumulative effect is calculated as follows
ψx [k + 1, kwx ] = Γx [k, kwx ] + Ax [k]ψx [k, kwx ] (4.66)
with initial value ψx [kwx , kwx ] = 0
nx×nw .
For propagation beyond one time-step, the Kalman gain,K [k + i− 1], is equal to zero
within Ax [k + i− 1] as defined in (4.18) and the pseudo cumulative effect is instead in the
reduced form of (4.33) as follows
ψx [k + i+ 1, kwx ] = Γx [k + i, kwx ] + A [k]ψx [k + i, kwx ] (4.67)
where it is assumed that the future state matrices,A [k + i], are equal to that of the current
time-step, A [k]. The cumulative effect of the measurement disturbance profile is then
calculated using the i-step-ahead propagated form of (4.61) as follows
ρ
x
[k + i, kwx ] = C [k]ψx [k + i, kwx ] (4.68)
where the values of the systemmatrices are also assumed to be equal to those of the current
time-step k.
The i-step-ahead measurement error covariance, Py˜wx , as given in (4.42), is a function
of the current covariance of the state disturbance input estimate, Pwˆx [k, kwx ], as well as
the i-step-ahead cross-covariance between the disturbance input estimate and the a priori
measurement error, Pwˆx,y˜ [k + i, kwx ]. As in the case of the measurement disturbance, it is
again only necessary to propagate the cross-covariance to future time-steps since the state
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disturbance input covariance is equal to the value of the current time-step. The propagation
of the cross-covariance is made possible by simplifying (4.43) in the same manner as for the
measurement disturbance as follows





y˜ [k|k − 1]
· (C [k]Px [k|k − 1] (I−K [k]C [k])′ +Ry [k]K ′ [k])
·A ′ [k + i]C ′ [k + i] (4.69)
where the cumulative effect of the state matrix,A [k + i], is defined in (4.59).
Algorithm 4.2 reorganizes the RLS-based state disturbance input estimation and pre-
diction procedures into a two stage structure, update and predict. Aswith themeasurement
disturbance input estimation procedure, the structure of Algorithm 4.2 mimics that of the
standard KF equations introduced in Section 3.2. The calculation of pseudo cumulative
effect is again a modified form of (4.62) to reduce the computational complexity of ex-
tending RLS disturbance input estimation to the recursive disturbance input prediction
problem. Thus, the initial value of the pseudo cumulative effect, ψx [k, kwx ], is also modified
to include the initial value of the measurement disturbance profile, or ψy [k, kwx ] = 0
nx×nw .
Algorithm 4.2 includes a count of the number of OPL that are required to execute the
algorithm for a systemwith a singlemeasurement as is the case for the algorithms of Section
3.2. The count does not include the operations required for updating the disturbance
profile as this value varies with the profile of the assumed disturbance. The computational
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Algorithm 4.2 Update and predict stages of the recursive least squares (RLS) state
disturbance input estimation and prediction error compensation procedure RLSx,ip.
[State disturbance estimation (update)]
ρ
x
[k, kwx ] = C [k]ψx [k, kwx ]
P y˜, [k|k − 1] = P −1y˜ [k|k − 1]
P
y˜
[k|k − 1] = P
1
2
y˜, [k|k − 1]
̺x [k, kwx ] = P y˜ [k|k − 1] ρx [k, kwx ]
Kx [k, kwx ] = λ
−1
x Px [k − 1, kwx ] ̺′x [k, kwx ](
1 + λ−1x ̺x [k, kwx ]Px [k − 1, kwx ] ̺′x [k, kwx ]
)−1
wˆx [k, kwx ] = wˆx [k − 1, kwx ]




[k|k − 1] y˜ [k|k − 1]− ̺x [k, kwx ] wˆx [k − 1, kwx ]
)
Px [k, kwx ] = (I−Kx [k, kwx ] ̺x [k, kwx ]) Λ−1x Px [k − 1, kwx ]
OPL for scalar y: 2n3wx + 6n
2
wx




[State disturbance estimation (predict)]
ψx [k + i, kwx ] = Γx [k + i− 1, kwx ]
+ A [k + i− 1] (I−K [k + i− 1]C [k + i− 1])ψx [k + i− 1, kwx ]
update Γx [k + i, kwx ]
ρ
x
[k + i, kwx ] = C [k]ψx [k + i, kwx ]
A [k + i] = A [k + i− 1]A [k + i− 1]
Pwˆx,y˜ [k + i, kwx ] = Px [k, kwx ] ρ
′
x
[k, kwx ]P y˜ [k|k − 1]
· (C [k]Px [k|k − 1] (I−K [k]C [k])′ +Ry [k]K ′ [k])
·A ′ [k + i]C ′ [k + i]
yˆwx [k + i|k] = yˆ [k + i|k] + ρx [k + i, kwx ] wˆx [k, kwx ]
P y˜wx [k + i|k] = Py˜ [k + i|k] + ρx [k + i, kwx ]Px [k, kwx ] ρ′x [k + i, kwx ]
− ρ
x
[k, kwx ]Pwˆx,y˜′ [k + i, kwx ]− P ′wˆx,y˜′ [k + i, kwx ] ρ′x [k + i, kwx ]
OPL for scalar y: 4Npn2wx + 4Npnwxn
2




















Figure 4.3: Connectivity betweenKF-basedmeasurement prediction and themeasurement
disturbance estimation and prediction error compensation procedure of Algorithm 4.1.
complexity of the RLS-based measurement disturbance interval-supporting estimation,
prediction, and compensation procedure is cubic with respect to the dimension of the
state vector multiplied by the prediction horizon, or RLSx,ip ∈ O (n3xNp). For a scalar
state vector, the measurement disturbance prediction algorithm requires 3Np + 1 more
arithmetic operations than for the state disturbance algorithm. An overview of the state
disturbance estimation and prediction error compensation procedure is illustrated inFigure
4.3.
Common oversights Within both the measurement and state disturbance estimation
procedures, it is imperative that the measurement innovation, y˜, is calculated using the
unmodified or uncompensated KF-based state estimation procedure. In addition, the
future values of the Kalman gain,K [k + i], must be assigned values of zero as the KF-based
update stage is not executed within the measurement prediction procedures of Chapter 3.
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Compensating for estimation error Although compensation of estimation error
rather than prediction error is beyond the scope of this work, the following provides a
brief outline for compensation. These compensation techniques may be useful within other
non-predictive decision making processes. For the purpose of estimation error compen-
sation, the estimated measurement disturbance input and measurement error covariance
are combined with the a priori measurement prediction and error covariance in the same
manner as for the LS filter using (4.13) and (4.14) respectively. Moreover, it is possible to
compensate the a posteriori measurement estimate and error covariance by reformulating
(4.14). In addition, the recursively estimated state disturbance input and measurement
error covariance may be combined with the a priori measurement prediction and error
covariance in the same manner as for the LS filter using (4.24) and (4.26) respectively.
Please refer to the following section for more information regarding the implementation
of both state and measurement disturbance estimation. Moreover, as with the prediction
compensation procedure, it is imperative that the compensated estimates remain separate
from the closed-loop of the KF procedure.
4.2.3 Disturbances to both the measurement and state
It is possible to estimate state disturbance inputs while also estimating measurement dis-
turbance inputs. These combined estimations require, however, that one of the two dis-
turbances be selected as the primary disturbance, i.e. the disturbance that is to be es-
timated first. Within the combined estimation procedure it is also necessary to consider
the cross-covariance between the estimated state and measurement disturbance inputs.
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In the following, the measurement disturbance is considered to be primary and the state
disturbance secondary.
First, the measurement innovation, y˜ [k|k − 1], that is considered by the secondary or
last calculated estimation is modified to include the estimated compensation of predic-
tion error that is calculated in the primary estimation problem. For the case where the
measurement disturbance is primary, the measurement disturbance is first calculated by
considering the measurement innovation that is equal to the actual measurement minus
the a priori KF-based measurement estimate, or one-step-ahead measurement prediction.
In contrast, the measurement innovation for the secondary state disturbance input estima-
tion routine is offset by the most recently calculated cumulative effect of the measurement




k|k − 1, kwy
]










where the subscript •wy indicates the inclusion of measurement disturbance input within
the a priori measurement estimation error. This estimation error is equivalent to the error
associated with the compensated a priori measurement estimate of (4.13).
Next, the normalizing covariance of the measurement innovation, Py˜ [k|k − 1], for the
secondary state disturbance estimation algorithm is compensated to consider the covari-
ance of the estimated disturbance input as well as the cross-covariance between the esti-
mated disturbance input and the measurement innovation. The measurement innovation
that is considered by the secondary state disturbance input estimation procedure is there-
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fore equal to the updated covariance, Py˜wy
[
k|k − 1, kwy
]
, that is calculated within the
primary measurement disturbance input estimation procedure, or (4.14).
Estimation of the state disturbance is then performed as formulated in Section 4.2.2.
Moreover, the state disturbance propagation also follows the methods of Section 4.2.2. The
prediction error is then compensated as follows.
yˆw [k + i|k] = yˆ [k + i|k] + ρy
[








[k + i, kwx ] wˆx [k, kwx ] (4.71)
The above three modifications to Algorithm 4.2 allow the state and measurement distur-
bance estimation routines to be combined.
In addition, the i-step ahead combined measurement error covariance, P y˜wx [k + i|k], of
Algorithm 4.2 is modified to consider the cumulative effects of both the state and measure-






Py˜w [k + i|k, kw] = E
{(
y˜ [k + i]− yˆwy
[
k + i|k, kwy
]− yˆwc [k + i|k, kwx ])2}
= E
{(
y˜ [k + i]− ρ
y
[
















[k + i, kwx ]Pwˆc [k, kwx ] ρ
′
x
[k + i, kwx ]
− ρ
x




k + i, kwy
]
Pwˆy ,wˆc [k, kw] ρ
′
x
[k + i, kwx ] (4.72)
where cross-covariance Pwˆy ,wˆc introduces an additional term beyond those of the state and
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measurement disturbance input estimation procedures, cross-covariance Pwˆc,y˜ is a modified
form of the cross-covariance established within (4.69), and covariance Pwˆc is calculated in
the same manner as Px within the general RLS equation (4.47).
The cross-covariance between the state disturbance input estimate, wˆc, and the mea-
surement innovation, y˜, is calculated as follows
Pwˆc,y˜ [k + i, kwx ] = E
{






























 y˜′ [k + i|k]











C [k]Px [k|k − 1] (I−K [k]C [k])′ +Ry [k]K ′ [k]
)







k + i, kwy
])
= Pwˆx,y˜ [k + i, kwx ]
− Pwˆc [k, kwx ] ρ′x [k, kwx ]P
−1
y˜c







k + i, kwy
]
(4.73)
where the cross-covariance between the estimated measurement disturbance input and the
measurement innovation is zero for time-steps kwx through (k − 1), and Pwˆy ,y˜ is given in
(4.36).
The i-step ahead combined measurement error covariance is then modified to include
the cross-covariance between the estimated state and measurement disturbance inputs.
198
The cross-covariance is calculated in the following non-recursive form

































































































P ′wˆc [k, kwx ] (4.74)
where the cross-covariance of the measurement innovation cancels with the inverse co-
variance and the cross-covariance between the measurement innovation and the estimated
measurement disturbance input is given as the transpose of (4.16). It is possible to cal-
culate the above cross-covariance in a recursive manner within the update stage of the
secondary RLS disturbance estimation algorithm by separating the series summation from
the covariance matrices of the current time-step as follows.




Ω [k, kwx ]P
′
wˆc
[k, kwx ] (4.75)
The cumulative effect of the state and measurement disturbance profiles on the cross-
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covariance of the estimated disturbance inputs is also calculated recursively as follows





















[k, kwx ] (4.76)
where Ω [kwx − 1, kwx ] = 0nwy×nwx .
Algorithm 4.3 combines the RLS-based measurement and state disturbance input es-
timation and prediction procedures into a two stage structure, update and predict. The
updated algorithm also includes the calculation of the necessary cross-covariances. The
number of OPL are not calculated for this algorithm, since the number of operations have
already been tallied for the two estimation in previous presented algorithms.
4.2.4 Resetting the disturbance and RLS covariance
The recursive ability of the RLS filter brings about many advantages to the disturbance
estimation problem, e.g. a reduction in computational complexity and data storage re-
quirements. Through the use of the forgetting factor, Λ•, it is possible for the RLS filter to
operate indefinitely as the algorithm places a higher weight on the most recent data. The
forgetting factor can allow for better adjustment with the compromise of reduced stability.
That said, it is only possible to make the disturbance estimation procedure entirely recur-
sive with respect to the disturbance profile for a subset of the profiles that may support
recursion. Moreover, for those profiles that due support recursion, the computational com-
plexity of the recursions may become limiting. For this reason, this work propagates the
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Algorithm 4.3RLS/KF-basedmeasurement interval-prediction with combinedmeasure-
ment and state disturbance input estimation and prediction error compensation where the
measurement disturbance is considered primary.
Require: Np,A,B,C,D, u, y,Rx,Ry, Λy
Initial conditions: xˆ [0|0] ,Px˜ [0|0]
Result: yˆw [k + i|k] , yˆu,αw [k + i|k] , yˆl,αw [k + i|k] ∀i = 1, . . . ,Np
k = 0
call [Initialization] from Algorithm 3.1
loop
k = k + 1
{measure y [k]}
call [Measurement disturbance estimation (update)] from Algorithm 4.1
call [State disturbance estimation (update)] from Algorithm 4.2
with y˜ and Py˜ replaced by the compensated y˜wy and Py˜wy
call [State estimation (update)] from Algorithm 3.1
for i = 1, . . . ,Np do
call [ith-step propagation (predict)] from Algorithm 3.3
call [Measurement disturbance estimation (predict)] from Algorithm 4.1
call [State disturbance estimation (predict)] from Algorithm 4.2
call [ith-step interval calculation] from Algorithm 3.3
with yˆ and Py˜ replaced by the compensated yˆw and Py˜w
end for
{propagate x [k] to x [k + 1]}
end loop
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disturbance profile forward in time from an initiating time-step, kw. It is therefore neces-
sary to update this initiating time-step in order to continuously monitor for the occurrence
of a disturbance.
The reset procedure is performed periodically after a given number of time-steps. The
values which are reset include, if necessary, the disturbance profile, Γ•, as well as the initial
value of the disturbance estimate covariance, P• and all of the cumulative variables, ψ•,
ρ•, and Ω. The estimated disturbance input is not reset, as the most previously calculated
estimate is considered to be a good initial guess for the reset estimation problem.
The choice of forgetting factor affects the tracking, convergence, and stability of theRLS
filter. This is even more important given the time-varying KF/RLS dual state and input
estimation problem. This work does not establish the criteria for selection of a sufficiently
stable forgetting factor. It is important that the forgetting factor be set at a value that
is relatively near to and less than unity. As the value of the forgetting factor approaches
unity, the RLS filter takes into account more historical data within the estimation problem.
Thus, larger values of forgetting factor generally improve the stability of the RLS filter.
More specifically, the effect of the forgetting factor on the measurement error at time-step
(k − kw) can be calculated as λk−kw . For example, a forgetting factor of 0.99 applies a
weight of 0.366 or 36.6% to the measurement error that was observed at 100 time-steps
into the past.
Alternating dual RLS filter configuration The reset procedure of this section oc-
casionally results in erroneous disturbance estimations due to the initial conditions within
the RLS filter. An alternate strategy to alleviate these errors is to duplicate the distur-
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bance estimation and prediction algorithms and to switch between the dual RLS filters, e.g.
from one RLS filter for measurement disturbance to another RLS filter for measurement
disturbance, and the same for state disturbance. This alternating dual configuration can
be performed for either of, or both of, the state and measurement disturbance estimation
algorithms. A simplified example of this alternating configuration is given in Algorithm
4.4.
The simplest mechanism for switching between the active and inactive RLS filters is
to do so at regular intervals. This switching function is denoted Θ in Figure 4.4 as well
as Algorithm 4.4. In this work, however, a convergence detection algorithm has been
implemented to determine a suitable time-step at which to switch between the filters.
The measurement and state disturbance algorithms are therefore switched at different
time-steps, i.e. not in unison. Upon switching, the RLS covariance of the inactive filter
as well as the initiating time-step of the disturbance are reset. Once the RLS solution
has converged, the algorithm switches back to the original RLS filter. This convergence
detection procedure is repeated indefinitely. Convergence is detected by monitoring the
magnitude of a moving average for the mean squared error in the measurement prediction
that would be achieved through the use of the inactive filter. The remaining details of
this mechanism are not significant to the contribution of this thesis and are therefore not
documented.
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4.2.5 Adaptive-limited-memory-filter-based noise covariance
estimation
This section considers the combination of the ALMF noise covariance estimation algorithm
within the alternating dual configuration of RLS-based disturbance estimation. This final
configuration combines, in an elegantmanner, all the algorithms that have been formulated
within this work. The ALMF-based noise covariance estimation algorithm determines the
statistical uncertainty in the state and measurement error. These errors are affected by
the RLS-based disturbance estimation. Thus, when used in conjunction with the RLS
filters, the ALMF algorithm is modified to consider the compensated prediction error. The
following modifications are included in Algorithm 4.4.
For the estimation of measurement noise covariance, the ALMF algorithm is modified
to consider the compensated a priori measurement error and error covariance, y˜w and
Py˜w , rather than those that are produced by the KF-based prediction algorithm alone, i.e
y˜ and Py˜. Thus, the measurement noise covariance considers the compensation that is
performed as a result of estimating the state and measurement disturbances. The result is
that the measurement error covariance more accurately represents the uncertainty in the
compensated errors.
For the estimation of state noise covariance, the modifications to the ALMF are more
involved. The state noise covariance is a function of the error between the a posteriori and
a priori state estimates, xˆ [k|k] − xˆ [k|k − 1]. Although the disturbance is applied to the
true state, as defined in (4.1), the state disturbance affects the state estimates through the
same equation as for the measurement disturbance. In other words, the only means by
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Algorithm 4.4RLS/KF-basedmeasurement interval-predictionwithALMFnoise covari-
ance estimation, dual combined measurement and state disturbance input estimation and
prediction error compensation where the measurement disturbance is considered primary
Require: Np,A,B,C,D, u, y,Rx,Ry, Λy
Initial conditions: xˆ [0|0] ,Px˜ [0|0]
Result: yˆw [k + i|k] , yˆu,αw [k + i|k] , yˆl,αw [k + i|k] ∀i = 1, . . . ,Np
k = 0
call [Initialization] from Algorithm 3.1
loop
k = k + 1
{measure y [k]}
call [Measurement disturbance estimation (update)] from Algorithm 4.1
call [Alternate-measurement disturbance estimation (update)] from Algorithm 4.1
call [State disturbance estimation (update)] from Algorithm 4.2
with y˜ and Py˜ replaced by the compensated y˜wy and Py˜wy
call [Alternate-state disturbance estimation (update)] from Algorithm 4.2
with y˜ and Py˜ replaced by the compensated y˜wy and Py˜wy
evaluate switching function, Θ, and select active disturbance estimates
call [Measurement noise covariance estimation] from Algorithm 3.4
with yˆ and Py˜ replaced by the compensated yˆw and Py˜w
call [State estimation (update)] from Algorithm 3.1
call [State noise covariance estimation] from Algorithm 3.4
with xˆ [k|k] and Px˜ [k|k] replaced by xˆ [k|k] and P x˜ [k|k]
for i = 1, . . . ,Np do
call [ith-step propagation (predict)] from Algorithm 3.3
call [Measurement disturbance estimation (predict)] from Algorithm 4.1
with Ry replaced by Rˆy
call [Alternate-measurement disturbance estimation (predict)] from Algorithm 4.1
with Ry replaced by Rˆy
call [State disturbance estimation (predict)] from Algorithm 4.2
with Ry replaced by Rˆy
call [Alternate-state disturbance estimation (predict)] from Algorithm 4.2
with Ry replaced by Rˆy
evaluate switching function, Θ, and select active prediction errors
call [ith-step interval calculation] from Algorithm 3.3
with yˆ and Py˜ replaced by the compensated yˆw and Py˜w
end for
{propagate x [k] to x [k + 1]}
end loop
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which to measure a disturbance in the state is through the measurement, y. Moreover, the
measurement affects the state estimates through the update equation in (3.16). Thus, the
a posteriori state estimate is updated as follows for the purpose of state noise covariance
estimation.












[k, kwx ] wˆx [k, kwx ]
)
(4.77)
This update eliminates the impact of the disturbances on the state estimate without em-
bedding the error compensation routine within the standard KF equations.
When both the state and measurement disturbance estimation routines are active, the
ALMF algorithm is modified to consider the cross-covariance between the two disturbance
input estimates in the same manner as in (4.72) for prediction error compensation. These
covariances are calculated within the update stage of the secondary RLS disturbance esti-
mation algorithm, however, rather than the prediction stage as included in the combined
state andmeasurement disturbanceAlgorithm 4.3. The chosen forgetting factor, λ•, should
allow the RLS-based disturbance estimates to be more responsive to error than the ALMF-
based noise covariance estimates given covariance estimation window, Nv. Moreover, for
LTV systems where the model parameters may be assigned from a multi-model lookup
table, it is imperative that bumpless transfer is included within all of the KF and LS or
RLS equations.
The KF-based measurement interval-prediction, RLS-based disturbance estimation
and prediction error compensation, as well as ALMF-based noise covariance estimation
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Figure 4.4: Connectivity betweenKF-basedmeasurement prediction and themeasurement
disturbance estimation procedure of Algorithm 4.1.
and state disturbance input estimation where the measurement disturbance is considered
primary.
4.3 Summary
This chapter presents the LS solution to the disturbance estimation problem. This esti-
mation procedure is performed in addition to the KF-based state estimation of Chapter
3 in order to consider deterministic changes in the operating conditions or signals of the
system. The LS problem is formulated for additive input disturbances to both state and
measurement of the system. The disturbance model is included within the estimation rou-
tine as a profile as opposed to the alternate method of augmenting the state matrix. This
form of estimation circumvents the selection of fictitious noise covariance for disturbances
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that are considered to be deterministic.
A recursive solution to the LS disturbance estimation problem is also formulated. This
recursive procedure includes the related covariances between the estimated disturbance in-
put and the measurement residual or innovation. The recursive solution does not, however,
include the ability to recursively update the initial time-step for the assumed disturbance.
For this reason, an alternating dual-RLS filter configuration is developed whereby the two
RLS filters switch upon detection of the compensated prediction error converging to within
some margin of accuracy with respect to the measurement signal. The RLS disturbance
input estimation procedure is then combined with the ALMF noise covariance estimation
routine of Chapter 3. The result is a prediction algorithm that incorporates three forms of




Assessment of Prediction Quality
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 address many of the prediction-related objectives that make up
this dissertation work. The remaining methodology-related objectives can be separated
into twomain tasks. The first is the development of PSDSs using the algorithms formulated
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. The second is the enhancement of the developed PSDS to
consider or assess prediction quality as well as the probability of a true or false impending
trip condition.
Regarding the development of a PSDS, this chapter introduces a benchmark conven-
tional SDS design that is a simplified portion of CANDU SDS1 as introduced in Section
2.2. The conventional SDS is modified to include the KF-based prediction algorithm of
Section 3.2. A block diagram of the basic structure for conventional SDS as well as the
modular addition of the prediction algorithm is illustrated within the context of SISs in
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Figure 5.1a) and Figure 5.1c) respectively. By including KF-based prediction, the PSDS is
able to consider stochastic uncertainty within the system, model, parameters, and signals.
The PSDS is then further modified within this chapter to include the noise covariance es-
timation algorithm of Section 3.6 as well as the prediction error compensation algorithm
of Section 4.1. These modifications are illustrated respectively in Figure 5.1d) and Figure
5.1e). The addition of RLS-based disturbance estimation enables the PSDS to consider
deterministic uncertainty, e.g. errors within the model parameter as well as disturbances
within the system inputs. Moreover, the addition of an ALMF-based noise covariance
estimation algorithm enables the PSDS to consider changes in the statistical descriptions
of the uncertainties that are provided to the KF. Each of the KF-based as well as the
KF/RLS-based PSDS designs is derived using both the point- and the interval-prediction
methods of Chapter 3. This chapter therefore introduces two point-PSDS designs and two
interval-PSDS designs.
In utilizing a KF as the foundation of the prediction algorithm as well as an RLS filter to
compensate for prediction error, the point- and interval-PSDS designs are able to calculate
accurate predictions even though the systemmay be operating under uncertain conditions,
e.g. those conditions that are compatible with the assumed model of disturbance input.
That said, multi-step-aheadKF-based predictions are calculated in an “open-loop”manner
since the prediction algorithm does not take into consideration the value of past multi-
step-ahead predictions. In other words, the KF-based measurement predictions and error
covariances are not functions of the error in predictions that are propagated beyond one
time-step. This is in contrast to the one-step ahead KF-based predictions that affect KF-





























Figure 5.1: Modular modification of a) conventional SDS logic to include the following
capabilities b) prediction quality assessment and alarm/trip optimization, c) safety pa-
rameter prediction, d) uncertainty or noise covariance estimation, and c) prediction error
compensation, all within the context of safety instrumented systems (SISs).
state estimate as a function of the a priori measurement error within the state update
equation (3.16). Thus, a secondary objective of this chapter is to monitor and asses the
quality of past predictions in an effort to improve the capability of the PSDS designs to
make accurate predictive decisions. This objective differs from that of Chapter 3 in that
the predictions and the prediction algorithm are being tested for quality rather than the
predictions only being compensated for errors.
The algorithms of Chapter 3 do not monitor for bias or drift in the predicted mea-
surements or discrepancies in the measurement prediction error covariances. Given the
assumption of a Gaussian probability distribution for prediction errors within the KF,
however, various statistical tests can be performed on the errors to determine whether
the assumed system model, signal, and noise characteristics match those of the true sys-
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tem [147, 148]. These tests provide a means for assessing prediction quality within each
time-step of the prediction window, as performed in [40]. Those predictions that are con-
sidered to be of sufficient quality given the statistical test criteria are then selected for
comparison against the TSP. The result is an effective prediction horizon that is adapted
as a function of prediction quality. Statistical testing, hypothesis testing, and optimal
alarm theory are then combined in an effort to adapt and optimize trip initiation in a
manner similar to the work of Martin [41]. More specifically, by including optimal alarm
theory, it is possible to not only adapt the effective prediction horizon but also to adapt
a metric that represents expected mean prediction error by maximizing the probability of
an impending trip condition given an alarm or trip. These two features are included in the
prediction quality assessment and trip optimization block of Figure 5.1b).
The above objectives result in a PSDS that is not only able to calculate future values of
safety parameter measurements under uncertain conditions, but is also aware of the quality
of the predictions that are being made. Moreover, the PSDS is able to adapt the effective
prediction horizon and predicted measurement metric so that the shutdown procedure is
activated at a time that is considered to be optimal. In this manner, the probability of
spurious and missed trip occurrences can be minimized. In general, this chapter presents
PSDS designs that emphasize simplicity andmodularity. All of the proposed PSDS designs
include the conventional trip detection mechanism in order to guarantee the occurrence of
a trip decision that cannot, under any circumstances, be made at a time which is later than
that of the conventional SDS. This research considers the well-established IB , NIS , and
IW tests for assessing the statistical properties of the predictions that are calculated by
the KF and RLS algorithms [147]. The hypothesis testing methods t investigated within
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this research include the calculation of TPR and FPR . These two rates are closely related
to the ROC that is utilized within some optimal alarm research [41] as well as the false
positive, Type I, and false negative, Type II, errors that correspond to spurious or missed
trip activations within SDS. The PSDS designs also incorporate a prediction selection
function that is responsible for adapting the prediction horizon or metric that is to be
compared against the TSP.
Of the topics covered in this chapter, the formulation of the point- and interval-PSDS
designs is considered a major contribution since these designs are the first known predictive
methods within the application of NPP shutdown. In addition, this chapter presents the
first known investigation into the relationship between the ROC space of optimal alarm
theory and the NPP shutdown decision-making procedures. Finally, the PSDS designs of
this chapter achieve the main aim set out within the motivation of this dissertation work.
In summary, the first two sections of this chapter introduce a conventional SDS design
and then combine the algorithms of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 to achieve PSDS designs
of varying capabilities and functionalities. The third section of this chapter enhances
the PSDS design to assess the quality of the predictive decisions. The third section also
presents the adaptation of prediction horizon as well as the metric that is to be compared
against the TSP. This adaptation is optimized with respect to the quality of the predicted
measurements. This chapter does not attempt to cover all aspects of SDS design or the vast
body of literature related to applied probability, and statistical and hypothesis testing. For
a more complete treatment of NPP safety and SDSmethods please refer to one of the many
safety-related IAEA technical documents [1] or international standards including those of


















Figure 5.2: Conventional shutdown system (SDS) in the context of safety instrumented
systems (SISs).
and hypothesis testing refer to the text by Papoulis [146,148] or Bar-Shalom [148], and the
course notes of Reid [147].
5.1 A Conventional Shutdown System Design
The structure of a conventional SDS logic solver is included in the context of SISs in Figure
5.2. A conventional trip occurs upon detecting a threshold-crossing event that involves a
safety parameter reaching a corresponding TSP. Conventional SDS logic solvers generally
include signal conditioning and validation logic as well as a comparator and corresponding
hysteresis threshold. The conditional logic of the comparator most often considers a TSP
that is constant, but TSPs may also be varied linearly with respect to some major system
parameter, e.g. another signal received by the SDS that is related to the system being
protected. The logic solver also incorporates, or is supported by, coincidence voting and
seal-in logic components, as reviewed in Section 2.2.2 [129]. The voting/seal-in block is
located at the edge of the logic solver since these functions may either be included within
the trip logic, or implemented using relay logic or other technologies that are external to
the trip computer.
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The SDS illustrated in Figure 5.2 includes an isolated logic solver that makes trip de-
cisions for a single safety parameter measurement, y, according to either a high or low
alarm-threshold or TSP, Ξ. In contrast, conventional SDSs generally include multiple
instances of this trip logic for safety parameter measurements that represent many NPP
subsystems. These logic solvers are connected between the same sensors and final elements,
and therefore have access to a number of safety-related signals or safety parameter mea-
surements. For example, although included in Figure 5.2, safety parameter measurement,
u, is not directly considered within the trip logic of the current safety parameter, y.
The sensors included in Figure 5.2 are the safety-related devices that provide the safety
parameters measurements, y and u, from the NPP subsystems. In contrast, the final ele-
ments or trip actions are the physical means by which, upon shutdown, negative reactivity
is introduced to the reactor core to stop the fission chain reactions, e.g. shut-off rods or
neutron poison. In addition, the trip actions are usually divided into two or more groups.
For example, each shut-off rod may be assigned to one of two banks where all rods of the
same bank are release using a single electrical signal that controls the electro-mechanical
clutch that keeps the rods suspended above the reactor core.
The function of the comparator block within the trip logic is to compare the safety
parameter measurement, y, of the current time-step against a corresponding TSP, Ξ ,
{Ξh, Ξl}. For software-based SDSs, the logic is executed on a time-interval known as an
execution interval or scan time, e.g. 100ms. If the safety parameter is found to be equal
to or beyond either a high or a low TSP, Ξh or Ξl, the trip signal, ξ , {ξh, ξl}, is de-
energized. The SDS therefore detects a threshold-crossing event. The conditional logic for
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1 y [k] < Ξh
0 otherwise
, ξl [k] =


1 y [k] > Ξl
0 otherwise
(5.1)
where ξh and ξl are the resulting high and low trip signals respectively. Here, a trip signal
equal to 1 indicates continued operation without trip whereas a signal equal to 0 indicates a
trip occurrence, i.e. de-energize to trip. In Figure 5.2, the notations Ξ and ξ indicate either
a high or low TSP and corresponding trip signal for high and low trip logic respectively.
In practice, the TSP can vary as a function, Ξ (u), of some major system parameter, e.g.
u. Although this feature is included in Figure 5.2, the TSPs of this study have constant
values.
The comparator block of Figure 5.2 includes a hysteresis offset that is combined with
the TSP. The hysteresis offset prevents jitter within the trip signal that may be caused
by fluctuations in the safety parameter measurement. For example, measurement fluctua-
tions may result in a down-crossing and subsequent up-crossing of a low TSP. Under these
conditions, the SDS will not de-energize and then re-energize without a significant reversal
in the dynamics of the system that provides the measurement. The measurements that are
input to the SDS may be acquired from multiple redundant sensors for the same physical
variable. In some cases, these input signals undergo filtering, compensation, and/or aver-
aging prior to being compared against the TSP. These features are include in Figure 5.2 as
the validate/signal condition block. All safety parameter measurements are monitored to
be within the valid range of the electrical signal characteristics for the safety transmitter,
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e.g. a 4− 20mA sensor that is transmitting 3.0mA. Safety parameters that are detected to
be invalid result in the parameter being de-energized within the voting logic. This validity
or error check is performed through the use of the validation trip signal, ξ. A fault in the
sensor of a safety parameter therefore results in an increased probability of spurious trip
for the multi-channel SDS.
5.2 Predictive Shutdown System Designs
KF-based point-predictions, as formulated in Section 3.3, are a function of prior informa-
tion that specifies a model and uncertainty for a given system and corresponding signals.
This information provides a KF predictor the ability to anticipate the mean trajectory
of a given system over a prediction window to some prediction horizon. When KF-based
point-predictions are calculated for safety parameter measurements within a system being
protected, this ability provides a means for making trip decisions at a time which is earlier
than for the case of conventional decision-making systems since the conventional systems
wait for the occurrence of the impending event. These mean anticipated trajectories or
point-predictions are therefore the foundation of the point-PSDS design.
The KF also has the ability, as a stochastic filter, to describe the anticipated trajectory
in terms of a probability distribution. This probability distribution can be interpreted as a
measure of confidence in the calculated predictions within each time-step of the prediction
window. KF-based interval-predictions, as formulated in Section 3.5, include the sameprior
information as the KF-based point-predictions but also assign specific levels of confidence
to the bounds of an interval of the anticipated trajectories. KF-based interval-predictions
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result in trip decisions that occur earlier than for conventional decision-making but also
have a certain level of confidence in the occurrence of an impending abnormal condition.
In comparison, trip decisions that are made using the mean prediction values of the point-
PSDShave a level of confidence in the impending trip condition of 50%. Interval-predictions
are therefore utilized to calculate the upper and lower bounds of a confidence-interval, one
of which corresponds to a level of confidence that is greater than 50%. The greater of the
two bounds is the inner bound with respect to the domain of safe operating conditions.
Confidence-interval-based decisions are expected to counteract spurious trips that may be
encountered when using the point-PSDS design.
RLS disturbance estimation and prediction error compensation provide an additional
means of enhancing the point- and interval-PSDS designs. The main aim of either the
point- or interval-PSDS designs is to predict abnormal conditions that would eventually
be detected by the conventional SDS. It is therefore important that the predictions accu-
rately represent the future dynamic response of the model and the potential occurrence of
uncertain conditions that may arise during the transient to an abnormal condition. In com-
pensating the predictions for the estimate of the prediction error, the predictions are forced
to follow the safety parameter measurements more closely than the response of the model
that is provided to the KF or even the optimal KF-based predictions. Error compensation
therefore benefits the PSDS by allowing the prediction algorithm to be more accurate with
respect to impending abnormal conditions. This is especially true for uncertain conditions
that are deterministic in nature and can be modelled as some form of additive disturbance
input.
Within the nuclear industry, strict regulations regarding sensor quality as well as sensor
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redundancies help to ensure that the sensor measurements are reliable. This has a direct
impact on the uncertainties assumed within the KF since it is less likely for the measure-
ments to be uncertain. For example, an averaging function or voting mechanism applied
to four high quality redundant steam generator level sensors results in a very reliable mea-
surement that has low uncertainty. For industries that have less sensor reliability and
increased uncertainty measurement, the above configuration can be modified to compare
both the compensated as well as the uncompensated measurement predictions against the
corresponding TSP. This modified design is subject, however, to a potential increase in
spurious trip occurrences due to the addition of a parameter being compared against the
TSP. That said, the potential for model-based trip is not included within the trip coverage
of the conventional SDS. Although the KF-based predictions are assessed within the results
of this work, a PSDS design that compares both the KF and KF/RLS-based predictions
against a TSP is considered to be beyond the scope of this study.
It is also possible to perform KF-based prediction for multiple safety parameters within
the SDS. It is recommended, however, that each of the safety parameters be considered
independent of the remaining parameters in order to reduce computational complexity as
well as the interconnection between the safety parameter calculations. This strategy should
not have any impact on the independence of the SDS since the predicted safety parameters
are those that were already monitored by the SDS. Moreover, the KF algorithm does not
rely on any single common variable between the parameters.
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5.2.1 Point-PSDS: point-predictive shutdown system
The structure of the point-PSDS is included in the block diagram of Figure 5.3. A point-
predictive trip occurs upon predicting a threshold-crossing event that involves the mean-
value of a predicted measurement reaching a corresponding TSP, Ξ. This TSP is the same
value as is used for conventional trip. In this configuration, the logic solver is modified to
include a KF-based prediction algorithm that considers a system model as well as various
constraints and uncertainties. Point-predictive decisions are made by comparing safety
parameter measurement predictions against the conventional TSPs. The structure of the
point-PSDS is a modular evolution of conventional SDS that does not require additional
sensors or hardware modifications. This requirement does, however, assume that the sys-
tem input to the KF, u, is available as a safety parameter measurement or can be calculated
as a function of others parameters. The conventional trip logic remains active within all
of the proposed PSDS designs as a backup to the predictive trip mechanism, i.e. measure-
ments are also compared directly to the TSPs. The conventional trip logic is implemented
within the point-PSDS design in the same manner as described for the conventional SDS
in Section 5.1. The upper limit of time-to-trip is therefore guaranteed to be equal to that
of the conventional SDS given that the PSDS has an equivalent scan time. In other words,
the addition of the point-prediction algorithm is only able to improve upon the response
time of the conventional SDS.
Safety parameter measurements are predicted using the KF prediction block of Figure
5.3 and the KF-basedmeasurement point-prediction equations of Algorithm 3.2. Although
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Figure 5.3: KF/RLS-based point-predictive shutdown system (point-PSDS) in the con-
text of safety instrumented systems (SISs) with the option for activating RLS or ALMF
algorithms.
trip occurs if any of the measurement predictions within the prediction window reach either
a high or low TSP, Ξh or Ξl. Thus, a maximum or minimum of the predictions within the
predictionwindow is selected to be compared against either a high or a lowTSP respectively.
The selected prediction is the output of the selection function block, and function S, as
follow
yˆ [k] = S (yˆ [k + i|k]) =


max (yˆ [k + i|k]) for Ξh
min (yˆ [k + i|k]) for Ξl
, ∀i = 1, . . . ,Np (5.2)
where max and min return the maximum and minimum of the point-predictions that are
calculated within the prediction window. If the selected safety parameter point-prediction,
yˆ, is equal to or beyond either a high, Ξh, or a low TSP, Ξl, then the trip signal, ξp ,






1 yˆ [k] < Ξh
0 otherwise
, ξp,l [k] =


1 yˆ [k] > Ξl
0 otherwise
(5.3)
In addition, the conditional logic for the backup conventional trip that remains active
within the point-PSDS are defined in (5.1).
The presence of system-model mismatch or input disturbances can cause the KF-based
measurement predictions to deviate from the future measurements. This is the case for
many practical dynamical systems where the model parameters may be time-varying or
when disturbances are present. Error compensation is made possible by performing RLS-
based estimation of disturbance inputs for an assumed disturbance profile as included in
Algorithm 4.1 and Algorithm 4.2. These algorithms are included in Figure 5.3 as the
optional RLS error compensation block. Functionally, the algorithms propagate the esti-
mated disturbance models over the prediction window in order to compensate error within
the safety parameter predictions. The compensated predictions are denoted yˆwxy , yˆwy , or
yˆwx for the respective state and measurement, measurement, and state disturbance input
cases. As in the case of the KF-based point-PSDS, the maximum or minimum compen-
sated prediction value is then selected within function S of (5.2) where yˆ is replaced by the
corresponding compensated safety parameter predictions yˆwxy , yˆwy , or yˆwx .
The ALMF covariance estimation block of Figure 5.3 allows for the KF to consider state
and measurement noise covariances, Rx and Ry, that are unknown or time-varying. This
is often the case for the state noise covariance since this covariance is not easily measured.
Many studies therefore approximate covariance values through trial-and-error, or utilize
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other methods that are referred to as being ad-hoc. In contrast, the ALMF-based noise
covariance estimation routine, as included in Algorithm 3.6, estimates the noise covariance
as a function of state andmeasurement errors that are calculatedwithin theKF.TheALMF
algorithm also provides a mechanism for detecting divergence within the KF whereby
specific values within the two noise covariances may be growing without bounds. It is
recommended that these conditions be monitored and the covariance estimation routine
either reset or constrained if the covariance values approach the limits given the model of
the system.
When both the RLS and the ALMF algorithms are included, the ALMF-based mea-
surement noise covariance estimation algorithm is modified to consider the compensated
a priori measurement prediction and measurement error covariance whereby y˜ [k|k − 1]
is replaced by (y [k|k − 1]− yˆw• [k|k − 1]) and P y [k|k − 1] by Py˜w• with w• indicating
either the state or measurement disturbance. Moreover, the ALMF-based state noise
covariance estimation algorithm is similarly modified whereby ˜ˆx [k] is replaced by ˜ˆx [k] +
K [k] (yˆw• [k|k − 1]− y [k|k − 1]) while the state error covariance equation remains unmod-
ified.
5.2.2 Interval-PSDS: interval-predictive shutdown system
The interval-PSDS uses KF-based stochastic descriptions of prediction uncertainty to
make confidence based decisions regarding impending abnormal conditions. An interval-
predictive trip occurs upon predicting a threshold-crossing event that involves the bounds










Compensated safety parameter predictions
and error covariances

















Figure 5.4: KF/RLS-based interval-predictive shutdown system (interval-PSDS) in the
context of safety instrumented systems (SISs) with the option for activating RLS or ALMF
algorithms.
value as is used for point-predictive and conventional trip. The structure of the interval-
PSDS is included in the block diagram of Figure 5.4. Interval-predictive decisions are made
by comparing the upper or lower bounds of a confidence interval for the safety parameter
measurement predictions against the conventional TSPs. As is the case for the point-PSDS
design, the structure of the interval-PSDS is a modular evolution of the conventional SDS
which does not require additional sensors or hardware modifications. Moreover, the con-
ventional trip logic is implemented within the interval-PSDS design in the same manner
as described for the point-PSDS and conventional SDS in Section 5.1. The addition of the
interval-prediction algorithm is, again, only able to improve upon the response time of the
conventional SDS.
That said, the interval-PSDS does result in a delayed trip when compared against the
point-PSDS design. This is a result of the interval-PSDS waiting for a specific level of
confidence in an impending abnormal condition to be achieved. The point- and interval-
PSDS designs have the potential, therefore, to result in increased false and missed trip
occurrences respectively. These occurrences should be considered prior to implementation,
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in order to reduce conflict with existing standards and regulations.
Safety parametermeasurements andmeasurement error covariances are predicted using
the KF prediction block of Figure 5.4 as well as the KF-based measurement interval pre-
diction equations of Algorithm 3.3. The interval-PSDS design differs from the point-PSDS
designs in that the state error covariance is propagated to the prediction horizon, Np, and
the measurement error covariance, Py˜, is calculated at each time-step within the prediction
window. These measurement predictions and error covariances are then combined within
the confidence interval block of Figure 5.4 for a specific one-tailed significance level, α, and
corresponding two-tailed significance level, α, as introduced in Section 3.5. The result is a
set of confidence-based prediction values, yˆα , {yˆl,α, yˆu,α}, that bound the measurement
predictions within each time-step of the prediction window.
For a high TSP, Ξh, the lower bounds represent a level of confidence that is greater than
50%. In contrast, for a low TSP, Ξl, the upper bounds correspond to a level of confidence
that greater than 50%. For example, a low level trip with a two sided significance level of
α = 5% results in an upper bound being compared against the TSP. This upper bound
is expected to be higher in value than 97.5% of the expected future safety parameter
measurements within the corresponding time-step of the prediction window. Thus, when
the upper bound reaches the low TSP, the interval-PSDS has a level of confidence greater
than or equal to 97.5% that the measurements will also reach the low TSP within that
specific time-step of the prediction window.
The interval-predictive trip logic is designed to trip if any of the either lower or upper
bound values within the prediction window reach either a high or low TSP respectively.
This functionality is equivalent to the S function within the point-PSDS design, but for
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different prediction values. Thus, a maximum or minimum of the specific bound within
the prediction window is selected within S function block as follows, and is to be compared
against either a high or a low TSP respectively.





yˆl,α [k + i|k]) for Ξh
min (yˆu,α [k + i|k]) for Ξl
, ∀i = 1, . . . ,Np (5.4)
If the selected bound of the safety parameter interval-prediction, yˆ, is equal to or beyond
either a high, Ξh, or a low TSP, Ξl, then the trip signal, ξp, is de-energized. The conditional
logic for an interval-predictive trip is therefore defined as it was for the point-PSDS in (5.3).
In addition, the conditional logic for the backup conventional trip is as defined in (5.1).
Compensation of prediction error can also be included within the interval-PSDS design
by including the RLS-based disturbance input estimation as formulated for both state and
measurement disturbance inputs in Algorithm 4.3. Otherwise, the state or measurement
disturbance input estimation routines can be performed separately by individually imple-
menting Algorithm 4.2 or Algorithm 4.1 respectively. These algorithms are included in
the RLS block of Figure 5.4. Functionally, the algorithms propagate the estimated distur-
bance model and the calculated cross-covariances over the prediction window in order to
compensate error within the safety parameter predictions as well as the error covariance
that provides a probability distribution for the safety parameter predictions. The compen-
sated predictions are denoted yˆwxy , yˆwy , or yˆwx for the respective state and measurement,
measurement, and state disturbance input cases.
For interval-prediction, the disturbance estimation algorithmcalculates the auto-covariance
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of the estimated disturbance input as well as the cross-covariance between the estimated
input and the a priori measurement estimation error. These two covariances are then
combined with the measurement error covariance of the KF within the confidence interval
block so that the distribution of the compensated predictions is accurate given the sec-
ondary estimation problem. The confidence interval block then calculates the upper and
lower bounds and the maximum or minimum compensated prediction bound is selected
using theS function of (5.2) where yˆα is replaced by the corresponding compensated bound
of the safety parameter prediction.
Covariance noise estimation has a more significant role in improving the quality of the
interval-predictions than it does for the point-predictions. The reason for this increased
role is that KF-based point-predictions are minimum variance estimates of the state or
measurement under a variety of model-mismatch and disturbance conditions. Moreover,
the point-predictions are optimal when the model matches the system and the noise within
the state and measurement equations is white and Gaussian. In contrast, the performance
of the error covariances is not so well defined and may even be erroneous. These errors
are often overlook in the literature since the KF is most often utilized for point-estimation
purposes. In other words, although the point-estimates are optimal given that the infor-
mation provided to the KF is accurate, this is not the case for the state and measurement
error covariances. These covariances may not reflect the true uncertainty within the state
or measurement estimates or predictions. The erroneous covariances occur as a result of
insufficient or misleading state or measurement noise covariances being provided to the KF.
More precisely, small variations in the assumed noise covariances have minimal impact on
the quality of the KF-based prediction, but profound impact within the descriptions of un-
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certainty regarding these predictions. Thus, when implementing the interval-PSDS design
it is recommended that some form of covariance noise estimation be performed or, in the
least, that a formal method for calculating the state error covariance be employed.
The primary benefit of the interval-PSDS is the ability of the consider uncertainty
regarding the calculated predictions. Where the point-PSDS produces a trip upon the
point-prediction reaching the TSP, the interval-PSDS instead waits until the TSP has
been reached with a predetermined level of confidence. The interval-PSDS therefore ben-
efits safety-critical decisions that have high productivity losses associated with alarm or
shutdown. That said, measures of confidence in decision-making, whether calculatedwithin
the interval-PSDS or otherwise, quantify the belief that is held by a decision-making mech-
anism given a specific set of prior information or knowledge, that an impending condition
is going to occur. Both the point- and interval- PSDS, however, remain unaware of the
performance or accuracy of past predictions. Thus, the remainder of this chapter aims to
assess the quality of previously calculated predictions in order to establish a PSDS design
that is aware of the prediction algorithm performance.
5.3 Prediction Quality Assessment
The point- and interval-PSDS designs, as formulated in Section 5.2, consider prior knowl-
edge and prediction uncertainty but do not consider prediction quality. This section aims
to determine the quality of the predictions that are calculated using the prediction, error
compensation, and noise estimation algorithms of Chapter 3. The quality of the calculated
predictions is assessed according to a predetermined significance level, α or α, through the
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use of statistical tests and hypothesis testing methods. The significance level in turn spec-
ifies the false positive or Type I error rate, FPR. The statistical tests assess whether or not
the prediction errors are zero mean, or unbiased, and white with an accurately estimated
measurement prediction error covariance [147,148]. The results of the tests are utilized to
optimize the performance of the predictive decision-making mechanism with respect to the
probability of an impending abnormal condition. These methods allow for enhancement
of both the point- and interval-PSDS designs by adapting the effective prediction horizon
as well as prediction bias within the optimal-PSDS design of Section 5.3.3.
Within the point- and interval-PSDS designs, the prediction algorithms are provided
models of the system as well as the disturbances that may be affecting the state or mea-
surement signals. The accuracy of the calculated predictions relies on the validity of these
assumed models as well as the assumed, or calculated in the case of the ALMF, statis-
tical properties regarding uncertainty in the signals and the model parameters. More
precisely, these uncertainties are the state and measurement noise covariances, Rx and Ry
respectively. Section 5.3.1 investigates three statistical tests that can be utilized to assess
the validity of these assumptions as a function of measurement prediction error and er-
ror covariance for each time-step within the prediction horizon. If these assumptions are
erroneous, the prediction error may either be biased or time correlated, or have a covari-
ance descriptions that are either too wide or too narrow. In being able to identify these
erroneous properties of the predictions, the predictive decision-making mechanism of the
PSDS design can then be enhanced to consider prediction quality at each time-step within
the prediction window.
In general, predictions are unbiased if the mean of the error distribution is equal to zero.
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Those predictions that are either unbiased or biased slightly toward the TSP provide the
benefit of reducing the probability of amissed detection with the drawback of increasing the
probability of false detection. Those predictions that are unbiased or lead themeasurements
toward theTSP therefore improve safety. In contrast, predictions that are biased away from
the TSP and toward the center of the normal operating region may decrease safety since
these biases result in a delay to the predictive trip decision, a reduction in the probability
of false detection, and an increase in the probability of a missed detection. Biases affect
point- and interval-based predictive decisions equally since both the point-prediction as
well as the bound of the confidence-interval are affected by the offset that is the bias. It
is beneficial, therefore, to either reduce or detect bias within each of the PSDS designs in
order to prevent the occurrence of a false or missed trip events.
Regarding covariance quality, the measurement prediction error covariance is consid-
ered exact if the variance of the measured prediction errors is equal to the predicted error
covariance. For interval-PSDS designs that utilize levels of confidence greater than 50%,
an estimated covariance that is wider than the measured covariance results in an increased
probability of missed detection with the benefit of decreasing the probability of false trip.
This is due to the confidence intervals of the prediction being wider than the confidence
associated with the actual covariance of the error and not representing the true uncertainty
in the eventual measurements. In contrast, for interval-PSDS designs that utilize levels of
confidence that are less than 50%, the wider estimated covariance causes increased prob-
ability of false detections and decreased missed detections. The quality of the predictive
decisions within the interval-PSDS design are therefore a function of level of confidence
in the predictions. This level of confidence is, in turn, a function of the error covariance.
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Thus, it is important, when using the interval-PSDS, that the observed variance of predic-
tion error is approximately equal to the expected variance.
In addition to prediction quality, Section 5.3.3 investigates the extension of hypothesis
testing to optimal alarm theory. In general, hypothesis testing aims to determine the
outcomes of statistical tests that lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis according to a
pre-specified level of significance, α, e.g. the probability that the predicted measurement
will occur outside a confidence interval of some significance level. Within this work, the
hypothesis tests consider the null hypothesis of an impending abnormal condition and the
alternate hypothesis of continued operation under normal conditions, see Figure 1.1. In
this manner, it is then possible to quantify the ability of the statistical test outcomes to
either “not reject” or to “reject” the null hypothesis of the impending abnormal condition.
This ability is measured through the calculation of true and false positive rates, TPR and
FPR [41].
By quantifying the performance optimizing rates within each time-step of the prediction
window and for a set of hypothetical mean predictions errors, the PSDS designs are able to
not only adapt the effect prediction window but also the score associated with the bounds
of the confidence interval. These adaptations are discussed with respect to the ROC space
that is constructed with TPR and FPRmetrics as axes. The PSDS design is then enhanced
by means of optimal alarm theory to consider an upper bound on the probability of false
trip within each time-step of the prediction window.
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5.3.1 Hypothesis testing
This section introduces three statistical tests that are each able to determine, for a given
level of significance, α, whether a sequence of random variables, or measurement prediction
errors, correspond with a given covariance, e.g. the measurement error covariance. It is
expected that performing these tests prior to initiating shutdown will result in an increase
in the accuracy of the predictive trip decisions. This increase in accuracy is achieved by
adapting the effective prediction window to consider only those predictions that are within
time-steps of the prediction window that are assessed not to be beyond a sufficient level of
quality. Moreover, hypothesis testing relates significance level, α, to Type I or false positive
errors. The performance of the prediction algorithm is therefore made to have an upper
bound on the probability of a false positive event. Within the nuclear industry, this event
corresponds to a missed trip occurrence; false positive is a false detection of the normal
condition.
Hypothesis testing involves a sequence of testswith respect to a null hypothesis,H0, that
is considered the default condition and an alternate hypothesis, H1, that is the condition
to be proven. The null hypothesis either fails to be rejected, reject′, or is rejected, reject, by
means of some statistical test. The results of a series of hypothesis tests can be organized
using an error matrix or contingency table as included in Table 5.1 [160]. Error matrices
provide a means for quantifying the results of a hypothesis test within one of four of the
following outcomes: TP are those conditions that are hypothesized to be alternate and are
actually alternate, FP are those conditions that are hypothesized to be alternate and are
actually null, FN are those conditions that are hypothesized to be null and are actually
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alternate, and TN are those conditions that are hypothesized to be null and are actually
null. Of these values, TP and TN correspond with correct decisions whereas FP and FN
are incorrect. These values may either be percentages or rates, as is common in hypothesis
testing, or a tally of a number of outcomes, as is more often used for binary classification.
This table is referred to as the error matrix due to the FP and TN outcomes representing
errors in the hypothesis testing procedure [160].
As stated previously, FP outcomes correspond with Type I errors or those events where
the null hypothesis is true, H0, but is rejected, reject (H0). This type of error corresponds
with a false alarm since the test statistic indicates that the null condition is false when it is
actually true. For NPP SDSs, an FP is referred to as a missed trip, i.e. the presence of an
abnormal condition without any trip action being activated. In contrast, the FN outcome
corresponds with a Type II error or those outcomes where the null hypothesis is true, H1,
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but is rejected, reject′ (H0). This type of error corresponds with a missed alarm since the
test statistic indicates that the null condition is true when it is actually false. For NPP
SDSs, an FN is referred to as false trip, i.e. a trip action being activated while operating
under normal conditions.
The errormatrix introduces variousmetrics that are functions of TP , FP , FN , and TN
rates from within the error matrix [160]. Of these metrics, optimal alarm theory focuses on
the TPR, FPR that make up the domain of the ROC [41], with the latter rate the metric
over which optimal alarms are optimized. Optimal alarm theory also considers a third
metric known as the negative preditive value (NPV). First, the TPR and FPR metrics are
conditional probabilities and corresponding ratios: for TPR as follows






and for FPR as follows.






The TPR is therefore the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis given that the true
condition is the alternate hypothesis. The TPR is also the ratio of TP outcomes to the
total number of occurrences for which the alternate hypothesis is determined to be true. In
contrast, FPR is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis given that true condition
is the null hypothesis. The FPR is the ratio of FP occurrences to the total number of
occurrences that are the null hypothesis. In addition, the NPV metric is the following
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conditional probability and corresponding ratio.







The NPV is therefore the probability of a null hypothesis given that the null hypothesis
was predicted or, more formally, not rejected. The NPV is the ratio of TN outcomes to the
total number of null hypotheses that were not rejected.
The above hypothesis tests are made possible through the statistical tests of the follow-
ing sections. These tests are commonly used for Gaussian probability distributions. The
tests are the result of likelihood ratio tests that identify the distribution or score against
which the calculated tests statistics are to be compared. The tests of the following sections
are performed for a predetermined test window of length, Nt, and either the one-tailed
significance level, α, or two-tailed significance level α. The tests are implemented in either
a moving average or a cumulative sum form. Themoving average forms are straightforward
for the IB and IW tests with the cumulative form of the NIS test being transformed to a
moving average by dividing the test result by the length of the test window. The mov-
ing average implementation of these algorithms is realized in the same manner as for the
basic strategy of estimating noise in Algorithm 3.4 with initialization given in Algorithm
3.5. Alternatively, each of the IB and IW tests can be transformed into a cumulative form
whereby the averaging operations are removed from the recursive equations of Algorithm
3.4 and the cumulative sum is divided by the length of the test window.
In addition to verifying prediction quality, the following statistical tests can be inter-
preted as predictive hypotheses regarding the eventual safety parametermeasurement error
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with respect to the probability distribution of the safety parameter prediction. These hy-
potheses correspond to events within the above error matrix that quantify the ability of the
prediction algorithm to predict the statistical conditions of an impending safety parameter
measurement. The hypothesis testing methods essentially determine whether the value of
the eventual measurement satisfies, with some predetermined probability, the predicted
condition. This determination is performed for each time-step within the prediction win-
dow. This hypothesis testing procedure is then re-framed within the context of optimal
alarms for predictive shutdown in Section 5.3.2.
The length of the statistical test window,Nt, is selected as a function of the significance
level, α, within the statistical test while also considering the maximum rate of change of
the dynamic response. The length of the window maintains a balance between detection
precision and the potential for delay or lag within the test results. For example, a statistical
test with a significance level of 5% and test window of length, Nt = 10000 requires the
calculated test metric of 9374 samples to be within specific bounds in order for prediction
quality to be validated. After determining that prediction is not of sufficient quality, the
test may return an insufficient result for the remainder of the 10000 time-steps. On the
other hand, in the case of a test window of length,Nt = 100, only 94 of the 100 samples are
required to be within the bounds. In comparing the two configurations, the first example
has lower sensitivity in deciding that the predictions may be inaccurate whereas the second
example has a higher rate of rejecting potentially anomalous deviations from the assumed
probability distribution of the predictions. The test window must be sufficiently long in
order to allow for a reasonable estimate of the full precision for the selected significance
level, e.g. with Nt = 100, the estimate of 94 samples is similar to the full precision value of
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93.74 samples. Longer test windows are therefore required for higher significance levels.
Within this study, the test window is assumed to be of sufficient length that the number
of degrees of freedom within the samples do not have an impact on the distribution of
the errors. For smaller sample sizes the Student’s t-distribution and t-test as well as
the F-distribution and Hotelling’s T2-test are recommended in place of the Z- and χ2-
tests [40, 161].
5.3.1.1 Innovation bound or Z test
The first of the three statistical tests is referred to as the IB test but is also known as
either the one- or two-tailed Z test. The two-tailed IB is also a form of the innovation
magnitude bound test [147]. The IB test determines within each time-step of the prediction
windowwhether there is any bias in the calculated predictions. The test is performed over a
sequence of lengthNt by calculating the Z statistic that is equal to themean prediction error
divided by the mean standard error of the predictions. The Z statistic is then compared
against critical values that are the scores associatedwith a predetermined one- or two-tailed
significance level, α or α. These scores have the same underlying principle as the z• scores
calculated for the confidence intervals in Section 3.4.
The test metric, TZ, captures the boolean result of a two-tailed IB test performed over








y˜ [j|j − i]√
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(5.8)
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if TZ [k, i] ≤ −Z (α)
or TZ [k, i] ≥ Z (α) for a two-tailed test
(5.9)
with the one-tailed IB test as follows







if TZ [k, i] ≤ −Z (α) for a lower one-tailed test
if TZ [k, i] ≥ Z (α) for an upper one-tailed test
(5.10)
where Z (•) are the critical values against which the test metric is compared for a pre-
determined significance level, and i is the time-step within the prediction window. In
addition, y˜ [j|j − i] is the prediction innovation, or the prediction error made i time-steps
into the past, as defined in (3.20) or for the disturbance input estimation problem in (4.5),
and Py˜ [j|j − i] is the innovation covariance for a single measurement signal, also made i
time-steps into the past, as defined in (3.24) and modified for the disturbance estimation
problem in Section 4.2. The T
Z
metric is the z-score of the observed measurement predic-
tion error and error covariance pairs averaged over the test window. The square root of the
measurement error covariance in (5.8) is calculated for each measurement of a non-scalar
measurement vector separately using the diagonal values of the covariance matrix.
The two-tailed IB test returns a true value if the mean prediction error for a specific
time-step of the prediction window is within the bounds of the confidence interval at a
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Figure 5.5: IB or Z test statistics and critical values for unbiased prediction error as well
as positive and negative biases that are introduced at time-step 250.
mean prediction error is either less than or greater than the upper and lower bounds of the
confidence interval at a rate of 100 (1− α)%. For both one- and two-tailed tests, an average
z-score that is greater than the upper critical value indicates, with probability greater than
or equal to 100 (1− α)%, that the predictions have a positive bias. In contrast, if the
average z-score is less than the lower critical, there is greater than or equal to 100 (1− α)%
probability that the predictions errors have a negative bias. These concepts are included
in the scores and critical values that are illustrated in Figure 5.5.
5.3.1.2 Normalized innovations squared or chi-squared χ2 test
The second statistical test is known as the NIS test but is also known as either the one-
or two-tailed chi-squared, χ2, test [147]. The NIS test determines whether the calculated
predictions are unbiased and have an accurately described variance within a predetermined
probability or significance level, α for the one-tailed test and α for the two-tailed test. The
NIS test is performed by calculating, for each time-step of the prediction window, the time-
average of the normalized innovation or predicted measurement error squared over a given
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sequence of prediction errors that are assumed to be time-independent. The average is
then compared against critical values that are the confidence interval of the χ2 distribution
with a number of degrees of freedom, Nχ, equal to the dimension of the measurement
vector multiplied by the length of the given innovation sequence. In the case of RLS-based
disturbance input estimation, the number of degrees of freedom is reduced by the number of




. TheNIS test uses theχ2 probability
distribution rather than the Gaussian distribution of the Z-test due to the fact that the
normalized square of Gaussian distributed random variables are distributed according to
the chi-squared distribution.
Test metric Tχ2 captures the boolean result of a NIS test performed over a range of Nt
time-steps prior to the current time-step k for time-step i within the prediction window as
follows
Tχ2 [k, i] =
k∑
j=k−Nt+1
y˜′ [j|j − i]P−1y˜ [j|j − i] y˜ [j|j − i] (5.11)





















for a two-tailed test
(5.12)
or for the one-tailed test as follows







Tχ2 [k, i] < χ
2 (α,Nχ) for a lower one-tailed test
Tχ2 [k, i] > χ
2 (1− α,Nχ) for an upper one-tailed test
(5.13)
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are the critical values of the test statistic or the confidence interval for the χ2 distribution
withNχ degrees of freedom, two-tailed significance level,α, and one-tailed significance level,
α. TheTχ2 metric is the cumulative normalized innovation squared. This cumulative value
is distributed according to the χ2 probability distribution and can therefore be directly
compared against χ2 distribution for Nχ degrees of freedom. Alternatively, the time-
averaged metric, Tχ2/Nt, can be compared against critical values that are divided by the
number of time-steps, χ2/Nt.
The NIS test returns a true value for a specific time-step within the prediction window
if the mean normalized innovations squared are within the specified confidence interval of
the χ2 distribution. More specifically, for the two-tailed test, if the calculated average of
the test statistic is within the confidence interval of the χ2 distribution, the predictions
are determined with a probability equal to the value (1− α) to be unbiased and to have
accurate prediction error covariance. Otherwise, the predictions are determined either be
biased or to have an erroneous covariance. If the calculated average of the test statistic is
less than the upper critical value of theχ2 distribution, the predictions are determined, with
a probability equal to the (1− α), to be unbiased and to have a prediction error covariance
that is sufficiently large with respect to the observedmeasurement errors. For test statistics
that are greater than the lower critical value, the predictions are determined to have a
prediction error covariance that is sufficiently small according to the observed prediction
errors, again with a probability equal to the (1− α). In other words, the lower critical
value determines whether the prediction error covariance is too large and not whether any
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Figure 5.6: NIS or χ2 test statistics and critical values for unbiased prediction error as well
as positive and negative biases, and over and underestimated error covariances that are
introduced at time-step 250.
conditions and the presence of bias within the predictions. These concepts are included in
the NIS and critical values that are illustrated in Figure 5.6. In Figure 5.6, the biases do
not cause the test statistic to reach the critical values of the χ2 distribution. The NIS test
is therefore not as sensitive to bias as the Z test.
Combining the IB and NIS tests results in the ability to determine whether predictions
are either biased or include a wide or narrow estimated error covariance. The combined
test results and corresponding conditions are summarized in Table 5.2. The NIS is, in
general, more capable at detecting changes in covariance as is observed in Figure 5.6 where
the biases of Figure 5.5 are not detected by the NIS test but are by the IB test.
5.3.1.3 Innovation whiteness or autocovariance test
The final statistical test is referred to as the IW or autocorrelation test [147]. This test
is computationally demanding since it calculates auto-covariance through self-convolution
of the prediction error signal for each time-step of the prediction horizon. The IW test
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Positive bias one-tailed (upper) one-tailed (upper)
Negative bias one-tailed (lower) one-tailed (upper)
determines whether or not the prediction errors are serially correlated. The test is per-
formed by calculating the autocorrelation vector of a given sequence of prediction errors
for each time-step within the prediction window. The autocorrelation vector is then nor-
malized using the zero-lag autocorrelation. The IW test involves calculating the ratio of
the number of entries in the autocorrelation vector that are within the bounds of a specific
confidence interval to the total number of total number of entries in the autocorrelation
vector, excluding the zero-lag autocorrelation result. The bounds of the interval are, once
more, a function of the two-tailed significance level, α, and corresponding value, (1− α),
i.e. the level of confidence of the autocorrelation vector entries being within the interval.
The computed ratio is then compared against the expected value, (1− α). If the two values
are similar, the prediction errors are determined to be serially uncorrelated, or white.
The following test variable TIW captures the boolean result of an IW test performed
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over a range of Nt time-steps prior to the current time-step k as follows,








(∣∣∣ r(k,τ ,i)r(k,0,i) ∣∣∣ ≤ zα√Nt) < (1− α)2
(5.14)
where





(y˜′ [j|j − i] y˜ [j + τ |j + τ − i]) , (5.15)
with the other parameters as defined for both the IB and NIS tests in (5.9) and (5.12)
respectively. The IWtest is equal to one unless, given a predetermined number of time-steps
and maximum lag over which to calculate the autocorrelation, the autocorrelation vector
entries either do not peak at a lag equal to zero, i.e. τ = 0, or the remaining entries occur
outside the predetermined confidence interval at a rate that is greater than 100 (1− α)%.
The IW test is not investigated any further within the PSDS designs as the convolution of
the prediction error sequences is expected to increase the scan time within the predictive
logic solver of the PLC implementation. In other words, the computational complexity
of the IW test will force the PSDS designs to exceed current industry requirements for
time-interval between subsequent trip decisions.
5.3.2 Optimal alarms
Optimal alarms optimize the effective alarm-threshold for a potential threshold-crossing
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Figure 5.7: Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) space.
and the threshold-crossing event a trip occurrence. The alarms may also be considered as
various other messages, indications, and warnings that are presented to NPP operators.
The application of optimal alarm theory within NPP SDSs may then be considered as
optimal trip. More generally, the use of the term alarm within optimal alarm theory is
independent of the severity of the corresponding threshold-crossing event.
Within optimal alarm theory, the TPR and FPR metrics provide a measure by which
to compare the performance of competing prediction algorithms. For this, the ROC graph
of Figure 5.7 depicts relative trade-offs between benefits or TP outcomes and costs or FP
outcomes that correspond to the performance of statistical tests in predicting an impending
condition. The ROC space is defined between 0 and 1 on both the horizontal axis of FPR
and the vertical axis of TPR. The dashed line that divides the ROC space in upper left and
lower right triangular halves represents a fair coin-flip or a random guess between one of
two events.
The upper left half of the ROC space, e.g. “A” in Figure 5.7, represents favourable per-
formance as the high values of TPR correspond with high probability of correctly detecting
an alternate hypothesis while the low values of FPR correspond with low probability of
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incorrectly detecting an alternate hypothesis. In other words, for high values of TPR there
is high probability in predicting the alternate hypothesis given a true alternate hypothesis
condition. Alternatively, for low values of FPR there is low probability in predicting the
alternate hypothesis given the null hypothesis condition.
In contrast to high TPR with low FPR, the upper right corner of the ROC space, e.g.
“B” in Figure 5.7, represents high TPR along with high FPR. This combination of rates
indicates a rather high probability in predicting the alternate hypothesis given that the
null hypothesis condition is present, i.e. high probability of false alarm or missed trip.
Moreover, the lower left corner of the ROC space, e.g. “C” in Figure 5.7, represents low
TPR along with low FPR, or low probability in predicting the alternate hypothesis given a
true alternate hypothesis condition. It is straightforward to refer to false andmissed alarms
as Type I and Type II errors respectively, since the connotation of false or missed alarm
events is counter-intuitive with respect to the SDS application. Moreover, by specifying
error type rather than false and missed alarm, the definitions of the mistaken conditions
are directly related to the hypotheses.
Hypothesis testing metrics like TPR, FPR, and FNR make it possible to determine,
through the use of statistical tests, whether a prediction algorithm is accurate. These
hypothesis tests can then be utilized to determine whether those predictions that have
reached the TSP are: correct and an abnormal condition occurs, a true trip; are erroneous
and an abnormal condition does not occur, a false trip or Type II error, or are; erroneous
and an abnormal condition does occur, a missed trip or Type I error. The hypothesis tests
are reformulated within optimal alarm theory whereby the hypothesis is referred to as an
alarm and the eventual event is referred to as a catastrophe. Within the nuclear industry,
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these events correspond respectively to trip and abnormal conditions as follows
PTPR = P (T
′|A′b) (5.16)
PFPR = P (T
′|Ab) (5.17)
= P (reject (H0) |H0) (5.18)
PFNR = P (T|A′b) (5.19)
= P (reject′ (H0) |H1) (5.20)
PTNR = P (T|Ab) (5.21)
whereT is the trip event,Ab is the abnormal eventwith subscript “b” included to distinguish
this symbol from the alarm symbol “A” that is common within optimal alarm theory, also
•′ indicates the logical complement of the boolean variable substituted in place of •. A
false negative e predictive event is therefore the correct rejection of an abnormal condition
whereas the false positive predictive event is the incorrect predictive acceptance of a normal
condition.
Optimal alarm theory is utilized in [41] to optimize and alarm region or decision bound-
ary that results in the fewest possible false alarms for a fixed detection probability [141].
This optimization process places a constraint on the FPR while maximizing the NPV.
Within [41], optimal alarm theory is then applied to the case of a symmetric two-sided
threshold-crossing event. In other words, a parameter that is monitored and alarms on
high and low alarms that are symmetric about a mean value. In addition, Martin assumes
a steady state solution to the KF. An optimal alarm region is then calculated considering
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the probability that a threshold-crossing event will occur within a prediction window. This
probability is calculated as the complement of the intersection for the individual probabili-
ties that the threshold-crossing events do not occur within each time-step of the prediction
window. The optimal alarm region is then defined as the region within which an impending
threshold-crossing event has a probability of occurrence that is greater than some critical
value. This optimization considers the intersection of the Gaussian distributions of pre-
diction error within each time-step of the prediction window for which an approximate
solution is found. The performance of optimal alarm conditions is then compared against
red-line and predictive alarm systems in terms of TPR and FPR as well as the area under
the curve within the ROC space. It is determined that the optimal alarm system performs
better than either of the other two alarm systems.
The shutdown problem considered within this work is a one-sided threshold-crossing
problem. Rather than calculating an optimal alarm region, this work aims to identify opti-
mal predictions and corresponding time-steps within the prediction window as a function of
the TPR and FPR. This work differs from that of [41] in that the complexity of the optimal
alarm algorithm must adhere to certain constraints regarding computational power. This
work also considers the online solution of the KF for time-varying systems rather than the
simplified steady state solution of the KF. This work does not calculate the intersection
of multivariate Gaussian distributions within an online KF-based prediction algorithm, as
the computational complexity of these operations are considered beyond the capabilities
of the intended industrial computer platform or safety-PLC.
Alarm systems are accurate if the rate of correctly detected normal conditions against
all normal conditions is near to one. In other words, the TPR is approximately equal to
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one. If at the same time, the rate of correct abnormal conditions against all hypothesized
trips is at a maximum, the alarm system is said to be optimal. This rate is the NPVmetric.
This work therefore identifies the optimal or most effective of the time-steps within the
prediction window. Thus, the optimal alarm adapts the effective prediction horizon at
which predictive decisions are made.
In designing the optimal alarm, the FPR is first specified by the significance level, α,
of the statistical test where PFPR = α for a one-tailed test. This optimal range constrains
the maximum upper bound regarding the probability of Type I error or missed trip. This
constrained range is included in the ROC space of Figure 5.8. The NPV is then calculated
for each combination of time-step within the prediction window and hypothesized mean of
the prediction error. The optimal value of NPV is identified as a function of the prediction
error and error covariance. This optimization is performed as follows
PNPV [k] = max
i
(PNPV [k + i|k]) (5.22)
where PNPV is the optimal TPR within the current prediction window. The relationship
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Figure 5.8: Constrained region and optimal behaviour of the optimal alarm within the
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) space.
Since the aim of the optimal alarm is to maximize PNPV, the following limit demonstrates







Thus, the optimal alarm not only maximizes PNPV but also PTPR. By maximizing the
probability of an abnormal condition given a trip decision, the predictive decision-making
algorithm is forced to the upper left corner of the ROC space as is illustrated in Figure 5.8.
In contrast to FPR or missed trip rate, the design of NPP SDSs also considers the false
trip rate. False trip occurrences are Type II errors that are captured by the FNR metric
within hypothesis testing. Optimal alarm theory specifies a maximum FPR for Type I
errors. There is no such maximum imposed on the FNR. The relationship between NPV














TN (1− PNPV) + PNPVTP (5.26)







Thus, the optimal alarm not only maximizes PNPV and PTPR, but also minimizes Type
II errors and the FNR, PFNR. The remaining tasks as well as details regarding optimal
prediction shutdown are left to the optimal-PSDS design of Section 5.3.3.
5.3.3 Optimal-PSDS: optimal predictive shutdown system
Hypothesis testing provides a means to consider the quality of a specific prediction algo-
rithm and to optimally adapt the predictive decision-making mechanism within an ad-
vanced combined point- and interval-PSDS design. The structure of one such optimal-
PSDS design is included in Figure 5.9. This design includes the capability tomake decisions
using either point- or interval-predictions, and to select an effective prediction horizon and
prediction bias in an optimal manner. In this optimal design, the logic of the KF and CI
block are as described for the interval-PSDS design of Section 5.2.2. The statistical and
hypothesis testing block and optimal alarm functions are added to the design. The struc-
ture of the optimal-PSDS design is again a modular evolution of conventional SDS which
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Figure 5.9: KF/RLS-based optimal-predictive shutdown system (optimal-PSDS) in the
context of safety instrumented systems (SISs) with the option for activating RLS or ALMF
algorithms.
trip logic remains active within the optimal-PSDS design and is implemented as described
in Section 5.1. The addition of the optimal-prediction algorithm is, again, only able to
improve the response time of the conventional SDS.
For interval prediction with statistical testing, the measurement predictions and error
covariances are combined within the CI block of Figure 5.9 for a specific one-tailed signif-
icance level α and corresponding two-tailed significance level α. This results in a set of




, that bound the measurement predic-
tions within each time-step of the prediction window. The predictions are then processed
by one or more of the statistical tests described in Section 5.3.1. When more than one sta-
tistical test is performed, a logical function, F, for combining the multiple tests is defined
as is described in the experimental setup of Section 6.6. The statistical tests are performed
using the same significance level, α orα, that corresponds with the bounds of the confidence
interval in Section 3.4. The result of the statistical testing procedure is a subset, yˆαT , of
the confidence interval bounds including only the values from those time-steps within the
prediction window that are within the constrained region of the ROC space. The subset of
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verified bounds is defined as follows for interval-predictions
yˆ•,α
F
[k + i] =


yˆ•,α [k + i|k] if F (T•)
y [k] otherwise
, ∀i = 1, . . . ,Np (5.28)
where yˆ•,αT is a subset over the prediction window of either point-predictions or upper or
lower bounds depending on the configuration of the optimal-PSDS. The •,α notation is
included for the upper and lower bound to be indicated whereas T• indicates the chosen
test or set of tests. For point-predictions, the above equation is simplified to the following
form.
yˆF [k + i] =


yˆ [k + i|k] if F (T•)
y [k] otherwise
, ∀i = 1, . . . ,Np (5.29)
The optimal alarm then considers the identified subset of prediction values. The supremum
of the entire set of prediction values is the prediction within the constrained subset that has
the minimum value inside bound of confidence interval. Here, inside refers to the bound
being on the side of the normal operation with respect to the point-prediction, e.g. the
upper value for a low TSP. This is essentially the same functionality as the S function
provides within the interval-PSDS design. Thus, a maximum or minimum of the subset of
bound values is selected to be compared against either a high or a low TSP respectively
using the output of the S function block as in (5.4).
It is not only possible to use the optimal alarm to adapt the effective prediction horizon
but also to adapt a bias in the prediction that is to be compared against the alarm-threshold
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or TSP. For example, the statistical tests of Section 5.3.1 can be modified to consider a
mean prediction error, y˜b, that is equal to some value other than zero. For example, a mean
prediction error equal to one standard deviation in the positive and negative directions of
the measurement domain. The statistical tests are then able to provide boolean decisions
that select a subset of the time-steps within the prediction window that are satisfied for a
specific mean prediction error. The subset of the prediction window for which the predic-
tion time-steps and assumed mean prediction errors or biases are found to be valid is then
calculated as yˆy˜bF [k + i] in the form of (5.29). Moreover, the maximum NPV and therefore
TPR can be calculated for each time-step of the prediction window as well as the assumed
mean prediction biases. These concepts can even be extended to consider multiple covari-
ances and distributions other than the Gaussian distribution although these extensions are
beyond the scope of this work.
The optimal-PSDS design is the final of the PSDS designs proposed within this disser-
tation. It is the successful culmination of the methodology-related objectives outlined in
Section 1.2. By incorporating hypothesis testing within the PSDS design, the predictive
decision-making mechanism gains an awareness as to the quality of the predictions that
are being made. The decision-making mechanism is also able to monitor the occurrence of
false positive and false negative decisions, i.e. Type I and Type II errors in the predictions.
Finally, hypothesis testing provides the ability to quantify the probability that the pre-
diction algorithm is able to either correctly or incorrectly predict an impending condition
whether the shutdown procedure is activated, or otherwise.
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5.4 Summary
Three enhanced PSDS designs are developed within this chapter. In addition, a conven-
tional SDS design is also presented. Each of the PSDS design includes a conventional SDS
mechanism as a backup to the predictive decision-making algorithm. The following is a
summary of each individual PSDS design.
The first design, or point-PSDS, calculates KF-based point-predictions with the option
of utilizing the RLS disturbance estimation algorithm of Chapter 4 and the ALMF noise
covariance estimation algorithm of Chapter 3. The point-PSDS design compares each
point-prediction within the prediction window against the alarm-threshold or TSP in order
to make a predictive decision regarding an impending condition.
The second design is the interval-PSDSwhich calculates KF-based interval-predictions.
Within this design, the inner bound of the confidence interval for a specific significance level
is compared against the TSP for each time-step of the prediction window. The inner bound
is the bound that is on the normal operating side of a point-prediction, e.g. an upper bound
for a low level TSP. These inner bounds correspond to confidence levels that are greater
than 50% in the future measurement. The interval-PSDS may also make use of the RLS
and ALMF algorithms, as is the case for the point-PSDS. In fact, it is recommended that
the ALMF algorithm be implemented for the state noise covariance and levels of confidence
to have improved accuracy. This recommendation is due to the confidence interval of the
predictions being a direct function of the measurement error covariance.
The third design is the optimal-PSDS that utilizes either the point- and interval-
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predictions. The optimal alarm constrains the probability of a Type I error or missed
trip occurrence to the rate of significance level α. The prediction window is therefore
adapted to include only those time-steps or values that adhere to the aforementioned con-
straint. The optimal alarm then selects the prediction that has the maximum probability
for correctly identifying normal operating conditions. The point- or interval-prediction
of the selected time-step within the prediction horizon is compared against the TSP. The
optimal alarm process, including hypothesis testing, are developed within this chapter.





This chapter describes and distinguishes between the simulation and experimental plat-
forms that have been constructed for evaluation of the PSDS designs proposed in Chapter
5. For each of the two platforms, the conventional and predictive SDSs monitor and pre-
dict the dynamic response of the water level within the steam generator subsystem of an
NPP. The SDSs also make trip decisions regarding abnormal conditions that are related
to the steam generator system being protected. This subsystem is one of a collection of
subsystems that transmit safety parameter measurements to the NPP SDSs as reviewed in
Section 2.2.
The purpose of a steam generator within an NPP is to transfer thermal energy from the
reactor core to the turbines of an electrical generator. The steam generator also accom-
modates the conversion of thermal energy into kinetic energy while maintaining physical
separation between the coolants of the primary and secondary heat transport loops, i.e.

















Figure 6.1: U-tube steam generator with admissible range, yR.
manner, the steam generator water level is regulated within a narrow range of the steam
generator tank height between low and high TSPs. This narrow range of operation that
is considered to be valid is known as the admissible range, yR. The admissible range is
therefore the range of operation within which the steam generator water level is expected
to remain under normal operating conditions. The structure of a generic u-tube steam
generator is provided in Figure 6.1 including primary and secondary side inlets and outlets.
This steam generator form is referred to as a u-tube generator due to the heat exchanger
tubes being formed in an inverted “U” shape, as labelled in Figure 6.1.
Of the two TSPs, the high steam general level TSP prevents excess steam moisture
as this may cause damage to the turbine blades. Thus, water level measurements that
meet or exceed the high TSP cause the SDS to trigger a turbine trip. In contrast, water
level measurements that are equal to or lower than the low TSP cause the SDS to trigger
a reactor trip. This low TSP prevents the NPP from operating with reduced capability
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for removing heat from the reactor core. This low TSP also prevents the heat exchanger
u-tubes from becoming uncovered as this hazardous condition is likely to cause damage
to the heat exchanging tubes. In order to prevent these potentially hazardous conditions,
the steam generator level high (SGLH) and low (SGLL) safety parameters are included
in the SDSs of various NPP designs including SGLL within SDS1 of the CANDU reactor
design [162].
Although the SGLL trip parameter is of interest within this study, it is more often the
case that the neutronic safety parameters are used to determine SDS response time speci-
fications [163]. That said, there are three primary justifications for applying the proposed
predictive shutdown methods to the SGLL condition rather than those that correspond
with the neutronic parameters. The first justification is the complex inverse response char-
acteristic that is exhibited by the steam generator water level dynamic. In other words, the
steam generator water level has a dynamic response that is non-intuitive and potentially
difficult to forecast without the use of a mathematical model for reference. The second
justification is the vast body of literature regarding control and modelling of steam gener-
ator water level dynamics. This body of literature includes the application of predictive
algorithms to perform model-based prediction and the construction of simulation and ex-
perimental test facilities or platforms. The final justification is the ability to implement
the PSDS designs for the SGLL parameter within an actual safety PLC and physical ex-
perimental platform. The result of this implementation is the evaluation of a modern yet
computationally constrained PLC-based PSDS that monitors a real-world physical system
being protected. Thus, by considering the SGLL safety parameter, both the simulated as
well as physical or real-world performance of the PSDS algorithms are analyzed.
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Another reason for not studying the neutronic parameters is that those parameters
would require the construction of a much more elaborate experimental setup and physical
experimentation would not have been possible. In addition, the nonlinear dynamics of the
neutronic reactions within the reactor core are expected to be beyond the capabilities of
the standard KF, and may require the use of the EKF or UKF as well as a more powerful
computational platform. It is expected that these computational requirements may be
satisfied through the use of an FPGA or a graphical processing unit. These more powerful
platforms are, however, beyond the scope of this study.
The simulation and experimental platforms are illustrated in Figure 6.2a) and Figure
6.2b) respectively. The simulation platform includes discrete-time MATLAB implemen-
tations of: a magnitude and frequency scaled model of the steam generator water level
dynamic known as the Irving model; a three element proportional integral (PI) controller
for steam generator water level regulation; and conventional SDS as well as the proposed
PSDS designs. In contrast, the experimental platform replaces the simulated components
with a physical system as well as industry-standard process and safety controllers. The
physical system is known as the plate level system (PLS) with level dynamics compensated
to match a scaled form of the Irving steam generator model. For experimentation, the
three element PI closed-loop water level controller is implemented within a Siemens PCS-7
DCS and the conventional SDS and PSDS designs are implemented within a Tricon v9
triple modular redundant safety PLC. Pictures of each of the PLS, the PLC, and the DCS
are included in Figure 6.2b). Each of these components is described in more detail in the
subsequent sections of this chapter.
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Figure 6.2: The a) simulation and b) experimental platforms.
wired individually shielded twisted pair cables using industry standard 4− 20mA signals.
These signals are annotated as u and y in the experimental platform of Figure 6.2. Within
the nuclear power generating industry, safety parameter sensors and signals are physically
independent of those of the process control systems. This is especially true for the signals
that provide the safety parameters to any of the SDSs. Thus, the two sets of feedwater
flow-rate and level sensors are assumed to be wired separately. This separation is included
in Figure 6.2 with the process control set of signals indicated by an asterisk, e.g. system
input u∗ and system output or measurement, y∗. In reality, the PLS of the experimental
platform has only a single laser level sensor that measures the distance from the top of the
tank to the floating plate. It is therefore assumed within this work that the safety and
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process measurements, y and y∗, are transmitted by the same level sensor. To alleviate this
assumption, this study does consider experimental cases where the safety system input
u deviates from the process control input u∗. These case are referred to as having an
unmeasured initiating event in Chapter 7.
Upon shutdown, the trip signal, ξ, that is output by the SDS or PSDS has no effect on
steam generator water level, whether simulated or experimental. This assumption does not
hinder the ultimate objective of the trip procedure which is to activate, in a timely manner,
the insertion or injection of negative reactivity via the shutdown mechanisms, e.g. shut-off
rods or neutron poison, into the reactor core. In other words, all events that occur after the
actuation of the shutdown procedure are irrelevant to the timing analysis performed within
this study. This work does not, therefore, study of the impact that reductions in time-to-
trip have on specific safety margins. The time response for activating trip, or the shutdown
procedure, is the primary characteristic of interest within this study. Although the steam
generator water level does undergo shutdown-related manoeuvres, these manoeuvres do
not effect the insertion or injection of negative reactivity into the reactor core.
Within the simulation platform, the trip signal is captured as a boolean variable for time-
to-trip analysis. The experimental platform, however, includes two indicator lamps, one
for conventional shutdown, and one for predictive shutdown. These lamps are individually
de-energized by the Tricon v9 safety PLC when a trip condition has been detected within
the either the conventional or predictive SDS. The trip signals generated by the PLC are
also acquired as a 10-bit integer with values that represent which of the four types of trip
are active: conventional, point-predictive, interval-predictive, or optimal-predictive.
The remainder of this chapter presents details regarding the design and implementation
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of each component within the simulation and experimental platforms. The chapter begins
with a description of the physical experimental plant or PLS in Section 6.1. Section 6.2
then introduces the steam generator subsystem that is the system being protected studied
throughout the remainder of this dissertation work. Section 6.2 also introduces the open-
loop dynamic response of the steam generator water level. Section 6.3 discusses closed-loop
control of the steam generator water level while the scenarios or operating modes under
which the shutdown systems are tested are discussed in Section 6.4. The initiating events
that cause abnormal conditions or thewater level to drop to the SGLLTSPwithin the steam
generator of the simulation and experimental platforms are then discussed in Section 6.5
respectively. The chapter then concludes by presenting the considerations for implementing
the SDS and PSDS designs. This final section also discusses expectations regarding the
performance of the SDS and proposed PSDSs within the simulations and experiments of
Chapter 7.
6.1 Physical System
The original purpose for constructing the PLS was to allow for the testing of various control
system algorithms and industrial communication protocols using modern DCS and PLC
platforms. Mechanically, the PLS consists of a cylindrical tank containing an aluminum
plate that is manoeuvred vertically along a central rod by changes in pressure within the
volume of air below the plate. Operationally, the plate level is controlled by manipulating
a solenoid valve which affects the feed air flow-rate into the bottom of the tank. Further,






































Figure 6.3: Functional diagram of the physical plate level system (PLS) in the a) nominal
and b) compensated, or modified, form.
system.
A picture of the PLS is included in the experimental setup of Figure 6.2. In addition, a
more detailed functional diagram of the original or nominal PLS provided in Figure 6.3a).
The PLS of Figure 6.3a) includes a solenoid valve driver or signal amplifier that converts
the 4 − 20mA signals to pulse width modulated (PWM) signals that are appropriate for
manipulating the solenoid valve. Figure 6.3a) also includes the pressures in pounds per
square inch (PSI) units at the supply and the regulator as well as the atmospheric pressure
(ATM) at the outer side of the vent orifice.
The dynamic response of the nominal PLS is that of a single integrator requiring an
offset input for steady state operation. In other words, the plate will steadily rise or fall
given the feed air flow-rate input deviates from a particular value at which the plate floats.
The PLS can therefore be thought of as a water tank with a leak of constant flow-rate. For
the purpose of this research, the single integrator dynamic response of the plate level is
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modified, or compensated, to mimic an industry-standard model of steam generator water
level response known as the Irving steam generator model. This matching of dynamic
water level response is achieved through the design and implementation of an open-loop
compensator within a Microchip PIC micro-controller (µC). The µC is installed in-line
with the control signal to the solenoid valve driver of the feed air valve.
The open-loop compensator introduces a second manipulated variable and imposes
a more complex non-minimum phase, or inverse response, characteristic within the level
dynamics of the PLS. The feedwater and steam flow-rate signals are combined within the
compensating µC after being output from the two digital filters, Fe and Fv respectively.
These filters produce a feed air flow-rate that forces the plate-level to match the level
dynamics of a scaled form of Irving steam generator model by manipulating the single feed
air flow-rate valve. Aside from compensating for the steam generator level dynamics, the
µC is also utilized to linearize the response of the nominal physical system. More precisely,
the dynamic response of the plate level has a maximum rate of falling, or decrease, that is
equivalent within the Irving model to a loss in water level of 443mm/s. Thus, the rate of
rise, or increase, is constrained not to exceed the falling rate by restricting the operating
range of feed-air valve.
Although the compensator is open-loop, it is installed within a closed-loop control sys-
tem and is therefore able to be calibrated. The calibration sequence is performed during
closed-loop control of the nominal PLS at steady state for a level set-point of 50%. During
calibration a “float” offset variable is set equal to an average of over 200 samples of the
feedwater flow-rate control signal. This calibration allows for a more accurate dynamic
response with respect to the target steam generator model. These calibrations are per-
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formed periodically to mitigate changes in the dynamic response of the nominal plant that
are caused by variations in the mechanics or temperature of the solenoid valve.
A picture of the modified PLS is included within the experimental platform of Figure
6.2. In addition, a detailed functional diagram of the modified PLS including the two
digital filters of the open-loop compensating µC is provided in Figure 6.3b). In Figure
6.2, input variable u includes both the feedwater flow-rate, qe, and steam flow-rate, qv,
manipulated variables. The feedwater flow-rate is the output of the closed-loop water level
control system whereas the steam flow-rate is a function of the current operating power
level within the NPP. Figure 6.3b) illustrates these two signals separately. The feedwater
flow-rate, steam flow-rate, and plate-level signals form the basic requirement for steam
generator water level control. These signals also enable KF-based prediction of the open-
loop steam generator system. The additional valve that exits the top of the tank remains
closed within this work.
6.2 The Scaled-Irving Model
The dynamic response of the steam generator water level can be characterized by the
Irving steam generator model as introduced in [164]. The Irving model is a fourth-order
LPV model which exhibits a complex inverse response characteristic known as swell and
shrink [28,165]. The dynamic response of the plate level within the PLS is compensated to
match a scaled form of the Irvingmodel. This scaling is performed in order to accommodate
the size and dynamic response of the nominal PLS. The scaled-Irving model is defined in
the following frequency domain LPV transfer function that includes the standard Irving
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Table 6.1: Irving model parameters, steam flow-rates as well as control intervals, and
controller gains at specific power levels.
Θ (%) 5 15 30 50 100
qv(kg/s) 57.4 180.8 381.7 660 1435
G1 0.058
G2 9.63 4.46 1.83 1.05 0.47
G3 0.181 0.226 0.310 0.215 0.105
τ1 41.9 26.3 43.4 34.8 28.6
τ2 48.4 21.5 4.5 3.6 3.4
Υ 119.6 60.5 17.7 14.2 11.7
model modified by two scaling gains





















where s is the complex Laplace variable and frequency parameter, Y (s) is the water level
with units mm, Q
e
(s) is the feedwater flow-rate with units kg/s, Qv (s) is the steam flow-
rate with units kg/s, Kf is a frequency scaling gain, Km is a magnitude scaling gain, and
the remaining parameters are given in Table 6.1.
The Irving model is frequency scaled by a factor ofKf = 10 to better match the steady
state rate of change of the water level to dynamics of the plate level. This factor of frequency
scaling results in the ability to investigate the performance of the prediction algorithms for
a system with faster dynamics than those of the relatively slow steam generator water level
response. In addition to frequency scaling, the magnitude of the Irving model is scaled by
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a factor ofKm =
yR,PLS
yR
= 0.0525Kf as a function of the admissible range of the water level
within the steam generator, yR = 4000mm, and that of the PLS, yR,PLS = 210mm, as well
as the frequency scaling gain of the target steam generator,Kf = 10. The frequency scaling
gain is included in the calculation of the magnitude gain due to the frequency scaling gain
causing the magnitude of the output to be modified by a multiplicative factor of 1/Kf . The
admissible range of the steam generator water level is therefore assumed to be equivalent
to the range of plate level range within the PLS. Thus, the maximum 210mm of water
level height within the PLS is assigned the maximum range of operation within the steam
generator, i.e. 4000mm while 0mm is chosen the bottom of the admissible range for both.
The original Irving model parameters are provided in Table 6.1 as given in [164]. These
parameters are scale independent due to the inclusion of the magnitude and frequency scal-
ing gains, Kf and Km, in (6.1). The model parameters are linearly interpolated between
reactor power levels, Θ, and steam flow-rates, qv, in real-time within both the simulation
and experimental platforms. For experimentation, interpolation is performed within the
compensating µC with the two open-loop compensator filters of Figure 6.3 calculated as
Fe (s) = Y (s)HPLS (s) /Qe (s) and Fv (s) = Y (s)HPLS (s) /Qv (s), discretized with a sam-
pling time of 10ms, inverted, and subtracted from the forcing feedwater or steam flow-rate
input to ensure the stability of the modified PLS. Here,HPLS is the continuous-time trans-
fer function form of the nominal PLS. It is also possible to discretize the continuous-time
Irving steam generator and nominal PLS models and then perform the above calculations
for the digital filter directly. For more on the analytical compensation technique that was
performed to design the open-loop compensating digital filter, refer to [166].
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Figure 6.4: Open-loop response of the scaled-Irving model to a 10kg/s step increase in a)
feedwater flow-rate, q
e
, and b) steam flow-rate, qv.
or 0.5% step increase in feedwater flow-rate and also in Figure 6.4b) for a 10kg/s or roughly
0.7% step increase in steam flow-rate at each of the five operating points, power levels, or
steam flow-rates, qv, that are included in Table 6.1.
The inverse response characteristic occurs for both an increase and a decrease in either
feedwater or steam flow. For changes in feedwater flow, the characteristic is the result of
the difference in temperature between the feedwater and the inventory water. For changes
in steam flow, the characteristic is the result of the difference in pressure between the steam
and the bubbles within the inventory water. A change in either flow-rate causes bubbles
to expand and contract, hence swell and shrink. In addition, as in Figure 6.4a), the step
response due to a change in feedwater flow includes an oscillatory term. This oscillation is
the result of feedwater and condensing water mixing in the downcomer. The non-intuitive
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inverse response characteristic is the dynamic that complicates the prediction problem and
is one of the justifications for studying the SGLL safety parameter within the SDS.
Although the PLS is made to mimic the above scaled-Irving model through open-
loop compensation, the simulation platforms utilizes a discrete-time state-space form of
the scaled-Irving model. The scaled-Irving steam generator model of (6.1) is therefore
converted, as in [167], to the following continuous-time state-space representation
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Kf , x5 (t) = qe (t), Qe (s) =
Qe(s)
s+1
is a filter acting on the
feedwater valve, y (t) is the steam generator water level, qv (t) is the steam flow-rate, and
qe (t) is the feedwater flow-rate control signal.
The continuous-timemodel is thendiscretizedbybi-linear transformation to thediscrete-
timeKF-compatible state-space form of (3.9) and (3.10) where the systemmatricesA,B,C
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andD are functions of Θ rather than continuous-time t, or discrete-time k, i.e. an LPV sys-
tem. The initial condition for the state vector is assigned as x [0] = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0]′. The effects
of these initial conditions on the simulation results are eliminated, however, by allowing the
system to settle to an initial steady state operating point prior to experimentation. Thus,
any initial transient behaviour within the response of the scaled-Irving model occurs in the
time-steps prior to the plotted simulation and experimental data sets.
6.3 Closed-loop Control
This section provides a design overview for a gain scheduled three-element PI controller
to control steam generator water level [28, 165, 167, 168]. The controller is implemented
within both MATLAB as well as a DCS. The controller has three inputs: water level, y,
feedwater flow-rate, qe, and steam flow-rate, qv. The relationship between these variables
is represented in the frequency domain by following transfer function
Qe (s) =
KC (Θ) (KI (Θ) s+ 1)




KCO (Θ) (KIO (Θ) s+ 1)
2KIO (Θ) s+ 1
(R (s)− Y (s))
)
(6.5)
where R (s) is the control set-point, and the remaining parameters are given in Table 6.2.
The continuous-time controller in (6.5) is discretized with a sampling time of Ts =
100ms to satisfy the two control intervals listed as TCI in Table 6.2. The controller is then
tuned to be asymptotically stable using the gains listed in Table 6.1. In addition, the
feedwater flow-rate is limited in magnitude from 0 to 2000 kg/s and the steam flow-rate
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Table 6.2: Control intervals, and controller gains for the discretized controller within power
level operating ranges.
Θ (%) 5 15 30 50 100
qv(kg/s) 57.4 180.8 381.7 660 1435
q∗v(kg/s) 119.1 281.25 520.85 1047.5 1435
TCI (s) 0.5 0.2
KI 3.5τ2 τ2
KC 5.0 1.0
KCO 0.100 0.315 0.266 0.460 1.000
KIO 0.2KI 5.0KI
from 0 to 1435kg/s within both the simulation and experimental platform. Inputs qe and qv
are both included in the deterministic input u∗ of Figure 6.2. The discretized control logic
is programmed using structured text within a function block of the Siemens PCS-7 DCS.
The controller design also includes an additional integral gain at the level error input in
order to reduce steady state error at low power levels due to the plate level system having
a relatively large dead band surrounding the floating point. For consistency, this integral
gain is also implemented within the simulation platform.
During normal operation, the control intervals and the controller gains are selected as
a function of mid-point steam flow-rate q∗v . For example, a gain of KCO = 0.1 is active
in the steam flow-rate range 0 to 119kg/s. It is assumed that measurement and process
noise level are constant over all power levels, e.g. Rx and Ry do not change with q
∗
v . If this
assumption does not hold, the various prediction algorithms of Chapter 3 can be extended
to consider different noise levels for power level, q∗v , by substituting the assumed values into
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Figure 6.5: Swell-based set-point function, steam generator level low (SGLL) trip set-point
and level high (SGLH) alarm threshold.
The reference level of the steam generator, denoted r, is a function of the mid-point
steam flow-rates given as q∗v in Table 6.2. This set-point function is known as the swell-
based set-point function and is plotted in Figure 6.5 [165]. The use of a function rather
than a constant benefits heat transfer from the primary to secondary side of the NPP and
reduces the potential for reaching alarm levels and TSPs that are also included in Figure
6.5, e.g. the SGLL TSP denoted as Ξl.
6.4 Operating Modes
The steam generator operates within one of two manoeuvres, known as power transients,
at the time of injecting an initiating event for an eventual shutdown. The two manoeuvres
provide a realistic operating scenario for the study of SDS performance. The following
power transients are based on those studied in [28]:
a) step-wise power increase (SWPI) (5 to 40%): a series of step-increases in power
demand from 5% to 40% at steps of 5% power incrementing every 150s once above
15% and 250s otherwise; and
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b) power ramp-down (PRD) (30 to 5%): a ramp-down in power from 30% to 5% at an
approximate rate of 5% per minute.
The above percentages are with respect to full power where full power refers to both the
operating point of the nuclear reactor core and the operating point for steam flow to the
high pressure turbine otherwise referred to as the steam flow-rate. For the experimental
platform, the operating modes are programmed within a reference function block in the
Siemens controller using structured text. The scenarios are activated manually after the
PLS settles to steady state given the initial power level and water level set-point, e.g. 5%
for SWPI and 30% for PRD.
The closed-loop step responses of the two power transients are included in Figure 6.6
where ysim is the simulated steam generator water level, yexp is the experimental steam
generator water level, r is the reference water level, and Ξl is the SGLL TSP. The power
transients are initiated 10s into each scenario. Moreover, time-step zero is the time-step
at which the system has been determined to have achieved a stable steady state condition
at the initial power level. All data previous to time-step zero is omitted from the plotted
results and analyses. The closed-loop responses of Figure 6.6 demonstrate good control
performance and relatively tight control when compared with the MPC results of [28].
In addition to the above two power transients, this work also investigates the perfor-
mance of the predictive shutdown routines under the conditions of an unanticipated change
in the water level set-point. This transient is referred to as the set-point disturbance (SPD)
and is made to occur at an initial power level of 30%. The set-point steps to one of two
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Figure 6.6: Steam generator water level responses to power transients a) step-wise power
increase (SWPI) from 5% to 40%, and b) power ramp down (PRD) from 30% to 5% initiated
at 10s.
the SGLL TSP whereas the trip-SPD scenario causes the water level to only barely reach
the SGLL TSP. This operating mode differs from the power transients in that the steam
generator water level is not being forced to an abnormal condition of operation, but instead
either nearly or just reaches the TSP.
The closed-loop step response for the nontrip-SPD is included inFigure 6.7. For nontrip-
SPD, the value of the water level set-point is offset from the calculated swell and shrink
set-point of 62.24% to the near-trip value of 29.1%. In contrast, although not included in
Figure 6.7, a modified set-point of 29% is used in the alternative case that does result in a
trip condition, i.e. trip-SPD. To emphasize that the set-point offset is a disturbance, the
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Figure 6.7: Steam generator water level response to an unanticipated step change in water
level set-point at a power level of 30% with set-point made equal to 29.1% at 10s. This is
the nontrip-SPD transient.
entire duration of the simulation. The two SPD scenarios are not investigated within the
experiments of this study. Although it is possible to implement the SPD scenarios within
the experimental platform, the impact of the SPD scenarios is best observed through
simulation. The SPD scenarios are, however, recommended for future experimental study
in order to better understand the capabilities of the PSDS design with regards to false- or
spurious- and missed-trip occurrences.
6.5 Postulated Initiating Event
The power transients and set-point function of the previous sections are designed to prevent
the steam generator water level from reaching the level high and low TSPs, SGLH and
SGLL. It is therefore necessary to force the water level to the boundary between normal
and abnormal conditions. This is achieved by activating an initiating event that causes the
steam generator level to transient to the boundaries of the admissible range, beyond the
TSPs. Postulated initiating events are those which are hypothesized during or known from
the NPP design process to cause a specific trip occurrence. A postulated initiating event
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for the SGLL trip condition is the loss of feedwater flow into the steam generator. Although
this is not the only PIE for the SGLL trip condition, the loss of feedwater flow-rate has a
direct effect on the steam generator water level. This specific PIE is able to be implemented
within the physical PLS of the experimental platform as included in Figure 6.2.
The loss of feedwater PIE is also referred to as a loss of secondary side cooling. This
is due to the feedwater on the secondary side of the steam generator being at a lower
temperature than that of the inventorywithin the steamgenerator. The feedwater therefore
provides cooling to the steam generator water inventory. Without secondary side cooling,
the inventory continues to be heated by the high temperature primary side heavy water
that flows through the heat exchanger tubes at the base of the steam generator. After
some time, the temperature within the steam generator rises and more steam is produced.
The inventory within the steam generator is then reduced and the heat exchanging tubes
may become uncovered. This uncovering, in turn, results in more significant temperature
increases and the potential for damage to the steam generator tubes. It is assumed within
the Irving model, and therefore within the simulation and experimental platforms, that the
water exits the steam generator as steam only. Within an NPP, this steam is directed to
the high power turbine, discharged to the atmosphere, or re-routed to the condenser having
bypassed the turbine. In other words, within this investigation, there is no mechanism to
reduce the water level by allowing water to flow out of the steam generator tank.
For both simulation and experiment, the loss of feedwater PIE is injected by activating a
flowmalfunction within the feedwater valve of the secondary side heat transport loop. The
malfunction is realized through a linear scaling back, or reduction, of feedwater flow-rate by
1.0%/s at themanipulated variable of the closed-loop level controller. The PIEmalfunction
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is activated exactly 200s after the first power transient manoeuvre that is a step in the case
of SWPI and the first manoeuvre within the ramp of PRD. This PIE is not utilized for
the SPD transients since the SPD transient investigates predictive shutdown for a system
that is not being forced to an abnormal condition. In other words, the unanticipated
step causes the system to approach the SGLL TSP. For the experimental platform, the
PIE functionality is programmed within a PIE function block using structured text. The
PIE function block is then triggered by the aforementioned reference function block that
specifies the power transient manoeuvres.
6.6 Shutdown Systems
The PSDS designs that are proposed in Chapter 5 are compared against a benchmark
conventional SDS within the simulations and experiments of Chapter 7. This section
outlines the design criteria that are shared by each of the conventional and predictive
SDSs, e.g. TSP Ξl, or are specific to each of the predictive SDSs, e.g. prediction horizon,
Np, and significance level, α.
Most significantly, the conventional and predictive SDSs utilize a SGLL TSP, Ξl, that
is equal to 10% of the admissible range as included in Figure 6.5. This use of a constant
TSP differs from practice where the SGLL TSP is a function of the reactor power level, Θ.
Here, the TSP is held constant to reduce the complexity of analyzing the performance of
the PSDS designs. The use of a variable TSP requires that the prediction algorithms are
modified to compare predictions against an expected future TSP. Although relatively sim-
ple to implement, the expectation of the TSP introduces additional uncertainty within the
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predictive shutdown problem and is therefore beyond the scope of the current investigation.
Both the conventional and predictive shutdown algorithms are implemented without
the use of redundant shutdown channels or trip computers. For example, simulated as well
as experimental conventional shutdowns occur when the level measurement reaches 10% of
the admissible range within a single SDS logic solver; the SGLL TSPs are therefore 400mm
and 21mm for the Irving steam generator and the PLS respectively. In practice, the relay
logic of the trip chain has a k-out-of-n configuration of either local or general coincidence
as discussed in Section 2.2. This investigation instead focuses on the time response for a
single safety parameter within a single SDS channel that does not include coincidence logic.
This simplification does not impact the relevance of the results since each of the channels
within a specific SDS generally make trip decision using equivalent SDS functions or logic.
The shutdown logic that is implemented within the experimental function block for the
conventional SDS is a port of the FORTRAN code that provides the shutdown mechanism
within the Darlington NPP training simulator that is maintained by Ontario Power Gen-
eration (OPG). Upon shutdown, the trip signal at the output of the SDS is de-energized.
The comparator and TSP of the SDS function block operate with a hysteresis equal to 1%
of the admissible range of water level. The hysteresis prevents jitter within the trip signal
that is output by the comparator block as discussed in Section 5.1. The conventional SDS
comparator block is also implemented within the PSDS designs where the prediction values
are input to the comparator. In this manner, each of the prediction components is added
to the PSDS as a modular extension of the conventional SDS logic. It is recommend that
the PSDS designs of Chapter 5 include conventional SDS logic so that the safety parameter
measurements can be compared directly against the TSP. This backup conventional SDS
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function is, however, removed within the simulation and experimental results of Chapter
7 so that the performance of the prediction algorithms can be assessed independent of
conventional SDS functionality.
The PSDS designs are expected to provide trip decisions at a time which is earlier than
that of the conventional SDS. Moreover, the PSDSs are designed as modular extensions
of the conventional solution to the SDS problem. Thus, the experimental SDS and PSDS
implementations are limited to scan times or execution intervals of 100ms. This particular
scan time is chosen as it is within the design requirement for SDS1 of the CANDU NPP.
The scan times are reported within the experimental platform by the Tricon v9 safety PLC.
These time are documented for each of the conventional and predictive SDS algorithms in
Section 7.2. The simulation platform includes full implementations of each prediction and
shutdown algorithm from Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 respectively with no restrictions on
the amount of time taken to complete the required calculations. Within the experimental
platform, however, the above scan times result in the RLS estimation algorithm being
implemented in a less complex form. These and other SDS and PSDS specific design
criteria are described in the following sections.
6.6.1 Predictive shutdown, the Kalman filter, and
point-prediction
In general, each of the PSDS designs consists of a combination of the following three
components:
a) calculation of the safety parameter measurement predictions or confidence intervals
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by some form of KF-based prediction;
b) compensation of prediction error or error covariance by RLS-based estimation of
disturbances to the state and measurement equations of the prediction model; and
c) assessment of prediction quality by statistical and hypothesis testing and selection
of an optimal safety parameter prediction.
The point- or interval-predictions are then input to a comparator in the same manner
as for the conventional SDS logic and a trip decision is made. The functionality of the
PSDS therefore responds as though the prediction were a sample of the safety parameter
measurement signal.
Within all PSDS designs, the KF includes the following reduced-order state-space form
































where x3 (t) = qe (t), all other signals are defined as in (6.2) and (6.3), and all parameters
are defined in Table 6.1. This continuous-time model is then discretized by bi-linear trans-
formation to the discrete-time KF-compatible state-space form of (3.9) and (3.10) where
the system matrices A,B,C and D are functions of Θ as opposed to being functions of
time. The parameters of the state-space model are active within the KF over the range
leading up to the mid-point steam flow-rates, q∗v . Moreover, these parameters, as well as
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the deterministic input to the system, u, are assumed constant with values of time-step, k,
over the prediction window, time-steps (k + 1) to (k +Nh).
The reduced-order model of (6.6) and (6.7) is implemented in favour of the full-order
Irvingmodel to conserve computational power within the Tricon v9 safety PLC. The Tricon
v9 does not inherently support matrix operations. Thus, discrete-time implementations of
the KF equations are first realized within MATLAB. The equations are then converted to
structured text by iterating through and outputting structured text compatible equations
for each of the KF and other required matrix calculations. Use of the third rather than fifth
ordermodel, therefore, saves a significant number of addition andmultiplication operations
and allows the scan time of the safety-PLC to be reduced.
The initial conditions of the KF state estimate and state-error covariance for the
reduced-order state-space representation are respectively chosen as xˆ [0|0] = [0, 0, 0]′, and
Px˜ [0|0] = 100I3×3. The initial state value matches that of the state-space Irving model in
(6.2) and (6.3). To keep the initial conditions from affecting the simulation and experimen-
tal results, the water level response as well as the KF are allowed to settle to steady state
prior to beginning the power transient sequence. In other words, within all simulation and
experimental results, the dynamic water level response of the steam generator system as
well as KF gain are at steady state at time-step zero, k = 0. Thus, any initial transient
behaviour of the system or the KF estimates and predictions occurs in the time-steps prior
to the plotted data sets.
Output y of the scaled-Irving model is the steam generator water level. The steam
generator level signal is a standard safety parameter within SDSs, includingCANDUSDS1.
This signal is the safety parameter measurement prediction that is output by the KF
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prediction block in Figure 5.3. Input u and qv of the scaled-Irving model are the steam
generator feedwater and steam flow-rate and are the two inputs from the sensors illustrated
in Figure 5.3. In this work, it is assumed that the steam generator feedwater and steam
flow-rates are available to the SDS although this may not always be the case in practice,
and is not the case for CANDU SDS1. It is therefore assumed that the feedwater and steam
flow-rate variables are available to the SDS, or can be calculated as a function of other safety
parameters. In addition, the PLS of the experimental platform does not include a feedwater
flow-rate sensor device. The feedwater flow-rate is therefore calculated as a function of the
manipulated variable transmitted by the process controller. This assumption has little
impact on the timing study as it is likely that the process and safety instrumentation in a
NPP would have similar values for a given set of signals.
Within all PSDS designs, the KF propagates the state and state error covariance pre-
dictions to a prediction horizon of up to twenty time-steps into the future, or Nh = 20.
This horizon is equal to that 2.0s that is the expected total amount of time between the
time of trip detection and insertion of sufficient negative reactivity into the reactor core for
SDS1 of the CANDU NPP design. This study also investigates the use of various other,
shorter, prediction horizons down to three time-steps, or Nh = 3. This lower limit is one
time-step longer than the required maximum time interval between subsequent trip deci-
sions. In other words, a predictive trip detection at a prediction horizon of three time-steps
results in the shutdown procedure being activated prior to the time of detection within the
conventional SDS. In addition, within the optimal-PSDS design, the prediction window is
adapted to have an effective prediction horizon as a function prediction quality and proba-
bility of an impending abnormal condition. In the end, the ultimate objective of this work
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is tomake accurate predictions using short horizons rather than speculative and potentially
erroneous predictions using long horizons.
6.6.2 Noise covariances, stochastic uncertainty, and the
adaptive limited memory filter
It is assumed within the KF that the system being protected includes additive noise terms
within both the state andmeasurement equations as vx and vy respectively, i.e. the stochas-
tic state-space form of (3.9) and (3.9). These additive noise terms represent uncertainty
in the estimation and prediction procedure with respect to the real-world measurement
and input signals, as well as system-model mismatch, e.g. parameter error. The additive
measurement noise terms represent the variations that are present within the 4 − 20mA
signal transmitted by the laser level sensor. This noise is not, however, present within
the simulated measurements. An additive measurement noise term, vy, with covariance
Ry = 6.24mm
2 is therefore added to themeasurement equation (6.3) of the simulated steam
generator system in MATLAB. This value ofRy is estimated off-line from steady state PLS
level measurements. The measurement noise of the simulation platform therefore matches
that of the experimental platform and the above value of Ry is assumed within the KF of
both platforms.
The value of the state noise covariance for the PLS is not as easy to estimate as the
measurement noise covariance, given PLS measurements. This is due to the fact that the
true system states cannot be measured. What is known is that there exists system-model
mismatch between the dynamic response of the PLS and that of the scaled-Irving model
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and the state noise covariance is not equal to zero. Thus, the state noise covariance is
approximated by bounding the a priori measurement estimate within the first standard
deviation confidence interval of the a priori measurement error covariance. In other words,
the state noise covariance is approximated to satisfy the probability distribution of the a
priori measurement prediction error or measurement innovations. This approximation is
possible due to the a priori measurement prediction, y [k|k − 1], being a function of the
state noise covariance, Rx [k − 1], with known measurement noise covariance, Ry [k], as
defined in (3.19), (3.46), (3.47), and (3.24).
The simulation state noise covariance matrices are calculated to have the values listed
in Table 6.3 for each of the five operating ranges. These values are calculated by analyzing
the covariance of the a priori prediction error while utilizing the RLS-based measurement
disturbance estimation algorithm. More specifically, the covariance values correspond to
a 10% expansion of the measurement error covariance, Py˜, during normal operation prior
to and after a 5% step change in steam flow-rate that crosses the nominal power levels of
the five different operating points. These relatively large magnitudes in comparison to the
measurement noise variance, Ry indicate that the KF considers the provided model to be
more uncertain than the measurements.
For the simulation platform, state noise is not added to the state equation of the steam
generator system as was the case for the measurement noise. This is due to the simulation
platform already including system-model mismatch. That being said, the model mismatch
within the system is known and as a result the state noise covariances for simulation have
values that are less than those of the experimental platform. The state noise covariances
for simulation are listed in Table 6.3. These values are calculated in the same manner as for
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Table 6.3: State noise covariance estimates for use without ALMF.
Θ (%) 5 15 30 50 100
Simulation Rˆx diag(95.2) diag(96.7) diag(109.2) diag(113.9) diag(115.4)
the experimental platform but without the use of the RLS-based disturbance estimation
algorithm.
The state noise covariance also accounts for uncertainty in the effect of the future system
input, u [k + 1] on the measurement equation, as in (3.10). As for the measurement noise,
there is no noise present within the simulated system inputs. An additive input noise term,
vu, with covariance Ru = 0.624kg
2/s2 is therefore added to the system input, u [k], of
the simulated steam generator system. For experimentation, the ALMF noise covariance
estimation algorithm is utilized without estimation of the state noise covariance matrices.
The above procedures are considered to be superior to the trial-and-error approach that
is utilized in many studies for the oﬄine estimation of state noise covariance. The state
noise covariances are still, however, oﬄine estimates of time-varying parameters. These
parameters are therefore erroneous during operating conditions that are different than those
that were present when the covariances were estimated. To counteract this problem, the
ALMF procedure of Section 3.6 is utilized. The ALMF algorithm utilizes initial conditions
for the state and measurement covariances that are equal to the low power estimations of
Table 6.3. Thenoise covariance estimates for both themeasurement and state are calculated
over an estimation window of length Nv = 100. The window length for noise covariance
estimation is chosen as a function of the dynamic response and expected trajectories of
the steam generator system. In other words, the noise covariances, which change with the
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dynamics of the system, are not expected to vary significantly over a period of 10s. Noise
covariance estimation is not performed until after the KF has converged within the initial
time-steps of simulation or experiment. This delay in calculation prevents the covariances
from becoming artificially large and potentially triggering an unnecessary trip.
6.6.3 Disturbance inputs, deterministic uncertainty, and the
recursive least squared filter
In addition to the use of the KF for prediction, prediction error is compensated by RLS
estimation using (4.9). For simulation and experimentation, the disturbance is assumed




for i = [1, . . . ,Np]. Unlike for the KF, the RLS estimation in (4.9) does not support a
fully recursive implementation. For this reason, the RLS algorithm considers a specific
instance of a disturbance that initiated at time-step kw. In other words, the initialization
of the disturbance does not move forward in time at each time-step. The time-step of the
disturbance initializationmay therefore be 100 time-steps into the past, i.e. kw = (k − 100).
At the next time-step the disturbance will have initiated (k − 101) time-steps into the past.
In order to reset the disturbance initialization time-step, a dual RLS algorithm is pro-
posed in Section 4.2.4. In this configuration, a duplicate RLS algorithm performs the
same disturbance estimation as the original RLS algorithm. The disturbance estimation
algorithm then switches between the two RLS algorithms at the time-step in which the
duplicate RLS estimation and corresponding measurement prediction error estimate have
been determined to have converged to a steady state solution of a predetermined accuracy.
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]) , ∀i = 1, . . . ,Np (6.8)
where wˆ1 and wˆ2 are the duplicate disturbance estimates, and kwy,1 , kwy,2 are the time-steps
of the disturbance initialization considered by the original and duplicate RLS algorithms
respectively. Moreover, Fc is the function that determines whether or not the estimated
prediction error has converged within either the original or duplicate algorithm.
The RLS disturbance estimation algorithm is of the exponentially weighted LS form.
These weights help the algorithm to better respond to changes in the deterministic uncer-
tainty and also the changes that are due to the LTV parameters of the system. Thus,
the RLS estimation considers recently measured prediction errors more heavily. The
RLS algorithm uses a forgetting factor for the measurement disturbance estimate that








y , . . . ,λy
)
. In contrast, the state distur-





x , . . . ,λx
)
. These forgetting factor values are chosen to be very near to unity in
order to reduce the possibility of instability within the disturbance estimation procedure.
Moreover, the forgetting factor for the state disturbance responds more slowly to changes
in the disturbance than the measurement disturbance, again, to reduce the possibility for
instability within the algorithm. When combining the KF, the ALMF, and RLS filter it is
essential to consider the possibility for the three estimates to become unstable. Within this
work, the stability of the combined filter is verified first through the use of the MATLAB
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based simulation while taking into account the precision of the PLC operations. More
specifically, the functional blocks of the PLC pass single-precision floating-point values
with double-precision values utilized within the structure text of any given function block.
For experimentation, only the measurement disturbance estimation, RLSy, is imple-
mented. This reduction in functionality is due to the increased computational complexity
that would be required by the state disturbance estimation procedure. Although it is pos-
sible to implement the state disturbance estimation procedure, RLSx, within the Tricon v9
PLC, the scan time of the controller exceeded the regulatory limit of 100ms. That said, a
more directed effort that aims to optimize the arithmetic within the RLS algorithm may
result in the possibility of implementing the complete algorithm. This effort is, however,
beyond the scope of this study. The RLS-based state disturbance estimation procedure is
instead implemented and investigated alongside the measurement disturbance estimation
algorithm through simulation only.
6.6.4 Point-, interval- and optimal-predictive shutdown
system designs
The point-PSDS design calculates predictions up to a prediction horizon of Np time-steps
into the future. Two different values ofNp are investigated in Chapter 7 in order to analyze
the reduction in time-to-trip that is possible via point-predictions within the predictive
decision-making process. A point-predictive trip does not necessarily, however, occur at
the prediction horizon. This is due to the fact that any point-predicted threshold-crossing
event over the entire prediction window will result in a predictive trip, e.g. yˆ [k + 3|k] ≤ Ξl
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withNp = 10. For simulation, the point-PSDS is studied while including the ALMF-based
noise covariance estimation algorithm. The point-PSDS is also studied in combination with
the RLS-based state and measurement disturbance estimation algorithm. For experiment,
the point-PSDS is always investigated in conjunction with the RLS-based disturbance
estimation for the measurement error as well as ALMF-based estimation of the noise co-
variances. This combination of KF and RLS algorithms is necessary during experiment in
order to accommodate for deterministic uncertainty and system-model mismatch.
The interval-PSDS design shares many of the same criteria that have been established
for the point-PSDS above. For example, the interval-PSDS design calculates predictions up
to a prediction horizon of Np time-steps into the future. Moreover, a number of prediction
horizons are investigated. In addition, the confidence interval of the interval-PSDS design
has a two-sided significance level of α = 0.05 or 5%. This is equivalent to a one-tailed sig-
nificance level of α = 0.025 or 2.5%. Thus, an interval-predictive trip occurs when there is
a level of confidence equal to 97.5% in impending abnormal condition. For simulation, the
interval-PSDS is studied without modification and is also modified to include the ALMF-
based noise covariance estimation algorithm and the RLS-based state and measurement
disturbance estimation algorithm. More specifically, interval-PSDS simulation results in-
vestigate the additional functionality of ALMF-based noise covariance estimation since the
noise covariances have a direct effect on the calculated intervals. During experiment, the
interval-PSDS is again always investigated in conjunction with the RLS-based disturbance
estimation. The experimental interval-PSDS results also provide insight into the accuracy
of the predicted intervals when utilizing the ALMF noise covariance estimation algorithm.
The optimal-PSDS design operates under different criteria than those of the point- and
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interval-PSDS designs. The optimal-PSDS design makes use of statistical tests to assess
the quality of the previously calculated predictions. The simulations and experiments of
Chapter 7 use the one-tailed IB or Z test as well as the one-tailed NIS or χ2 test. The
experimental results, however, implement only the Z test. The IB test is the lower one-
tailed test since the error is defined as the measurement minus the prediction and the
decision is being made for a low-valued TSP, Ξl. These tests are described in Section 5.3.1.
In assessing prediction quality, the optimal-PSDS is able to adapt the effective prediction
horizon. Predictions are calculated to a prediction horizon ofNp time-steps into the future
and the results of the statistical tests are then utilized form a subset of the predictions that
are assessed to be of sufficient quality with respect to a given Type I error rate also known
as the FPR. The Type I error rate of this study is also the two-tailed significance level of
α = 5%. An optimal-prediction is then selected from the subset of quality predictions as a
function of the mean measurement prediction and the measurement error covariance.
The adaptive and optimized abilities of optimal alarm theory are extended to consider,
through statistical testing, whether the meanmeasurement predictions have non-zero error
or are biased. More specifically, the optimal-PSDS design not only considers each time-step
within the prediction window, but also multiple possible mean prediction biases for each of
the prediction time-steps. The biases are calculated as a function of the measurement error
covariance. For simulation and experiment, the following set of standard deviations for
possible bias are investigated, y˜b = −2,−1, 0, 1, 2, where y˜b is the set of assumed prediction




This chapter presents the assumed system, operating conditions, events, and shutdown
configurations for the simulations and experiments performed in Chapter 7. The physical
system being protected is the steam generator or boiler within the NPP. A model of the
steam generator water level is given as the Irving steam generator model. This model is
scaled in frequency and magnitude to better support an existing physical experimental
platform known as the plate level systems. The physical platform involves a plate level
being vertically manipulated along a rod within an acrylic tank. A closed-loop controller is
developed for the control of the non-minimum phase Irving steam generator model as well
as the scaled-Irving physical plate level system.
The steam generator is assumed to be operating within one of three modes. The first
two modes are common power transients for increases and decreases in the power level of
the reactor core and steam flow rate into the turbines of the electrical generator within
the NPP. More specifically, the two power transients are step-wise power increase or SWPI
and power ramp down or PRD. The third mode is an unanticipated change in the steam
generator water level set-point. This mode of operation is referred to as a disturbance in
the set-point, or SPD. An abnormal condition is forced within the steam generator as the
results of a PIE known as the loss of secondary side coolant or feedwater flow, and also
the set-point disturbance. The timing of this initiating event, and the rate of decrease in
feedwater flow are consistent over all simulations and experiments.
All SDSs, including the PSDS designs, utilize the sameTSP equal to 10% of the admissi-
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ble range of operation for the steam generator. The prediction algorithms within the PSDS
design consider a reduced-order scaled-Irving model. Moreover, the various assumptions
and initial conditions regarding the KF, the ALMF, and the RLS filter are discussed in Sec-
tion 6.6. This chapter closes by describing each of the point-, interval-, and optimal-PSDS




This chapter investigates the use of the PSDS designs that are developed in Chapter 5
within the simulation and experimental platforms of Chapter 6. More specifically, the fol-
lowing results and analyses investigate the ability of the PSDS designs to detect abnormal
conditions within a system being protected at a time which is earlier than that of a bench-
mark conventional SDS design. This investigation therefore aims to determine whether
the predictions and detections are accurate under a variety of uncertain conditions. This
investigation also aims to determine whether the enhanced PSDS designs can minimize the
occurrence of erroneous predictive decisions, i.e. spurious and false or missed trip detec-
tions. The following results are an extension of the KF/LS point-PSDS results presented
in [169].
The results of this work demonstrate that, given a short-term prediction horizon and
low uncertainty in future values of the model parameters and deterministic inputs, the
proposed predictive SDS achieves a reduced time-to-trip. Further, this work demonstrates
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that it is possible to implement the proposed PSDS design within an industry standard
safety PLC while meeting current scan time requirements, although an FPGA might be
beneficial for a multiple parameter PSDS design. Finally, although the proposed predictive
SDS takes into consideration the possibility of a spurious trip occurring, the ability of the
shutdown algorithm to compensate for an anticipated spurious trip is considered to be
beyond the scope of this dissertation. This functionality would also go against the regu-
latory requirements of initiating shutdown procedures upon detecting a safety parameter
reaching a TSP.
7.1 Simulation Results
The following simulations compare the proposed PSDS algorithms against a benchmark
conventional SDS design. The simulations are organized into separate sections where each
section investigates a specific case of uncertainty in terms of either: the model mismatch
between the true system and the predictive model provided to the KF within the PSDS;
or anomalous signals that are available within the PSDS. More precisely, the first case
includes normal conditions for the system, model, and related signals with relatively little
uncertainty. The second case, however, includes an uncertain condition regarding the
system and assumed model. The KFs of all the PSDS designs are provided the reduced-
order model introduced in Section 6.6. The additional uncertainties for each case are
specified as follows.
• Case 1: multi-model selection with ideal signal availability
• Case 2: parameter error multi-model selection with ideal signal availability
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Multi-modelmatching refers to themodel parameterswithin the prediction algorithmbeing
equal to those of the nearest operating point. This nearest operating point is a function of
the exogenous steam flow-rate input that is assumed to be available as a safety parameter
within the SDS.The parameters within theKF therefore differ from the systems parameters
that vary linearly between the operating points. Ideal signal availability specifies that both
the feedwater and steam flow-rate inputs are available to the PSDS.
Table 7.1 provides a summary of the PSDS designs that are investigated within each of
the above cases. PIEs and subsequent SGLL trip occurrences are simulated for each of the
proposed PSDS and conventional SDS methods during two normal operating modes: once
while operating within the SWPI power transient, and again while operating within the
PRD power transient. The performance of each PSDS is also studied during an unantici-
pated control manoeuvre referred to as the SPD transient. The ∗ symbol indicates that the
ALMF covariance estimation algorithm is active within all PSDS methods with the effect
of the algorithm specifically investigated for the KF-based interval-PSDS of Case 1.
The following simulation results provide insight into the performance of the proposed
PSDS designs within a controlled environment and under conditions that are not possible
within the experimental platform. Moreover, the selected operating modes and uncertain
conditions include a realistic yet broad set of conditions for evaluating the performance of
the proposed PSDS designs. Within all simulations, the time-to-trip values do not include
signal processing, relay activation, or the physical displacement of the neutron absorbing
materials, e.g. dropping of the shut-off rods or injection of neutron poison. In other words,
the processing time within the logic solver of all simulated SDSs, both conventional and
predictive, is assumed to be instantaneous.
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Table 7.1: Summary of the PSDS methods that are investigated within each simulation
case. ∗ indicates both with and without the ALMF
Case 1: reduced-order multi-model
a) KF point-PSDS
b) ,c) KF interval-PSDS∗
d) KF optimal-PSDS





The dynamic response of steam generator water level is first illustrated for a loss of
feedwater flow PIE during SWPI and PRD power transients in Figure 7.1a) and Figure
7.1b) respectively. Within these figures, y is the water level, r is the control set-point,
Ξl = 10% is the SGLL TSP, ke is the initial time-step of the PIE, kd is the time of trip
detection by the conventional SDS, and ∆kc = kd − ke is the conventional time-to-trip, or
the difference in time between the time of detection and the time at which the initiating
event was initiated.
In Figure 7.1, the SWPI and PRD power transients both begin at 10s with the PIE
injected 200s later at ke = 210s. The occurrence of the PIE results in inverse response
characteristics in addition to those that are due to only the power transient manoeuvres
as illustrated in Figure 6.6. These inverse response characteristics have a significant and
non-intuitive effect on the amount of time required for the water level to transient to the
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Figure 7.1: Benchmark: simulated conventional SGLL trip occurrences due to loss of
feedwater flow PIE during a) SWPI and b) PRD power transients.
that the level will reach the TSP in less time than for the SWPI power transient, the inverse
response characteristic causes the opposite to occur. In the following results, the PSDS
designs are expected to accurately anticipate these complex dynamic responses so as to
avoid false and missed trip occurrences.
The dynamic response of steam generator water level is also illustrated for the trip-
SPD transient in Figure 7.2. This is the response to an unanticipated step change in water
level set-point from a nominal value of 62.24% to an anomalous value of 29.0%. The trip-
SPD transient results in a response similar to that of the nontrip-SPD case as previously
illustrated in Figure 6.7 except that in this case the safety parameter reaches the SGLL
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Figure 7.2: Benchmark: simulated conventional SGLL trip occurrences due to a distur-
bance in the water level set-point from a normal value of 62.24% to an anomalous value of
29.0%.
difference in the minimum measurement value for the trip-SPD and nontrip-SPD cases.
7.1.1 Benchmark: Conventional shutdown
Conventional SDSs trip when a safety parameter measurement, y [k], reaches the corre-
sponding TSP, Ξl. This event is also referred to as a down-crossing of the steam generator
water level with the low trip threshold or TSP Ξl. Conventional time-to-trip is measured
from the time-step of injecting the PIE to the time-step when the safety parameter mea-
surement reaches the TSP.
The time-to-trip results of the simulated conventional trip occurrences are 65.7s for
SWPI and 183.9s for PRD as observed in Figure 7.1 and also 21.2s for trip-SPD as observed
in Figure 7.2. These results are the benchmarks against which the simulated PSDS time-
to-trip results are compared. For ease of reference, the benchmarks are restated along with
all other simulation results in Table 7.3 at the end of this section.
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Figure 7.3: Benchmark: time-steps surrounding conventional SGLL trip occurrences plot-
ted for a) SWPI as in Figure 7.1a), b) PRD as in Figure 7.1b), and c) trip-SPD as in Figure
7.2.
and Figure 7.2 are highlighted in Figure 7.3a), Figure 7.3b) and Figure 7.3c) respectively.
These plots provide visual verification of the time-step of conventional trip detections, kd.
This is the time-step of the down-crossing event of the steam generator water level for the
alarm-threshold that is the TSP. As expected, the conventional trip detections occur at the
same time-step in which the water level measurement reaches the SGLL TSP.
Shutdown decisions are maintained through the use of a hysteresis threshold. This trip
is prevented from deactivating as long as the variations in safety parameter measurement
remain beyond the hysteresis threshold. For example, the trip decision in Figure 7.3c) is
not reversed upon the later up-crossing event of the TSP.
The time of trip for the conventional shutdown decision and the time-to-trip are both
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affected by the variation or noise within the measurement signal. In other words, the
time of trip decision could vary by a number of time-steps depending on the magnitude
of the variance for the measurement noise. This variation in time-to-trip is not directly
analyzed within this work, but does have an effect on the benchmark analysis. This work
instead focuses on comparing single instances of conventional and predictive trip to observe
the fundamental capabilities of the predictive trip mechanisms. In addition, KF-based
prediction removes this variability by filtering the measurement signal. Depending on the
magnitude of the state and measurement noise covariances, the KF effectively reduces the
variance of the predicted signal. Thus, it is not essential to evaluate the variation in time-
to-trip to observe the relative benefits of the point-, interval-, and optimal-PSDS designs.
It is, however, recommended that a study of the variation in time-to-trip be performed
prior to implementation.
7.1.2 PSDS Case 1: Reduced-order multi-model
This first predictive shutdown case considers reduced-order multi-model matching between
the simulated scaled-Irving model and the predictive models within the KFs of the various
PSDS designs. More specifically, the model parameters of the simulated system are inter-
polated between the operating points of Table 6.1. In contrast, the model within the KF
of the PSDS uses the nearest operating point in terms of power level or steam flow-rate,
qv [k], to select the corresponding set of model parameters from Table 6.1. The nearest
power level operating points, Θ, are documented for all possible steam flow-rates in Table
7.2. The modelling conditions for this case have the least uncertainty of all the simulation
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Table 7.2: Power level selection by steam flow-rate to determine the active scaled-Irving
parameters within the KF of the PSDS.
qv(kg/s) 0-119.1 119.1-281.25 281.25-520.85 520.85-1047.5 1047.5-1435
Θ (%) 5 15 30 50 100
cases in terms of model mismatch. Moreover, all safety parameter signals including steam
and feedwater flow-rate as well as steam generator water level are made available to the
KF within the PSDS, i.e. ideal signal availability.
7.1.2.1 Case 1a: KF-based point-predictive shutdown
The KF-based point-PSDS design detects an abnormal condition when either the mean
value of the safety parameter prediction, yˆ [k + i|k] ∀i = 1, . . . ,Np, or the safety parameter
measurement, y [k], reach the corresponding TSP, Ξl. The sensor measurement is included
in the proposed trip decision-making procedure of Chapter 5 to avoid a delay in trip beyond
the trip that occurs due to a detection by the conventional SDS. Within the following
simulations, however, the point-PSDS design of Figure 5.3 is modified to include only the
predictive trip algorithm and not the conventional backup. Thus, the following simulations
evaluate the effect that the various prediction algorithms have on the time-to-trip. For
point-prediction, time-to-trip, ∆kp, is measured from the time-step of injecting the PIE to
the time-stepwhen a point-prediction reaches theTSP, i.e. a point-predicted down-crossing
of Ξl.
KF-based point-predictions are plotted alongside the dynamic response of the steam
generator water level in Figure 7.4a) and 7.4b) for a loss of feedwater flow PIE during
SWPI and PRD power transients respectively. The point-predictions are calculated to a
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prediction horizon ofNp = 3 time-steps or 0.3s into the future and are observed to follow the
dynamic response of the water level and also the expected inverse response characteristic.
The length of the selected prediction horizon allows for investigating the ability of the
KF to calculate accurate prediction at short prediction horizons. More specifically, this
prediction horizon is one time-step longer than the length of the regulated maximum time
for decision making within CANDU SDS1. In other words, the minimal prediction horizon
in order to achieve a time of trip detection that is earlier than the conventional time of
detection when the safety parameter measurement reaches the TSP. The KF-based point-
predictive time-to-trip results, ∆kp, are 65.5s for SWPI and 183.4s for PRD. Time-step
kd now represents the time of point-predictive trip detection rather than conventional trip
detection.
KF-based point-predictions are also plotted for the trip-SPDandnontrip-SPD scenarios
in Figure 7.5a) and Figure 7.5b) respectively. These point-predictions also use a horizon
of Np = 3. As in the case of the PRD and SWPI transients, the point-predictions are
observed to follow the dynamic response of the water level. The KF-based point-predictive
time-to-trip for the simulated trip occurrence is 21.0s. In contrast, there is no detection
of trip within the non-trip SPD scenario plotted in Figure 7.5b). Again, these results are
restated along with all other simulation and benchmark results in Table 7.3 at the end of
the section after all simulation cases have been presented.
The time-steps surrounding the point-predictive trip detections of Figure 7.4 andFigure
7.5 are highlighted in the four plots of Figure 7.6. These plots focus on the time of trip
detection in the same manner as for the detailed plots of the conventional results. These
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Figure 7.4: Case 1a: simulated KF-based point-predictive SGLL trip occurrences due to
loss of feedwater flow PIE during a) SWPI and b) PRD power transients under multi-model
matching conditions.
from the measurement signal. This filtering is a result of the predictions relying more on
the provided model rather than the measured safety parameters and is a function of the
state and measurement noise covariances. The covariances of these point-predictive results
are calculated by the ALMF algorithm. A balance between the model and measurement
uncertainty is observed in Figure 7.6b) where the predictions do not necessarily correspond
with the spikes in noise values. In other words, if themodel were considered to be uncertain,
a large state noise covariance, the predictions would include variations that are similar to
the noise within the measurement signal.
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Figure 7.5: Case 1a: simulated KF-based point-predictive SGLL trip occurrences due to a
disturbance in the water level set-point from a normal value of 62.24% to disturbed values
of a) 29.0%, and b) 29.1% under multi-model matching conditions.
surement reaches the TSP, denoted kc. This would be the time-step of conventional trip
occurrence if the conventional trip logic was active within the PSDS. This time-step, and
corresponding time-to-trip, are also the benchmarks against which the predictive shutdown
activations are compared.
The point-predictions of Figure 7.6 are plotted at the prediction horizon Np time-steps
after the time-step in which the predictions are calculated. The predictive trip detections,
denoted kd, are, however, illustrated at the time-step of detection, up toNp = 3 time-steps
prior to the apparent trip inducing point-prediction value. The variable time-based offset
of trip detection is due to the fact that any point-prediction within the prediction window
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Figure 7.6: Case 1a: time-steps surrounding the simulated KF-based point-predictive
SGLL trip occurrences for a) SWPI, b) PRD, c) trip-SPD, and d) nontrip-SPD under
multi-model matching conditions.
For the SWPI power transient, the point-predictive trip detection occurs Np = 3 time-
steps prior to the down-crossing of the measurement with Ξl. Point-predictive trip provides
a 0.3s improvement or reduction in time-to-trip for the SWPI power transient when com-
pared against benchmark conventional shutdown. For the PRD power transient, it is also
the point-prediction at the prediction horizon that first reaches the TSP, but in this case
the point-prediction does not coincide with the down-crossing of the safety parameter mea-
surement and the TSP. An improvement in time-to-trip of 0.5s is therefore observed during
the PRD transient when compared against conventional SDS results. For the trip-SPD
scenario, it is again the point-prediction at the prediction horizon, (kd +Np), that first
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reaches the TSP. This predictive trip event results in a 0.2s reduction in time-to-trip with
respect to the conventional SDS. Finally, in the nontrip-SPD scenario of Figure 7.6d), the
point-predictions correctly avoid a predictive trip occurrence.
In the case of Figure 7.6c), the point-predictive reaches the TSP prior to the time of
conventional trip. In Figure 7.6c) and Figure 7.6d), however, the minimum measurement
within the range of plotted measurements is observed to be less than the minimum of the
point-prediction. This discrepancy indicates that an alternate value of set-point distur-
bance may result in a missed trip occurrence causing either a delayed trip or continued
operation without a trip occurrence at all. Missed point-predictive trips may therefore
occur due to the filtering of measurement noise that is performed by the KF-based predic-
tions, i.e. the instantaneous noise values of the measurement may result in a conventional
trip occurrence. Thus, given a relatively accurate model of the system, KF-based point-
predictions favour continued operation over the activation of the shutdown procedure. In
other words, point-predictions favour productivity over safety.
Additional plots whereby the point-predictions are propagated from the KF-based esti-
mates of the current time-step, k, through to the prediction horizon, (k +Np), are included
in Figure 7.7a), Figure 7.7b), and Figure 7.7c) for SWPI, PRD, and trip-SPD transients
respectively. The sets of point-prediction propagations are plotted everyNp+2 time-steps
leading up to the interval-predictive trip detection, hence the spacing between the sets of
marked points. The propagation follows the dynamic response of the system, indicating
that the KF-based point-estimates are also accurate. The nontrip-SPD scenario is not
included in this set of plots since no impending abnormal condition was detected.
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Figure 7.7: Case 1a: KF-based point-predictions being propagated over the prediction
window, i = 0, . . . , 3, while approaching the SGLL trip occurrence during a) SWPI, b)
PRD, and c) trip-SPD transients under multi-model matching conditions.
trip detection relative to the predicted down-crossing of the TSP. More specifically, the trip
inducing point-prediction of Figure 7.7c) is observed to be the two-step-ahead, (kd + 2),
value within the prediction window rather than the value of the prediction horizon, Np.
7.1.2.2 Case 1b: KF-based interval-predictive shutdown without ALMF
The KF-based interval-PSDS design detects an abnormal condition when either the up-
per bound of the confidence interval for a safety parameter prediction, yˆu [k + i|k] ∀i =
1, . . . ,Np, or a sensormeasurement, y [k], reaches a lowTSP,Ξl. While the point-predictions
of the previous case are optimal with respect to the mean squared error of the estimations,
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the expected value of the future measurements are defined over a probability distribution.
In being defined over a probability distribution there is a percentage probability within
each time-step of the prediction window that the true measurement is either greater or
less than the point-predicted value. Thus, at the time-step of point-predictive trip there
could be as little as 50% probability that the measurement will actually reach the TSP.
The interval-PSDS design instead utilizes the confidence interval metric to attain a higher
level of confidence in an impending abnormal condition.
In the following results, the bounds of the two-tailed 95% confidence interval are used,
i.e. a significance level of α = 0.05. This is equivalent to a one-tailed confidence interval
of 97.5% and significance level α = 0.025. Thus, when the upper bound of the confidence
interval reaches the low TSP there is 97.5% probability that the future safety parameter
measurement will reach the TSP. As with point-prediction, the interval-PSDS design of
Figure 5.4 is modified for the following simulations to include only the predictive trip action
without conventional trip. Thus, interval-predictive time-to-trip, ∆kp, is measured from
the time-step of injecting the PIE to the time-step when the upper bound of the interval-
prediction reaches the TSP, i.e. a high confidence interval-predicted down-crossing of Ξl.
This is in contrast to to a low confidence interval-predicted down-crossing which would
potentially cause an increase in the false trip occurrences that are already experienced
during point-predictive trip.
The interval-PSDS design utilized in the following results does not include the ALMF
noise covariance estimation algorithm of Section 3.6. Instead, the measurement noise
covariance estimate is assumed to be equal to the true covariance, Rˆy = Ry = 6.24. The
diagonal elements of the state noise covariance are assigned the values listed in Table
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6.3, with the off-diagonal elements of the covariance assumed to be equal to zero, i.e.
Rˆx = diag (•). These values are chosen due to the actual uncertainty not being known,
e.g. model mismatch. In this manner, the model assumed within the KF is considered less
certain than the steam generator water level measurement.
The time-steps surrounding the interval-predictive trip detections are highlighted in
Figure 7.8a) and Figure 7.8b) for the SWPI and PRD power transients respectively. As
with the point-predictions, the interval-predictions are calculated to a prediction horizon of
Np = 3 time-steps or 0.3s. Moreover, the interval-predictions are plotted at the time-step
for which the predictions have been calculated, i.e. the prediction horizon Np time-steps
after the predictions are calculated. The interval-predictive time-to-trip results for the
simulated trip occurrences are 65.6s for SWPI and 184.0s for PRD.
The interval-predictions observed in Figure 7.8 demonstrate a 0.2s reduction in time-
to-trip during the SWPI power transient. In contrast, the interval-predictions fail to detect
a trip condition at an time that is earlier than that of conventional trip for the PRD power
transient where the time-to-trip is instead increased by 0.1s. This missed trip occurrence
is the result of the upper bound of the predicted confidence intervals not reaching the
TSP prior to the down-crossing of the SGLL TSP by the steam generator water level
measurement. Perhaps, if a longer prediction horizon were used, the interval would have
reached the TSP prior to the conventional trip. The interval-predictions also fail to detect
the trip condition for the trip-SPD transient since the upper bound of the confidence interval
never reaches theTSP. Thus, missed trip events occur in both Figure 7.8b) andFigure 7.8c).
These two missed trip occurrences demonstrate that the interval-PSDS favours continued





































































Figure 7.8: Case 1b: time-steps surrounding the simulated KF-based interval-predictive
SGLL trip occurrences due to a loss of feedwater flow PIE during a) SWPI and b) PRD, c)
trip-SPD, and d) nontrip-SPD transients under multi-model matching conditions without
ALMF-based noise covariance estimation.
predictions. Finally, the interval-PSDS correctly avoids the detection of an impending trip
condition as observed in Figure 7.8d) for the nontrip-SPD transient.
The confidence intervals are propagated from the KF-based estimates through to the
prediction horizon in Figure 7.9a) and Figure 7.9b) for SWPI and PRD power transients
respectively. The confidence intervals are observed to bound the measurement signal
throughout the prediction window. The confidence interval is observed to expand as the
predictions are propagated forward in time. This limited expansion is a result of the
state noise covariance being relatively small in comparison to the admissible range of the





































Figure 7.9: Case 1b: KF-based point-predictions being propagated over the prediction
window, i = 0, . . . , 3, while approaching the SGLL trip occurrence during a) SWPI, and
b) PRD power transients under multi-model matching conditions without ALMF-based
noise covariance estimation.
the state noise covariance matrix can be compared against the admissible range as follows;
√
96.7 = 9.83mm≪ 4000mm at 15% power level. The effect of the state noise, as indicated
in the previous standard deviation, is also further reduced by the state-to-measurement
matrix, C.
The following simulations investigate the effect of state noise covariance on the per-
formance of KF-based interval-predictions within the current case. Confidence intervals
for two alternate and fictitious values of state noise covariances are propagated from the
KF-based estimates through to the prediction horizon in Figure 7.10a) and Figure 7.10b)
for the SWPI power transient. The diagonal elements of the state noise covariance are
assigned respective values of Rˆx = 0.1 in the first case and Rˆx = 3120.0 in the second case
with the off-diagonal elements of the covariance set equal to zero.
In Figure 7.10a), the model that is assumed within the KF is considered to have less




































Figure 7.10: Case 1b: KF-based point-predictions being propagated over the prediction
window, i = 0, . . . , 3, while approaching the SGLL trip occurrence during an SWPI
power transient with assumed state noise covariances of a) Rˆx = diag (0.1), and b)
Rˆx = diag (3120.0).
the small value that is assumed for the state noise covariance. In contrast, the KF that is
utilized in the results of Figure 7.10b) assumes that the model is more uncertain than the
measurements. This increase in uncertainty is a result of the larger value that is assumed for
the state noise covariance. These are the two competing filtering considerations within KF-
based estimation and prediction: trust the model or trust the measurement, as discussed in
Section 3.6. In the case of shutdown, where a trip occurrence is defined as the measurement
reaching the TSP, it is beneficial to trust the measurement. That said, in this work the
noise covariances are adapted by the ALMF so that the KF may either trust the model or
measurement depending on performance of the filter.
The interval-predictive time-to-trip results for the simulated trip occurrences are 65.3s
for the relatively uncertain measurement of Figure 7.10a) and 65.9s for the relatively un-
certain model of Figure 7.10b). Neither of these results are particularly favourable since
the interval-predictions of Figure 7.10a) are erroneous with respect to the measurement,
and those of Figure 7.10b) are late with respect to the conventional SDS trip occurrence.
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That said, large uncertainty in the assumed model with respect to the measurement does
result in the one-step-ahead predictions following the measurement more closely.
For a shutdown system that is concerned with the measurement prediction problem,
more uncertainty in the model results in short term predictions that are more accurate to
the measurements. In this case, long term predictions are less likely to be accurate given
that themulti-step-ahead predictions are only based on themodelled response of the system
yet it has been decided that the model is uncertain. For interval-prediction, an increase in
model uncertainty with respect to measurement uncertainty causes increased delay in the
decision-making process. Thus, the size of the noise covariances affect the ability of the
point- and interval-PSDS design differently.
7.1.2.3 Case 1c: KF-based interval-predictive shutdown with ALMF
The following interval-predictions are calculated by including the ALMF noise covariance
estimation algorithm of Section 3.6 within the interval-PSDS design. The time-steps sur-
rounding the interval-predictive trip detections are highlighted in Figure 7.11a) and Figure
7.11b) for the SWPI and PRD power transients respectively. The interval-predictive time-
to-trip results for the simulated trip occurrences are 65.7s for SWPI and 183.7s for PRD.
The interval-predictions observed in Figure 7.11 demonstrate 0.1s and 0.2s reductions
in time-to-trip during the SWPI and PRD power transients respectively. As in the previous
case that does not utilize the ALMF algorithm, the interval-predictions again fail to detect
the trip condition for the trip-SPD transient since the upper bound of the confidence interval
never reaches the TSP. Thus, a missed trip event occurs in Figure 7.11c) for the trip-SPD





































































Figure 7.11: Case 1c: simulation of KF-based interval-predictive SGLL trip occurrences
due to a loss of feedwater flow PIE during a) SWPI, b) PRD, c) trip-SPD, and d) nontrip-
SPD transients undermulti-modelmatching conditions withALMF-based noise covariance
estimation.
in Figure 7.11d) for the nontrip-SPD transient.
The confidence intervals are propagated from the KF-based estimates through to the
prediction horizon in Figure 7.12a) and Figure 7.12b) for SWPI and PRD power transients
respectively. The confidence intervals, including the predictions up to time-step (k +Np)
bound the dynamic of the system in the majority of time-steps. This is especially true for
the SWPI power transient of Figure 7.12a)where the bounds appear to bewide in relation to
the measurement noise. This discrepancy in bounds is due, in part, to the loss of secondary





































Figure 7.12: Case 1c: examples of the KF-based interval-predictions iterating over the
entire prediction time-interval, i = 0, . . . , 3, while approaching the SGLL trip occurrence
during a) SWPI and b) PRD power transients under multi-model matching conditions with
ALMF-based noise covariance estimation.
during the SWPI power transient at the time of trip. The difference in rate of change in
water level is illustrated in Figure 7.4a) and 7.4b). In addition, the SWPI power transient
includes discontinuous steps in water level set-point that affect the accuracy of the a priori
KF-based measurement estimates with respect to the one-step-ahead measurement. The
ALMF noise covariance estimation algorithms capture these inaccuracies as uncertainty,
hence the wider bounds.
The ALMF noise covariances result in the confidence intervals of Figure 7.12 not ex-
panding over the prediction window. This absence of expansion indicates that the state
noise covariance is relatively small with respect to measurement uncertainty. The smaller
value of noise covariance aids the interval-based decision-making process in reducing time-
to-trip. These results can be compared directly against those of Figure 7.9 where a missed
trip occurred for the PRD scenario.
Although the interval-PSDS design provides the benefit of considering a higher con-
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fidence in an impending abnormal condition, the interval-based decisions tend to favour
continued operation or productivity rather than safety. The interval-PSDS design also in-
creases the rate of missed trip occurrences when compared against the point-PSDS design.
The confidence intervals of the predictions do, however provide additional information
about the probability, and these metrics may provide benefit to some safety-related appli-
cations given proper modelling as well as a thorough investigation regarding the selection
of prediction horizon.
7.1.2.4 Case 1d: KF-based optimal-predictive shutdown
TheKF-based optimal-PSDS design detects an abnormal condition by selecting an optimal
prediction horizon or bias as a function of confidence in an impending measurement for
a safety parameter prediction, yˆo [k + i|k] where i = 1, . . . ,Np, or a sensor measurement,
y [k], reaches the corresponding TSP, Ξ. Either an interval-prediction, upper or lower, or
a point-prediction may be used, although the point-predictions are recommended since
the confidence is considered through statistical testing. The selection of an optimal and
effective prediction horizon or mean bias rather allows the PSDS to consider the quality
of the previously calculated predictions. The optimal-PSDS then uses this information to
determine the quality of the current predictions.
Although the interval-predictions allow for the confidence of an impending abnormal
condition to be considered by the PSDS, the intervals are also calculated using assumed
distributions, or statistics that describe the noise. The consequence of performing open-
loop predictions with assumed probability distributions is that the prediction algorithm
is not aware as to whether or not these distributions are accurate. Thus, at the time-step
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of interval-predictive trip the PSDS could be misled into believing that the measurement
belongs within the bounds of the confidence. The optimal-PSDS design instead adapts the
mean bias of the confidence interval and the prediction horizon to optimal values given the
past performance of the prediction algorithm.
The optimal-PSDS selects a subset of the measurement predictions from within the
prediction window that are considered to be of sufficient accuracy for comparison against
the TSP. If no predictions are considered of sufficient quality or accuracy, the optimal-
PSDS resorts to comparing the measurement against the TSP. Thus, in this case of poor
prediction quality, the optimal-PSDS design regresses to the conventional SDS design.
The optimal-predictive time-to-trip is measured from the time-step of injecting the PIE
to the time-step when the either the optimal-prediction or measurement reaches the TSP,
i.e. the optimally predicted down-crossing of Ξl. The following optimal-predictions are
calculated by combining the IB and NIS tests of Section 5.3.1. Predictions are considered
of sufficient quality if both the IB and NIS tests are successful. In other words, if either of
the tests indicates that the predictions are not accurate, the corresponding prediction is
not considered within the optimal subset.
The time-steps surrounding the optimal-predictive trip detections are highlighted in
Figure 7.13 for the SWPI, PRD, and SPD transients. The interval-predictive time-to-trip
results for the simulated trip occurrences are 63.8s for SWPI, 181.7s for PRD, and 21.0s
for trip-SPD. In addition, the non-trip condition of the nontrip-SPD scenario is correctly
avoided by the optimal-PSDS design. These detailed plots illustrate the prediction that
is considered to be optimal. This optimal point-prediction is connect by a horizontal line









































































Figure 7.13: Case 1d: simulation of KF-based optimal-predictive SGLL trip occurrences
due to a loss of feedwater flow PIE during a) SWPI, b) PRD, c) trip-SPD, and d) nontrip-
SPD transients under multi-model matching conditions.
in effective prediction horizon is visible in the plotted results. The effective predictions
horizons are also denoted in the lower right corner of the individual plots as Npe .
The optimal-predictions observed in Figure 7.13 demonstrate 2.0s and 2.2s reductions
in time-to-trip during the SWPI and PRDpower transients respectively. These large values
for optimal prediction horizon indicate that the prediction algorithm is able to accurately
predict impending measurement and potential conditions. Moreover, the model provided
to the KF is likely to be accurate. The ability of the optimal-PSDS design to adapt the
prediction horizon is observed in the lines that are connected to the yˆo of Figure 7.13c) for
the trip-SPD transient. Here, the effective prediction horizon is reduced to four time-steps
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at the time of trip with only a 0.2s reduction in time-to-trip.
In utilizing point-predictions, the optimal-PSDS favours safety over continued oper-
ation. In contrast to point-prediction, however, the optimal point-prediction is not only
sufficiently accurate with respect to some significance level, but this value has an upper
maximumFPR ormissed trip rate. The optimal-PSDS alsomaximizes TPR andminimizes
FNRor false trip ratewithin the subset of selected accurate predictions. The optimal-PSDS
therefore has the advantage of considering confidence in an impending measurement value
without waiting for some function of the probability distribution to reach the alarm thresh-
old or TSP.
7.1.3 PSDS Case 2: Reduced-order multi-model with
parameter error
The second simulation case considers the same reduced-order multi-model matching be-
tween the simulated scaled-Irving model and the predictive models within the KFs of the
PSDSs as in the first case. This case also, however, includes an erroneous parameter within
the scaled-Irving model. The presence of parameter errors within the identified model
simulates the real-world condition where the model of a system is inaccurate to the true
system. These parameter errors are assumed to be a result of poor system identification
or modelling. Parameter error may also occur under an uncertain condition whereby the
parameters of the true system deviate from those that are included in the model of the
PSDS. The PSDS designs are therefore modified to include the disturbance estimation and
prediction error compensation algorithms of Chapter 4.
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More specifically, the erroneous parameter, G1 = 0.029, is assumed within the model
that is provided to the KF and RLS algorithms rather than the true parameter within
the steam generator system, G1 = 0.058. The erroneous parameter is shared across all
steam flow-rates, qv, and is selected to be one half of the value of the nominal parameter.
ParameterG1 is the gain associated with the main integrator within the dynamic response
of the system, as illustrated in (6.1). The assumed model therefore misrepresents the rate
of response of the integrator component as half the rate of the true system. The modelling
conditions for this case represent a relatively large uncertainty in terms of model mismatch.
This uncertainty adds to the reduced-order and multi-model matching uncertainties inves-
tigated in Case 1. In regards to signal availability, all safety parameter signals including
steam and feedwater flow-rate as well as steam generator water level are made available to
the KF within the PSDS. This is the same signal availability assumption as for Case 1.
7.1.3.1 Case 2a: KF-based point-predictive shutdown
The time-steps surrounding the point-predictive trip detections for the uncertain case of
parameter error are highlighted in the four plots of Figure 7.14 for the SWPI, PRD, trip-
SPD, and nontrip-SPD transients. In the case of SWPI and PRD transients in Figure
7.14a) and Figure 7.14b) respectively, the predictions are completely erroneous. Although
these results include the use of the ALMF algorithm for noise covariance estimation, the
predictions do not follow the dynamic response of the measurement. This is one of the
primary reasons for investigating the use of the RLS filter for disturbance input estimation.
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Figure 7.14: Case 2a: time-steps surrounding the simulated KF-based point-predictive
SGLL trip occurrences for a) SWPI, b) PRD, c) trip-SPD, and d) nontrip-SPD under the
model parameter error condition.
nontrip-SPD transients do not have as large a magnitude of error with respect to the future
measurements. The point-predictive trip decision is even somewhat accurate in the case
of the trip-SPD. The result is a reduction in time-to-trip equal to 0.5s. The predictive
trip decision for the nontrip-SPD transient, however, results in a false or spurious trip
occurrence. Thus, the point-predictions mislead the point-PSDS to activate the shutdown
procedure when, in fact, the system continues to operate within the boundaries of normal
operation. For accurate models and assumed statistics, it is expected that the point-
predictions favour early trip conditions or safety. Under model mismatch, this property
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Figure 7.15: Case 2a: time-steps surrounding the simulated KF-based point-predictive
SGLL trip occurrences for a) SWPI and c) trip-SPD under the model parameter error con-
dition with only ALMF-based state noise covariance estimation and constant measurement
noise covariance, Rˆy = 6.24.
increase in either spurious or missed trip rates. Thus, under the conditions of this case, the
inaccurate point predictions are detrimental to the safety critical decision making process.
One alternate idea is to force the known measurement noise covariance to be constant
and to calculate the state noise covariance using theALMFalgorithm. The result is that the
measurements are always considered to be of some predetermined constant uncertainty and
the ALMF decides the accuracy of the assumed model as Rˆx. The time-steps surrounding
the point-predictive trip detections for the uncertain case of parameter error are highlighted
in the four plots of Figure 7.15 for the SWPI and trip-SPD transients. In the case of SWPI
and trip-SPD transients in Figure 7.15a) and Figure 7.15b) respectively, the measurement
noise covariance remains constant, Rˆy = 6.24, and as a result the predictions are now more
accurate to the dynamic response of the measurement. In fact, the modified form of the
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Figure 7.16: Case 2b: time-steps surrounding the simulated KF/RLS-based point-
predictive SGLL trip occurrences for a) SWPI and b) PRD under the model parameter
error condition.
7.1.3.2 Case 2b: KF/RLS-based point-predictive shutdown
The time-steps surrounding the point-predictive trip detections for the uncertain case of
parameter error are also highlighted in the two plots of Figure 7.16 for the SWPI and
PRD power transients. These point-predictions include error compensation using the RLS
filter to estimate both a state and measurement disturbance input with an assumed model
representing a ramp input. The prediction error compensation algorithm results in point-
predictions that are more accurate than those of Figure 7.14. In fact, the KF/RLS-based
point-PSDS design performs equivalently under parameter error uncertainty to the KF-
based point-PSDS of Case 1. Reductions in time-to-trip of 0.3 and 0.5 are observed for
SWPI and PRD transients respectively. Thus, the RLS-based disturbance estimation and
prediction error compensation algorithms of Chapter 4 have been demonstrated to improve
the accuracy of the multi-step-ahead predictions within these specific transients.
The time-steps surrounding the point-predictive trip detections for the uncertain case
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Figure 7.17: Case 2b: simulated KF/RLS-based point-predictive SGLL missed-trip occur-
rence during the trip-SPD transient under the model parameter error condition.
predictions also include prediction error compensation by the RLS filter to estimate both a
state and measurement disturbance input with the assumed ramp input model. The RLS-
based disturbance estimation algorithm is unable to compensate for both the parameter
error and the disturbance in the level set-point. The result is that the point-PSDS misses
the trip condition completely. In this particular case, it is not imperative that the shut-
down system be activated since the system returns, relatively quickly, to normal operating
conditions. This event is a missed trip occurrence, however, and reveals that there is a limit
to the capabilities of the RLS-based prediction error compensation algorithm.
The RLS algorithm is only able to compensate for a subset of uncertain conditions.
These are the conditions that are compatible with the predetermined disturbance model.
Moreover, although the RLS algorithm provides prediction error compensation, the point-
PSDS design is unaware of the predicted futuremeasurement quality. In addition, although
the RLS filter is recursive, the disturbance estimation procedure must reset periodically
and therefore only considers disturbances that initiate at relatively infrequent points in
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Figure 7.18: Case 2c: time-steps surrounding the simulated KF/RLS-based interval-
predictive SGLL trip occurrences for a) SWPI and b) PRD under the model parameter
error condition.
in the presence of multiple disturbances, or even a single incompatible disturbance, the dis-
turbance estimates may not converge, and the assumed initial time-step of the disturbance
may be prevented from being reset.
7.1.3.3 Case 2c: KF/RLS-based interval-predictive shutdown
The time-steps surrounding the interval-predictive trip detections for the uncertain case of
parameter error are highlighted in the two plots of Figure 7.18 for the SWPI andPRDpower
transients. Simulation results for the trip- and nontrip-SPD transients are similar to those
of Figure 7.17 but with the bounding confidence interval values included. These interval-
predictions include error compensation using the RLS filter to estimate both a state and
measurement disturbance input with assumed model. The interval-predictive decisions
suffer from the same problems as the interval-predictions of Case 1. More precisely, the
interval-predictions again introduce a delay in activating the shutdown procedure. The
























































Figure 7.19: Case 2d: time-steps surrounding the simulated KF/RLS-based optimal-
predictive SGLL trip occurrences for a) SWPI, b) PRD, and, c) trip-SPD under the model
parameter error condition.
7.1.3.4 Case 2d: KF/RLS-based optimal-predictive shutdown
The time-steps surrounding the optimal-predictive trip detections for the uncertain case of
parameter error are highlighted in the three plots of Figure 7.16 for the SWPI, PRD, and
trip-SPD transients. Simulation results for the nontrip-SPD transient are similar to those of
Figure 7.17. These optimal-predictions are point-predictions that have been compensated
for prediction error using the RLS disturbance estimation algorithm.
In the case of the SWPI transient, the effective prediction horizon is observed to adapt
from the nominal horizon of Np = 20 to the effective horizon of Np = 6. For the PRD
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transient, the nominal horizon is maintained. Thus, each of the SWPI and PRD transients
are determined to have accurate predictions within the prediction window as specified by
the significance level and FPR, α. Reductions in time-to-trip of 0.7s and 2.1s are observed
for the SWPI and PRD transients respectively. In contrast, the optimal-PSDS reverts to
the conventional mechanism of comparing the measurement against the TSP for the trip-
SPD transient. This is due to all of the predictions within the prediction window being
considered of insufficient quality.
It is also possible for the optimal-predictions to include a set of possible mean biases in
terms of prediction error that may satisfy the corresponding hypothesis tests. The results
of Figure 7.20 consider the following set of mean biases for prediction error, [−2,−1, 0, 1, 2]
standard deviations from zero mean. The result is that the optimal-predictions are able
to adapt an estimate of mean bias in prediction error as the result of hypothesis testing
in addition to the deterministic compensation of prediction error. This is beneficial under
uncertain conditions that are not able to be accurately predicted using the combination
KF/RLS algorithm as well as the ALMF noise covariance estimation.
For the SWPI transient, the optimal-prediction has a mean prediction bias equal to−1
standard deviations of the prediction error at the time of optimal-predictive trip. Moreover,
the optimal or effective prediction horizon for this mean prediction error is equal to the
nominal full length prediction horizon, Np = 20. The point-predictions are therefore
determined by the statistical tests to have a mean bias that is best represented by a value
other than zero. In contrast, for the PRD transient, the optimal-prediction is the nominal
one of zero-mean with prediction horizon, Npe = 20 as included in Figure 7.19b). For the















































Figure 7.20: Case 2d: time-steps surrounding the simulated KF/RLS-based optimal-
predictive SGLL trip occurrences for a) SWPI, b) PRD, and, c) trip-SPD under the model
parameter error condition.
leading up to this optimal-predictive decision.
7.1.4 Summary
In Section 7.1.2, reduced time-to-trip is observed while utilizing the point-PSDS design
and a reduced-order multi-model of the system. Reductions in time-to-trip are therefore
possible given a short-term prediction horizon as well as an accurate model. The point-
predictions are found to favour early trip. Under some conditions, however, the point-
predictions favour continued operation when compared against conventional activation
of trip. This property of the point-PSDS design is due to the filtering of noise from the
measurement by the KF, hence noisy measurements may cause a trip occurrence whereas
the filtered prediction may not. A comparison of the simulated time-to-trip results against
benchmark conventional time-to-trip is provided in Table 7.3 for each configuration within
the three simulation cases.
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Table 7.3: Summary of simulation time-to-trip, kc or kp, and effective prediction horizon,
Npe , results.
∗ - a false trip occurs for nontrip-SPD
Prediction
horizon,
Time-to-trip, ∆kc|∆kp [∆kp −∆kc] (s)
Np (s) SWPI PRD trip-SPD
Conventional SDS n/a 65.8 183.9 21.2
Case 1: reduced-order multi-model

























Case 2: reduced-order multi-model with parameter error
a) KF point-PSDS 0.3 late-trip late-trip 20.7∗
[−0.5]




















The interval-PSDS design is then investigated both with and without the ALMF noise
covariance estimation algorithm. A reduction in the accuracy of the predictions with
respect to the future measurements is observed for fictitious state noise covariances. In
addition, expansion of the confidence interval over the prediction window is observed for
larger values of state noise covariance. This expansion is in contrast to the constant width of
the confidence interval for smaller covariance values. With orwithout theALMFalgorithm,
the interval-predicted trip occurrences are observed to reduce time-to-trip by less time than
the point-PSDS design. This decrease in reduction of time-to-trip is a drawback of having
increased confidence in an impending abnormal condition. In some cases, the interval-
predictive trip occurs after the conventional trip, i.e. an increase in time-to-trip rather
than a reduction. In another case, the abnormal condition is never detected by the interval
prediction. The interval-PSDS design is therefore subject to an increase in missed trip
occurrences or Type I errors. Moreover, in order to reduce time-to-trip, the interval-
predictions are required to be calculated further into the future than the point-predictions.
The optimal-PSDS combines the benefits of point-PSDS with the statistical assessment
property of the interval-PSDS. In addition, the optimal-PSDS can consider longer predic-
tion horizons without concern for inaccuracies to occur within the predictions of these far
reaching horizons. By using the point-prediction as the metric to be compared against the
TSP, the optimal-PSDS is able to match the ability of the point-PSDS to balance safety
and productivity while being aware of the quality of past multi-step-ahead predictions.
The RLS disturbance estimation algorithm is able to compensate for prediction error
given that the model of the disturbance is accurate. The error compensation performs
best for large and consistent disturbances as mentioned in the formulation of the filter in
331
Chapter 4. In addition, the RLS disturbance estimation has difficulty when more than
one uncertain condition is affecting the system. This problem was observed in Case 2a
where the dynamic response that resulted from both parameter error and the set-point
disturbance was not accurately compensated by the RLS filter.
7.2 Experimental Results
The following sections analyze the performance of a conventional SDS and the PSDS al-
gorithms of Chapter 5 when implemented within an industry-standard safety PLC. Ex-
periments are performed by subjecting the scaled-Irving PLS to a loss of feedwater flow
PIE during each of the SWPI and PRD power transients within the experimental platform
described in Chapter 6. These results provide a means for evaluating the performance of
the various PSDS methods under uncertain conditions that are common to real-world pre-
diction and forecasting problems. These results also aid in validating the simulation results
of Section 7.1. The following experimental cases are investigated within this section.
• Case 1: parameter error or model mismatch, multi-model selection with ideal signal
availability
• Case 2: parameter error or model mismatch, multi-model selection with unmeasured
initiating event
All cases utilize the reduced-order model introduced in Section 6.6. The term unmeasured
initiating event refers to a specific scenario regarding the PIE wherein the loss of feed-
water flow-rate is not measured by the SDS. In Case 2, the predictive model is therefore
being misled by measurements that indicate the feedwater flow-rate is either increasing or
332
holding steady at an erroneous flow-rate when, in actuality, the flow-rate is being reduced.
The following experiments do not include the SPD transient that was investigated in the
simulation results. Instead, the uncertain conditions of an unmeasured initiating event is
studied in combination with the parameter error that is inherent to the experimental setup
as well as most real-world applications and physical systems.
The dynamic response of the plate level is illustrated in Figure 7.21 when affected by the
PIE at 200s into each of the two power transients where Ξl = 10% and the remaining entries
are as defined in Figure 7.1. Unlike simulation, time-to-trip results for the experimental
SDS include the amount of time required for signal conditioning and decision-makingwithin
the programmable electronic system. This is due to the predictions being calculated in real-
time within the Tricon v9 PLC. As in the simulation, however, experimental time-to-trip
results do not include the amounts of time required for relay activation and rod travel or
dropping of the shut-off rods since there are no physical shutdown mechanisms included
within the experimental PLS.
7.2.1 Benchmark: Conventional shutdown
Conventional SDSs trip when a safety parameter measurement, y [k], reaches the corre-
sponding TSP, Ξl. This is the same conventional trip procedure as for the simulations.
Conventional time-to-trip is therefore measured from the time-step of injecting the PIE to
the time-step when the safety parameter measurement reaches the TSP. The experimental
SDS designs also utilize a hysteresis threshold to prevent deactivation of the trip sequence.
The experimental times-to-trip for conventional shutdown are 62.0s for SWPI and 86.0s
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Figure 7.21: Benchmark: experimental conventional SGLL trip occurrences due to loss of
feedwater flow PIE during a) SWPI and b) PRD power transients.
for PRD as plotted in Figure 7.21. These conventional time-to-trip results are the bench-
marks against which the first case of experimental predictive trip detection routines are
compared. Subsequent cases have similar benchmarks that are calculated for the specific
instance of trip initiation as well as the dynamic response of the physical system. The
reason for these separate benchmarks is the variation in the shutdown transient between
successive experimental runs. In addition, it is not possible, within the current data acqui-
sition system, to collect the decisions from each of the three PSDS designs within a single
experimental iteration. The scan time for the partial SGLL implementation of conventional
SDS within Tricon v9 is 22ms with a surplus of 78ms within the required 100ms interval.
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7.2.2 PSDS Case 1: Reduced-order multi-model with
measured PIE
This first experimental predictive shutdown case considers reduced-order multi-model
matching between the simulated scaled-Irving model and the predictive models within
the KFs of the various PSDS designs. As in the case of the simulations, the model pa-
rameters of the simulated system are interpolated between the operating points of Table
6.1. The modelling conditions for this case are therefore more uncertain than those of the
first simulation case. This added uncertainty is the result of parameter errors in the model
that is provided to the KF. These parameter errors are assumed during experimentation
since the dynamic model that represents the PLS is only a mathematical abstraction of
the actual system behaviour. All safety parameter signals including steam and feedwater
flow-rate as well as steam generator water level are made available to the KF within the
PSDS, i.e. ideal signal availability.
7.2.2.1 Case 1a: KF/RLSy-based point-predictive shutdown
The KF/RLSy-based point-PSDS design detects an abnormal condition when either the
mean value of the safety parameter prediction, yˆ [k + i|k] ∀i = 1, . . . ,Np, or the safety
parameter measurement, y [k], reach the corresponding TSP, Ξl. These point-predictions
include prediction error compensation using the RLS filter to estimate only a measurement
disturbance input with assumed ramp input model. By only utilizing the measurement
disturbance estimation algorithm, RLSy, the complexity and scan times for the PSDS
implementations are reduced. Point-predictive time-to-trip, ∆kp, is measured from the
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time-step of injecting the PIE to the time-step when a point-prediction reaches the TSP,
i.e. a point-predicted down-crossing of Ξl. As in the simulations, the point-PSDS design
of Figure 5.3 is modified to include only predictive trip activation and not the conventional
trip logic.
The time-to-trip results for experimental point-predictive shutdown are 61.4s for SWPI
and 85.8s for PRD as illustrated in Figure 7.22. The point-predictions are calculated to a
prediction horizon of Np = 5 time-steps or 0.5s for both SWPI and PRD power transients.
This prediction horizon differs from that of the simulation results in order to investigate
the ability of the KF to calculate accurate prediction at various horizons. This prediction
horizon is equal to two times the length of the regulated maximum time for decision making
within CANDU SDS1. As in the simulation results, predictive trips occur at the time-
step in that the predictions were calculated which is Np time-steps prior to the plotted
measurement predictions.
For the SWPI power transient, the point-predictive trip detection occurs two time-steps
prior to the down-crossing of themeasurement with Ξl. Point-predictive trip provides a 0.6s
improvement or reduction in time-to-trip for the SWPI power transient when compared
against benchmark conventional shutdown. The PRD power transient, on the other hand,
provides an improvement in time-to-trip of 0.2s compared against conventional SDS results.
These values of reduction are consistent with respect to the prediction horizons and also
reflect the uncertainty that is inherent in the real-world experimental prediction problem.
The scan time for the SGLL implementation of predictive SDS within Tricon v9 is 67ms
with a surplus of 33ms for a prediction horizon of Np = 5. This scan time jumps to 85ms
for the prediction horizon of Np = 20. Thus, the Tricon v9 is capable of executing the KF
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Figure 7.22: Case 1a: experimental point-predictive trip due to SGLL during power tran-
sients a) SWPI and b) PRD under model mismatch.
prediction algorithm as well as the RLS measurement disturbance estimation algorithm
within the allotted 100ms time interval. Scaling this functionality up to the full set of ten
or more safety parameters will, however, require a more powerful technological platform,
e.g. an FPGA.
7.2.2.2 Case 1b: KF/RLSy-based interval-predictive shutdown with ALMF
The KF/RLSy-based interval-PSDS design incorporates the same prediction and distur-
bance estimation algorithms as for the point-predictive case, except that the upper bound
of the interval is compared against the TSP. The time-steps surrounding the interval-
predictive trip detections under the uncertain case of parameter error are highlighted in the
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Figure 7.23: Case 1b: interval-predictive trip due to SGLL during power transients a)
SWPI and b) PRD under model mismatch.
two plots of Figure 7.23 for the SWPI andPRDpower transients. These interval-predictions
include error compensation using the RLS filter to estimate the measurement disturbance
input given an assumed model. The interval-predictions again, as in the simulation re-
sults, introduce a delay in activating the shutdown procedure. The interval-predictions
also therefore increase the missed trip rate.
Interval-predictive trip provides a 0.2s improvement or reduction in time-to-trip for
the SWPI power transient when compared against benchmark conventional shutdown.
This time of trip is 0.4s later than for the point-predictive case. In contrast, the PRD
power transient results in a missed trip occurrence with an increase in time-to-trip of 0.6s
compared against conventional SDS results. In comparing this PRD result against the
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point-predictive case, the error covariance for the predicted measurements is expected to
be relatively wide since the change in time of trip experiences a large delay. Moreover,
this large change in time-to-trip between point and interval results indicates that the error
covariance for the PRD transient is also larger than that of the SWPI transient.
7.2.2.3 Case 1c: KF/RLSy-based optimal-predictive shutdown
The experimental results of the optimal-PSDS design demonstrate a time-to-trip of 58.9s
for SWPI and 71.3s for PRD as illustrated in Figure 7.24a) and Figure 7.24b) respectively.
These are 1.3s and 0.2s less than the corresponding conventional SDS time-to-trip. The
conventional SDS against which these values are compared is not the response included in
Figure 7.21 but is rather another instance of the results with specific times tabulated in
Table 7.4. Experimental optimal-predictions are selected using only the IB or Z test, and
not the NIS test as included in the simulation results.
The effective prediction horizon,Npe for the optimal-predictions are included for SWPI
and PRD transients in Figure 7.25a) and Figure 7.25b) respectively. These plots illustrate
the adaptive nature of the effective prediction horizon. The predictions for the SWPI
transient are accurate for large prediction horizons up to a few time-steps prior to predictive
shutdown. In the case of the PRD transient, however, the effective prediction horizon is
much shorter over the entire simulation.
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Figure 7.24: Case 1c: optimal-predictive trip due to SGLL during power transients a)
SWPI and b) PRD under model mismatch.
7.2.3 PSDS Case 2: Reduced-order multi-model with
unmeasured PIE
The second experimental case considers the same reduced-order multi-model matching
between the simulated scaled-Irving model and the predictive models within the KFs of
the PSDSs as in the first experimental case. This case also includes inaccuracies in the
parameters with respect to the scaled-Irving model due to the dynamic response of the PLS
not being an exact match to the scaled-Irving model. This case does not, however, include
the assumption that all safety parameter signals, including steam and feedwater flow-rate
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Figure 7.25: Case 1c: interval-predictive trip due to SGLL during power transients a)
SWPI and b) PRD under model mismatch.
Thus, the decrease in feedwater flow-rate by 1.0%/s is an uncertain condition whereby
the feedwater valve reduces flow while the manipulated variable or safety parameter for
the feedwater flow-rate that is provided to the PSDS indicates that the flow is normal or
increasing.
7.2.3.1 Case 2a: KF/RLSy-based point-predictive shutdown
The times-to-trip for experimental point-predictive shutdown are 59.5s for SWPI and 77.3s
for PRD as illustrated in Figure 7.26. These point-predictions include error compensation
using the RLS filter to estimate the measurement disturbance input given an assumed
model. The RLS algorithm is now compensating for both parameter error as well as the
unmeasured disturbance to the system input. The point-predictions are calculated to
a prediction horizon of Np = 5 time-steps or 0.5s for both the SWPI and PRD power
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Figure 7.26: Case 2a: point-predictive trip due to SGLL during power transients a) SWPI
and b) PRD under model mismatch and unmeasured initiating event.
transients. The conventional SDS against which these values are compared is also not the
response included in Figure 7.21 but is rather another instance of the results as tabulated
in Table 7.4.
The point-predictive trip detection occurs seven time-steps prior to the down-crossing
of the measurement with Ξl for the SWPI power transient. Point-predictive trip therefore
provides a 0.7s improvement or reduction in time-to-trip for the SWPI power transient
when compared against benchmark conventional shutdown. The PRD power transient, on
the other hand, provides an improvement in time-to-trip of 2.0s compared against conven-
tional SDS results. This large value for reduction in time-to-trip for the PRD transient
indicates that the KF/RLSy-based point-predictions may not necessarily be accurate to
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the true future measurements. The result is an early trip that may not necessarily be a true
representation of the impending conditions. In other words, the RLS-based disturbance
estimation overcompensates for the unmeasured disturbance in the system input.
7.2.3.2 Case 2b: KF/RLSy-based interval-predictive shutdown with ALMF
The time-steps surrounding the interval-predictive trip detections for the uncertain case of
parameter error are included in the two plots of Figure 7.27 for the SWPI and PRD power
transients. These interval-predictions include error compensation using the RLS filter to
estimate the measurement disturbance input given an assumed model. This algorithm
is again compensating for both parameter error and the unmeasured initiating event, or
disturbance to the system input. Moreover, the interval-predictions again introduce a delay
in activating the shutdown procedure when compared against the point-predictive results.
The interval-predictions also therefore increase the missed trip rate.
Interval-predictive trip provides a 0.2s improvement or reduction in time-to-trip for the
SWPI power transient when compared against benchmark conventional shutdown. This
time of trip occurs 0.2s later than for the point-predictive case. In contrast, the PRD
power transient results in a time-to-trip that is equivalent to that of the conventional SDS
case. In comparing this result against the point-predictive case, the error covariance for the
predicted measurements must be relatively wide since the change in time of trip is large.
Again, this large change in time-to-trip between point and interval results indicates that
the error covariance for the PRD transient is also larger than that of the SWPI transient.
These results demonstrate that the interval-PSDS design is able to reduce the possibility
of false trip occurrences when the model provided to the KF does not necessarily represent
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Figure 7.27: Case 2b: interval-predictive trip due to SGLL during power transients a)
SWPI and b) PRD under model mismatch and unmeasured initiating event.
the true system.
7.2.3.3 Case 2c: KF/RLSy-based optimal-predictive shutdown
The experimental results of the optimal-PSDS design demonstrate a time-to-trip of 60.1s
for SWPI and 80.3s for PRD as illustrated in Figure 7.28a) and Figure 7.28b) respectively.
For the SWPI transient, this time of trip results in a 0.3s reduction in time-to-trip in
comparison to the corresponding conventional SDS time-to-trip. Moreover, the effective
prediction horizon for the SWPI transient at the time of optimal-predictive shutdown is
Npe = 2. For PRD, the time-to-trip is equivalent to that of the conventional SDS since the
optimal-PSDS determines that none of the predictions are of sufficient quality to compare
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Figure 7.28: Case 2c: optimal-predictive trip due to SGLL during power transients a)
SWPI and b) PRD under some model mismatch and unmeasured initiating event.
against the TSP. The conventional SDS time-to-trip results are again tabulated in Table
7.4 and are not those included in Figure 7.21.
7.2.4 Summary
The proposed PSDS designs have been successfully implemented in an industry standard
safety PLC with a scan time that meets current requirements. The results of this sec-
tion demonstrate through experiment that, given a short-term prediction horizon and low
uncertainty in the model provided to the KF as well as low uncertainty in future system
inputs, all of the proposed PSDS designs are able to achieve a reduced time-to-trip. These
reductions in time-to-trip are summarized for the experimental results in Table 7.4.
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Np (s) SWPI PRD
Case 1: reduced-order multi-model
Conventional SDS n/a 62.0 86.0








Case 1 continued: optimal-PSDS
Conventional SDS n/a 60.2 72.8






Case 2: reduced-order multi-model with unmeasured PIE
Conventional SDS n/a 59.9 79.3








Case 2 continued: optimal-PSDS
Conventional SDS n/a 60.4 80.3







In Case 1, under real-world model mismatch, the point predictive algorithm achieves
a reduction in time-to-trip. This is similar to the simulation case with model mismatch,
except that the reductions in time-to-trip are not as consistent to the prediction horizon as
in the simulation case. Moreover, the interval-PSDS is again seen to cause a delay in the
trip decision-making process.
Case 2 reveals that it is necessary to asses the quality of the predictor within the PSDS.
The point- and interval-PSDS designs become less capable of achieving a reduced time-to-
trip as the conditions under which the system is operating deviate from the true system,
environmental, and signal conditions. The optimal-PSDS, however, is able to adapt certain
properties of the predictor based on the quality of the calculated predictions. It is therefore
possible, through the use of the optimal-PSDS, to ensure that the predictions which are
compared against an alarm threshold or TSP are, in fact, accurate to the actual impending




This dissertation presents the development of predictive shutdown logic as PSDSdesigns for
use as an automatic protection system within an NPP. The developed prediction algorithm
utilizes the update and predict stages of KF-based state estimation. In this manner, the
prediction algorithm has knowledge of an assumed model of the system being protected as
well as uncertainties within the modelled system parameters and signals.
The prediction algorithm is enhanced to take into consideration time-varying model
parameters and noise characteristics. These two enhancements are achieved by incorpo-
rating ALMF noise covariance estimation as well as LS disturbance input estimation. A
recursive solution to the LS disturbance estimation problem is also formulated within this
work. The PSDS is then further enhanced to assess the quality of previously calculated
multi-step-ahead predictions through the use of statistical and hypothesis testing as well
as optimal alarm theory. By assessing prediction quality, the prediction algorithm is able
to adapt the effective prediction horizon in order to optimize the predictive trip decisions
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with respect to false and missed trip rates. The algorithmmay also be extended to consider
the mean bias in the prediction error and/or other statistical parameters that can be tested
via statistical testing.
There are three PSDS designs developed within this work. Each design is a modular
extension of the conventional logic within an existing SDS, e.g. CANDU SDS1. The
first design is the point-PSDS which calculates point-predictions and then compares the
predictions against an alarm threshold or TSP. Although the KF-based point-PSDS is
able to reduce time-to-trip, the KF-based prediction algorithm suffers from the inability
to respond to uncertain conditions during the transient to an abnormal condition. For this
reason, an ALMF-based noise covariance estimation algorithm is implemented alongside
the KF in order to take into consideration changes in the stochastic uncertainties that
are provided to the KF. Moreover, RLS-based estimation of disturbances within both the
state and measurement equations is also be implemented alongside the KF in order to
compensate for prediction errors that are deterministic. The result is a KF/RLS-based
PSDS that can respond to a predetermined set of deterministic and stochastic uncertainty
conditions. The ultimate aim of the point-PSDS design is to calculate accurate predictions
at short prediction horizons. That said, the longer the prediction horizon, the less accurate
the predictions and predictive trip decisions may become.
Due to the preemptive nature of predictive trip, predictive trip decisions that are inac-
curate generally result in false trip occurrences, i.e. a predicted abnormal condition does
not eventually occur. Increase false trip occurrences, in turn, affect the productivity of
the system being protected. The functionality of the point-PSDS design is therefore ex-
tended within the interval-PSDS design in order to counteract an increase in false trip rate.
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The interval-PSDS design calculates interval-predictions and compares either the upper
or lower bound of the confidence interval against a low or high TSP respectively. In this
manner, predictive decisions are made when there is a predetermined and increased level
of confidence in the impending abnormal conditions with respect to some predetermined
alarm threshold or TSP. Although the interval-PSDSmakes decisions with increased confi-
dence, the interval-based decisions are delayed when compared against the point-predictive
design. In some cases, the interval-PSDS may even miss a trip event entirely. This increase
in missed trip rate is opposite to that of the point-PSDS design. The KF-based interval-
PSDS suffers from the same inability to respond to uncertain conditions during transient
to an abnormal condition as the point-SDS. The interval-PSDS is also, therefore, combined
with the ALMF noise covariance estimation and RLS-based disturbance estimation and
prediction error compensation algorithms.
The point- and interval-PSDSdesigns are able tomake accurate predictive trip decisions
given that the prior knowledge provided to the algorithm is a true representation of the
actual system, environment, and signals. That said, this knowledge is often assumed,
may not necessarily be accurate, and may result in an increase in false or missed trip
rate Thus, PSDS functionality is again extended to consider prediction accuracy. The
final optimal-PSDS design can compare either the point-predictions or the bounds of the
interval-predictions against a TSP. The optimal-PSDS also, however, utilizes statistical
tests to assess the quality of previously calculated safety parameter measurements. A
subset of the time-steps within the prediction horizon are identified as being of sufficient
qualitywith respect to a significance level. In addition, the optimal-PSDSmay also consider
a set of mean prediction error values to be compared against the TSP instead of the point-
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prediction. The optimal prediction metric, either point-prediction, interval-prediction, or
mean prediction error is selected bymaximizing theTPRandminimizing the corresponding
FNR. Thus, the optimal-PSDS design limits the maximum probability of false positive
predictive trip decisions. These false positives are known as missed trip occurrences. The
optimal-PSDSdesign alsominimizes the probability of false negative trip decisions, referred
to as false trip occurrences. This functionality is preferred over both of the point- and
interval-PSDS designs due to the prediction algorithm being aware of prediction quality,
and the predictions not being delayed to achieve a certain level of confidence.
This dissertation includes analysis simulation results as well as experiment using a
Tricon v9 safety PLC. The results demonstrate that each of the proposed PSDS reduce
time-to-trip when compared against a benchmark conventional SDS. This reduction in
time-to-trip subsequently reduces the potential for a high power surge to cause damage
to the reactor core and other critical components. In other words, predictive shutdown
results in negative reactivity being inserted into the reactor core earlier than conventional
SDSs under the conditions that the system model and related uncertainty descriptions are
accurate to the true conditions of the system.
Through the use of KF-based measurement prediction and RLS-based disturbance es-
timation, the SDS now incorporates additional prior information so that the SDS can make
proactive decisions prior to conventional trip decisions. Further, the proposed KF/RLS-
based trip detection algorithm overcomes the fundamental limitations which restrict the
potential benefits of conventional SDSs. The interval-PSDS design also provides the ability
to make a trip decision given a certain level of confidence in an impending abnormal condi-
tion. Moreover, the optimal-PSDS design is able to adapt the effective prediction horizon
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and mean prediction bias as a function of true and false positive and negative events. In
other words, the decision-making mechanism within the optimal-PSDS selects a predic-
tive value that is optimal with respect to minimizing false and missed trip occurrences.
The optimal-PSDS design is also the only PSDS design whereby the prediction algorithm
makes a predictive decision that considers the accuracy or quality of the previously pre-
dicted multi-step-ahead safety parameter measurements.
8.1 Recommended future work
This dissertation presents the foundations for enhancing a NPP SDS to make predictive
decisions. These predictive decisions have been demonstrated for a single safety param-
eter within SDS1 of a CANDU NPP. It is expected that scaling the proposed prediction
algorithms to the entire SDS1 safety parameter set will require the use of a more computa-
tionally powerful industrial controller, e.g. an FPGA. In addition, the dynamic response
of the neutronics within the reactor core may require the use of nonlinear models and
non-Gaussian probability distributions. It is expected that the EKF, UKF, and particle
filters may be of use in predicting these increasingly complex dynamic responses. It is
also recommended that the LOCA rather than the loss of secondary side feedwater PIE
be investigated with respect to predictive shutdown. This recommendation is due to the
fact that LOCA PIEs have the largest peak response in safety parameter measurement and
therefore establish the limiting criteria for SDS response time.
This dissertation also presents a recursive solution to the LS disturbance estimation
problem. The disturbance estimation is not entirely recursive, however, due to the inclu-
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sion of an initiating time-step for the assumed disturbance. It is possible to formulate a
fully recursive implementation that has a rolling initial time-step of disturbance for various
disturbance profiles. These profiles and the fully recursive formulation of RLS-based dis-
turbance estimation are therefore suggested for future study. In contrast, this work makes
use of a dual alternating configuration for disturbance estimation. In order to switch be-
tween the two RLS filters, a switching function is established which detects the convergence
of parameter error compensation to the current mean error. A complete analysis of these
switching functions and the development of a more suitable approach to switching between
the two estimators are recommended. Moreover, it is recommended that a future study in-
vestigate the ability of the disturbance profile for the additive disturbances to be accurate
under non-additive parameter error disturbances. When implementing the RLS distur-
bance estimation algorithm, it is essential that the expected disturbances are compatible
with the chosen disturbance profile. It is also the case that the predictive shutdown will
provide various model- and data-based metrics and time-series that may be useful in alarm
management and operator indication although these aspects of prediction are considered
beyond the scope of this dissertation work.
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